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A law office search threatens the attorney-client relationship by
jeopardizing values protected by the fourth, fifth, and sixth amend-
ments. After reviewing recent developments that underlie the sudden
emergence of the law office search, Professor Bloom examines the
nature of this threat and suggests that the values of the attorney-
client relationship can be reconciled with the needs of law enforce-
ment by requiring the police to use a subpoena rather than a search
warrant when seeking documentary evidence from an attorney.
Professor Bloom considers whether this "subpoena preference rule"
either is required by the fourth amendment or can be implemented
by nonconstitutional means. Professor Bloom then describes how, in
the absence of such a rule, society nonetheless can accommodate the
competing interests of effective law enforcement and effective legal
representation.
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I. "COUNSELOR, WE HAVE A WARRANT TO SEARCH YOUR OFFICE"
The primary effect of the practices advocated here would be on the
legal profession itself. But it too often is overlooked that the lawyer
and the law office are indispensable parts of our administration of
justice. Law-abiding people can go nowhere else to learn the ever
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changing and constantly multiplying rules by which they must
behave and to obtain redress for their wrongs. The welfare and tone
of the legal profession is therefore of prime consequence to society,
which would feel the consequences of such a practice as petitioner
urges secondarily but certainly. **
On July 25, 1978, three St. Paul, Minnesota, police officers served attorney
David O'Connor with a warrant to search his office for various "business
records" of a client who was suspected of making false statements in an
application for a liquor license.1 The attorney, who was not considered a
suspect, persuaded the officers to permit him to seek a judicial hearing before
execution of the warrant.2 After reviewing a box of business records produced
by the attorney, the judge who initially had issued the warrant sustained its
validity and held that the attorney had failed to establish that any of the
documents were protected by either the attorney-client privilege or the work-
product doctrine. 3 The court further ordered the parties to attempt to agree
on whether any documents in the "work product file," which the court had
allowed the attorney to retain pending its ruling, were privileged.4 After the
attorney sought a writ of prohibition from the Minnesota Supreme Court, the
trial court ordered the attorney to produce the "work product file" for in
camera review. 5
In issuing the writ of prohibition, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
the search of an attorney's office is unreasonable under both the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution6 and an identical provision of
the Minnesota Constitution7 if the attorney is not a criminal suspect and the
government has no reason to believe that the attorney will destroy the
evidence sought.8 The court concluded that the search of an attorney's office
necessarily poses a serious threat to the attorney-client privilege, the work-
product doctrine, the attorney's ethical obligation of confidentiality, and the
federal and state constitutional rights to assistance of counsel. 9 The court
noted that even if the warrant describes the evidence with particularity, the
officers executing it will need to search all the files in the office in order to
locate the specified items. In the process, the officers inevitably will examine
privileged materials. 10 The court indicated that requiring law enforcement
** Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 514-15 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) (referring to civil discovery
of an attorney's work product).
1. O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 401 (Minn. 1979) (en banc). Initqally, the officers had
attempted to execute a search warrant for the specified records at a tavern. The accountant at the
establishment informed them that the items belonged to the former owners and were in the possession of
O'Connor, their attorney. Id.
2. Id. at 401-02.
3. Id. at 401.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. U.S. CorsrT. amend. IV.
7. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
8. O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d at 405. The attorney challenged the trial court's order only with
respect to the documents in the work-product file. Id. at 402. Although it did not do so, the Minnesota
Supreme Court noted that it could have avoided the constitutional issue because the attorney's office was
not searched. Id.
9. Id. at 403-05.
10. Id. at 404.
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officials to seek evidence from nonsuspect attorneys by subpoena rather than
by search warrant poses no significant risk that evidence will be lost because
attorneys are legally and ethically obligated "to preserve and protect thejudicial process."" Moreover, the absence of precedent for the law office
search convinced the court that the subpoena had proven to be an adequate
device for obtaining evidence from attorneys in the past.12 The court declared
that even if subpoenas were at times unavailable during the early stages of a
criminal investigation, the need to protect the attorney-client privilege, the
work-product doctrine, client confidentiality, and the right to counsel
outweighed the cost to effective law enforcement.' 3
O'Connor v. Johnson was the first state or federal appellate decision to
consider directly whether an attorney's office legally is subject to search. The
issue has been litigated recently in other jurisdictions. During March and
April of 1979, for example, law enforcement officials searched the offices of
three law firms in the Los Angeles area. A court enjoined the search of
Kaplan, Livingston, Goodwin, Berkowitz & Selvin, a sixty-lawyer Beverly
Hills firm, while the search was still in progress.14 An attempt to search the
Cotton & Bregman firm in Sherman Oaks was averted when the attorney
surrendered documents under seal for in camera review; the attorney then
convinced the court that the warrant was unconstitutionally general. i5
Finally, law enforcement officers removed numerous documents from anoth-
er small firm following a seven-hour search that was partially invalidated
when a court held that the warrant was overbroad and insufficiently
particular.16
In response to these incidents, the California legislature amended the
California Penal Code in September, 1979, to prohibit a magistrate from
issuing a warrant to search for documentary evidence in the possession of an
11. Id. at 405.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 256, 162 Cal. Rptr. 857, 859-60 (Ct. App.
1980). Although they did not suspect any of the firm's lawyers of complicity in criminal conduct, agents of
the California Attorney General's office executed a search warrant on March 21, 1979, at the firm's office
pursuant to a medical fraud investigation of one of the firm's clients. Id. at 256, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
While the search was still in progress, the firm obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting removal
of any documents. Id. at 256, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60. The order subsequently was replaced by a
preliminary injunction. Id. at 256, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 860. A state appellate court then issued an order
vacating the injunction or in the alternative modifying it to provide that the firm could be searched in the
future only after the trial court approved a search plan containing various protective procedures.
Deukmejian v. Superior Court, No. 55977, slip op. at I (Ct. App. May 7, 1979).
15. LA Judge Bars Search of Law Firm, Saying Warrant Was Too Broad, Nat'l L.J., June 18, 1979, at 4,
col. 1 [hereinafter LA Judge Bars Search]. Law enforcement officials served the firm with a search warrant
for medical records pertaining to a homicide investigation focusing on one of the firm's clients. Id. Police
had no reason to believe that the attorneys would behave unethically or would remove or destroy the
documents. Transcript at 6, In re Law Offices of Bregman, No. SW 15591 (L.A. Mun. Ct. Apr. 24, 1979).
The judge who initially had issued the warrant later invalidated it as overbroad. In re Search Warrant No.
SW 15591 (L.A. Super. Ct. June 4, 1979). The decision has been appealed. Letter from Theodore G.
Bregman to Lackland H. Bloom, Jr. (July 10, 1980) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
16. Work, Raids: Are Clients' Secrets Safe? Nat'l L.J., Apr. 23, 1979, at 1, 14, cols. 1, 1 [hereinafter
Work, Raids]. State investigators searched the office of attorney Edward Masry pursuant to a warrant
seeking documents pertaining to a bribery investigation in which the attorney and two of his clients
purportedly were implicated. Id. The state subsequently indicted the attorney for bribery. Nat'l L.J., Apr.
21, 1980, at 2, col. 3.
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attorney, physician, psychotherapist, or clergyman not reasonably suspected
of criminal conduct unless special protective procedures are employed. 17
These procedures include appointing a special master to conduct the search,
permitting the subject of the search to be present and to tender the evidence
voluntarily, ensuring that purportedly privileged material will be placed
under seal for transmission to the court for in camera review, and requiring
that an expedited adversary hearing will be available following the search.'8
In considering an appeal from the preliminary injunction in the Kaplan &
Livingston case, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of California
held that the state attorney general could not resume the search of the firm
unless he complied with the new legislation. 19 These cases involve neither the
first nor the only searches of lawyers' offices.20 Trial courts in Texas2' and
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(c) (West Supp. 1980). See Mandel, Law Enforcement Searches of Law
Firm Offices, 51 OKLA. B.J. 707, 708 (1980) (briefly discussing legislative history of California Penal Code
amendments).
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(c)(1)-(4) (West Supp. 1980).
19. Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 262, 162 Cal. Rptr. 857, 863 (Ct. App. 1980).
Although the court suggested that the new legislation probably cured most of the problems raised by the
bar, it nonetheless declined to pass on the constitutionality or the adequacy of the legislation because an
actual search had not been conducted pursuant to it. Id. Before declining to reach the constitutional issue,
the court cited O'Connor v. Johnson with approval. Id. at 261, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63.
20. In October, 1973, and June, 1974, FBI agents served warrants on the attorneys of two
counterculture newspapers in San Francisco in attempts to obtain letters from the August Seventh Guerilla
Movement, the Black Liberation Army, and the Symbionese Liberation Army. See Hearings on the Citizens
Privacy Protection Act Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 35, 46, 48, 56 (1978) (statement of Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney qeneral,
Criminal Division) (describing FBI attempts to obtain letters) [hereinafter Privacy Hearings]; id. at 147
(appendix to testimony of Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press) (same). It has been reported that
during the past four years, law enforcement officials searched approximately two dozen law offices in
California. Kaye, Lawyers Protest Searches of their Offices, AM. LAW., July, 1979, at 30; Searches of Law
Office Stir California Dispute, Wash. Post, May 31, 1979, § A, at 3, col. 4.
After law enforcement officers searched two law offices in Los Angeles in 1971, the District Attorney
and the Los Angeles County Bar Association agreed upon special procedures for law enforcement officers
to follow during a search of a law office. Memo from Joseph P. Busch to all Deputy District Attorneys 1-2
(Dec. 6, 1971) [hereinafter L.A. DA/Bar Guidelines] (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
In the spring of 1978, the police inArlington, Virginia, obtained a warrant to search an attorney's office
for two pawn tickets that allegedly would have incriminated a client. The attorney refused to permit the
search and filed suit against the police to enjoin its execution. Arlington J., April 7, 1978, at 1, col. 1. Law
office searches in Canada also have increased during the past decade. See Schnoor, Privilege-Solicitor &
Client - Whether Applicable to Powers of Search & Seizure, 7 MAN. L.J. 341, 345- 48 (1977) (describing
increased problem of law office searches).
21. In December, 1978, Lee Chagra, a criminal defense attorney, was shot to death in his El Paso office.
Thompson, A Judge is Murdered, Nat'1 L.J., June 25, 1979, at 1, 9, cols. 2, 1 [hereinafter Thompson].
Because the murderer apparently slipped unnoticed past the deceased's elaborate security system, he might
have been a confidant or a client. Id. Over the protests of Chagra's associates, the police sealed off the office
and examined its contents, including approximately 100 client files, over a five-day period in order to find
clues to the identity of the murderer. In re Chagra, No. 32771-243, slip op. at 2 (Tex. D. Ct., El Paso
County, Feb. 5, 1979). Local police shared the materials seized from the client files with federal
investigators. Thompson, supra, at 9. In response to a petition by the El Paso Bar Association, state District
Judge Woodrow W. Bean II conducted a court of inquiry and concluded that the search was unreasonable
under Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978), that the review of client files violated the attorney-
client privilege, and that the conduct of the police violated state statutes prohibiting "official oppression
and misconduct." In re Chagra, No. 32771-243, slip. op. at 3-5 (Tex. D. Ct., El Paso County, Feb. 5, 1979).
The court referred the matter to the county attorney for a determination of whether prosecutions of those
policemen should be brought. Id. at 5.
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Oregon22 also recently have invalidated such searches. Nevertheless, a federal
district court in New York, in considering the seizure of materials from an
attorney's office by FBI agents, refused to suppress evidence that pertained to
illegal activities of a company allegedly operating out of the office. 23 Prior to
these cases, the Supreme Court in Andresen v. Maryland24 rejected an
attorney's fourth and fifth amendment challenges to a search of his office. 25 In
doing so, the Court never suggested that it considered the practice trouble-
some or unusual. In Burrows v. Superior Court,26 however, the California
Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the search of the office of a
criminally suspect attorney presented a serious threat to the attorney-client
privilege. 27
This article first will briefly review recent developments under the fourth
and fifth amendments that appear to be largely responsible for the recent
22. On October 10, 1979, the police in Portland, Oregon, seized more than 1,000 pages of documents
from the office of Milton Stewart, a local attorney, pursuant to a warrant issued during the course of an
embezzlement investigation involving one of his clients. Ore. Judge Orders Police to Return Lawyer's
Papers, Wash. Post, Oct. 18, 1979, at § A, at 14, col. 1, [hereinafter Oregon Search]. The police had no
reason to suspect the attorney of criminal conduct. Hearings on S. 1790 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1980) (statement of Professor Stephen Kanter, counsel for Milton
Stewart) [hereinafter S. 1790 Hearings]. At the suppression hearing, the police misled the judge who issued
the warrant into believing that the attorney would not object to a seizure. Oregon Search, supra, at § A, at
14, col. 1. The attorney later testified that he had been under the impression that he would be served with a
subpoena rather than a search warrant. Id. A week later the Presiding Judge of the District Court for
Multnomah County invalidated the search on the grounds that the police had made no showing of probable
cause, the warrant failed to describe the premises or items subject to seizure with sufficient particularity,
and one of the items seized was subject to the attorney-client privilege and therefore immune from seizure
as a matter of law. In re Stewart, No. DA-180-730- 7910, slip op. at 2-3. (Or. D. Ct., Multnomah County,
Dec. 4, 1979) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
23. National City Trading Corp. v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1332, 1335 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The court
rejected an argument that the warrant was overbroad and, in reliance on Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547 (1978), concluded that the question whether the FBI had probable cause to suspect the attorney of
criminal complicity was irrelevant. 487 F. Supp. at 1335. Nonetheless, considering that the FBI had
probable cause to believe that an illegal "boiler room" commodity options business was operating out of a
suite of offices with only the attorney's name on the outer door, that the attorney provided the suspect
company with free office space, that the attorney's wife was a one-half owner of the suspect company, and
that a room in the suite outfitted with law books appeared to be the center of the "boiler room" activity, it
would seem that the FBI agents had reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, to believe that the attorney
was criminally implicated. Id. The court, however, found it unnecessary to address the issue. Id. The FBI
conducted a search in a very similar situation recently in Miami although it turned out that the attorney
was not a member of the Florida bar. Letter from Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, to Sen. Birch Bayh (May 2, 1980), reprinted in S. 1790 Hearings, supra note 22, at 68.
24. 427 U.S. 463 (1976). See notes 52-53, 202-15, 359-76 infra andaccompanying text (significance of
Andresen).
25. 427 U.S. at 470-84.
26. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974) (en banc).
27. Id. at 250-51, 529 P.2d at 598, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 174. The court held that the warrant, as interpreted
and executed, was impermissibly general under both the United States Constitution and the California
Constitution. Id. at 249, 529 P.2d at 597, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 173. In People v. Superior Court, a California
court of appeals sustained a search of an attorney's office that yielded a letter incriminating a client
suspected of murder. 68 Cal. App. 3d 845, 846, 137 Cal. Rptr. 391, 393 (Ct. App.) (1977) (per curiam).
Without explanation, however, the California Supreme Court granted an order "decertifying" the opinion,
thereby striking it from the official reports and depriving it of any precedential value. People v. Superior
Court, 19 Cal. 3d 502, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977). See also People v. Doyle, 77 Cal. App. 3d
126, 128, 141 Cal. Rptr. 639, 641 (Ct. App. 1977) (invalidating seizure of client files from attorney's office
when attorney consented to search but client did not).
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emergence of the law office search. It will then examine the nature of the
threat posed by this practice to the attorney-client relationship. The article
will suggest that the values of that relationship may be reconciled with the
needs of law enforcement by requiring that the police proceed by subpoena
rather than search warrant in situations in which they have no probable cause
to believe that the attorney either is engaged in criminal conduct or would fail
to comply with a court order requiring production of evidence believed to be
in the attorney's possession. The article then will consider whether such a
"subpoena preference rule"28 is required by the fourth amendment and, if not,
whether it can be implemented by nonconstitutional means. Finally, the
article will address the issue whether, in the absence of such a rule, the
competing interests of effective legal representation and effective law enforce-
ment nevertheless can be accommodated through adjustments to prevailing
search and seizure procedure and, if so, how such modifications should be
implemented.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE LAW OFFICE SEARCH
Many developments explain the sudden and recent emergence of the law
office search. Some would argue that this phenomenon might be part of a
campaign of harassment against defense counsel.29 Others would contend that
it is part of an even broader problem-the search of "institutional third
parties."' 30 Arguably, Watergate contributed to the increase in law office
searches by lowering the public esteem of lawyers in particular 31 and by
28. See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd per curiam, 550 F.2d
464 (9th Cir. 1977) (en banc), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). The district court articulated the rule: "In view of
the difference in degree of intrusion and opportunity to challenge possible mistakes, the subpoena should
always be preferred to a search warrant, for non-suspects." Id.
29. See Burke, Survey Digs Up Few Cases of Misconduct, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 8, 1980, at 3, cols. 1-2; Burke,
Are Lawmen Hounding Lawyers?, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 6, 1979, at 1, col. 1 (suggesting that many prosecutors
hound defense attorneys with searches, grand jury probes, wiretaps, and tax audits); Tarlow, Witness for
the Prosecution -A New Role for the Defense Lawyer, 1 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 331, 332-33 (1975) (stating
that "lawyers and their clients are threatened with increased efforts to penetrate the privacy of their
relationship").
30. Falk, Are Law Offices Safe?, BARRISTER, Spring 1979, at 17. Mr. Falk, who represented the
Stanford Daily in Zurcher, argues that acute dangers are created by allowing a search of any relatively
neutral third party or institutional third party who is likely to possess confidential information about others
in the course of its profession or business. This category includes not only attorneys, but also newspapers,
doctors, banks, accountants, private investigators, psychiatrists, hospitals, telephone companies, credit
bureaus, large employers, and security services. Id.
In addition to protecting attorneys, the recent California legislation covers professionals such as
physicians, psychotherapists, and clergymen who are the subject of evidentiary privileges in the state. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1524 (West Supp. 1980). A recent amendment to the state's penal code explicitly extends
the protection of the state reporter's shield statute to the search and seizure context, thereby partially
circumventing the decision in Zurcher. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(g) (West Supp. 1980) (providing
that no warrant shall be issued for items described in CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1980)).
Although the search of institutional third parties presents a very significant and in many respects similar
problem, this article will confine its focus to the particular issues raised by the search of an attorney's office.
31. See S. 1790 Hearings, supra note 22, at 159 (statement of Richard J. Williams, Vice President,
National District Attorneys Ass'n) ("The recent experience of Watergate had diminished the myth of the
law abiding lawyer for our time."); Burbank & Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Profession: A Survey of Boston
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increasing skepticism about the wisdom of evidentiary privileges in general. 32
Furthermore, some law enforcement officials apparently have concluded that
certain defense attorneys are withholding relevant documentary evidence,
especially in white-collar crime cases.33 Most importantly, recent constitu-
tional developments have spurred the emergence of the law office search. The
Supreme Court's rejection of the mere evidence rule along with the demise of
the private papers doctrine have contributed to the increase in law office
searches.
The Supreme Court initially developed the "private papers doctrine" in
Boyd v. United States.34 In Boyd the Court considered the constitutionality of
a statutory procedure which provided that unless the defendant in a forfeiture
proceeding produced certain business records requested by the Government,
the allegations that the Government intended to prove through the records
would be established as true.35 The Court held that this procedure constituted
an unreasonable search and seizure and that the admission of the private
records into evidence violated the privilege against self-incrimination. 36
Thirty-five years later in Gouled v. United States37 the Court held that a
search for and seizure of "mere evidence," as opposed to contraband and the
Lawyers, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 66, 66-67 (1975) (Harris Poll confirms decline of public confidence in
lawyers since Watergate); America's Lawyers: "A Sick Profession?", U. S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 25,
1974, at 25 (attorneys "feeling the fallout of suspicion generated by Watergate"); Lawyers' Watergate, N.Y.
Times, June 11, 1974, at 40, col. 1 (Watergate heightened public awareness of lawyers' misdeeds).
32. As Professor Friedenthal recently observed, "[w]e're living in an era in which everything is
supposed to be done openly and above board, and privileges are coming under a great deal of attack
generally." Margolick, N.Y. Court Limits Spouse's Privilege, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 3, 1979, at 5, col. 1 (quoting
Jack Friedenthal, Professor of Law, Stanford University). Similarly, Professor Hazard has pointed out that
"the attorney-client privilege... is not only a principle of privacy, but also a device for cover-ups." Hazard,
An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 1061, 1062 (1978).
33. See Search Warrant Fever Spreads to Calif. Firms, 65 A.B.A. J. 886-87 (1979) (quoting George
Deukmejian, Attorney General of California) (defending his policy of searching law offices to obtain
evidence against white-collar criminals) [hereinafter Search Warrant Fever]; Work, Raids, supra note 16, at
14, col. 1 (quoting James Healey, Executive Director, National District Attorneys Ass'n) (expressing
concern about lawyers "sitting on white-collar crime records, as co-conspirators"); cf. Hearings on
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1979); (statement of Richard J. Williams,
Vice President, National District Attorneys Ass'n) (third parties connected to white-collar crime have
"relationship with potential targets which could lead to the ultimate destruction of evidence") [hereinafter
Zurcher Hearings].
34. 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
35. Id. at 617.
36. Id. at 634-35. A longstanding debate has developed over whether the Court's fourth and fifth
amendment holdings were interdependent or independent. Compare Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,
472 n.6 (1976) (Boyd example of "convergence theory" of fourth and fifth amendments) and Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976) (compelling production of private papers violated both fourth and
fifth amendments) with Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. at 489 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("seizure of
private papers may violate" fifth armendment) and Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 421 n.5 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (Boyd fourth and fifth amendment holdings "independent of each other"). See
generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1(b), at
7 (1978) (discussing Boyd and its continuing validity) [hereinafter LAFAVE TREATISE]; id. § 4.13(2), at 191
(same).
37. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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fruits of crime,38 was unreasonable per se under the fourth amendment.39
Nonetheless, the Court limited and undermined both the private papers
doctrine and the mere evidence rule almost from the outset.40 The Court
discarded the mere evidence rule in 1967 in Warden v. Hayden41 and largely
eviscerated the private papers doctrine in a series of cases42 culminating in
1976 with Fisher v. United States43 and Andresen v. Maryland.44
In Fisher the Court held that an attorney could not assert his client's
privilege against self-incrimination in response to an IRS summons seeking
production of the workpapers of the client's accountant that the client
recently had transferred to the attorney,45 because the privilege is personal
and the legal compulsion was directed at the attorney, not the client.46 The
attorney-client privilege would not preclude production of these preexisting
documents unless they otherwise were privileged in the hands of the client
and had been transferred to the attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice.47 In sharp contrast to the "content" focus of the private papers
doctrine,48 however, the Court concluded that the only arguably relevant
38. The Court distinguished contraband and the fruits of crime from papers having only an
"evidentiary value" on the basis of the government's superior property interest in the former. Id. at 308-10.
Subsequently, the Court included instrumentalities used to commit crime among the objects subject to
seizure. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
39. 255 U.S. at 305-06. The extent to which Boyd was a manifestation of the "mere evidence" rule also
has been disputed. Compare Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472 n.6 (1976) (Boyd prohibited seizure
of "mere evidence") and Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976) (Boyd rule against compelling
production of private papers rested in part on "mere evidence" rule) with Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
at 490 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (mere evidence rule was, at most, only one component of private papers
doctrine) and Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 421 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("that purely
evidentiary material may have been seized" in Boyd and progeny not relied upon to establish either fourth
or fifth amendment violation).
40. See, e.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1948) (privilege against self-incrimination
cannot be invoked with respect to records that government legitimately requires person to maintain);
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944) (privilege against self-incrimination cannot be invoked
with respect to records of unincorporated labor union if it has existence independent of its membership);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906) (privilege against self-incrimination cannot be invoked by
corporation in response to subpoena for corporate documents).
For a detailed account of the dismantling of Boyd, see T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 52-64 (1969); Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimination and Private Papers in the
Burger Court, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 343, 373-82 (1980); Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and
Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REv. 945, 964-79
(1977) [hereinafter Note, Constitutionally Protected Privacy]; Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United
States (1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REv. 184 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Life and Times of Boyd].
41. See 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) ("no viable reason to distinguish intrusions to secure 'mere evidence'
from intrusions to secure fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband").
42. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1974) (partner in dissolved three-member law firm
may not invoke personal privilege against self-incrimination to justify refusal to comply with subpoena
demanding production of firm's financial records); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 331 (1973)
(taxpayer may not assert privilege against self-incrimination in response to IRS summons served on
taxpayer's accountant). In Bells the Court maintained that a sole proprietor still could assert the privilege
in response to a subpoena for his business records. 417 U.S. at 87-88.
43. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
44. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
45. 425 U.S. at 396-98.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 403-04.
48. Justice Brennan argued that the privilege against self- incrimination should depend on the private
content of the documents because "[a]n individual's books and papers are generally little more than an
extension of his person." Id. at 420 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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privilege, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, did not
apply since any admission of the existence and possession implicit in the "act
of producing" the documents was neither testimonial nor incriminating. 49
In Andresen an attorney was convicted of defrauding purchasers of real
estate after records seized from his law office pursuant to a search warrant
were admitted into evidence against him.50 The Court, in rejecting the
argument that the search and seizure of the attorney's private papers violated
his privilege against self-incrimination, reasoned that a person "is not
required to aid in the discovery, production, or authentication of incriminat-
ing evidence ' 51 when his premises are searched and consequently is not
subjected to "compulsion" contrary to the protection of the fifth amend-
ment. 52 In the process, the Court observed that any significant immunity for
private papers would hamper law enforcement and would not undermine the
policies underlying the privilege against self- incrimination. 53
Beyond Fisher and Andresen, the Supreme Court's decision in Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily54 is most responsible for the recent emergence of the law office
search. In a civil rights action prompted by the search of a college newspaper
office, a federal district court held that the fourth amendment prohibited the
police from searching the premises of a nonsuspect third party in the absence
of proof that he would fail to comply both with a subpoena and a court order
prohibiting removal or destruction of the evidence.55 Furthermore, the
district court held that if the party is a newspaper, the police must make a
"clear showing" that important materials would be destroyed or removed
49. Id. at 409 (opinion of Court). The Court reasoned that inferences concerning the existence and
possession of the documents were not testimonial since the Government did not need to rely on the
taxpayer to establish either. Id. at 409-10. Justice Brennan criticized the Court for deciding the availability
of the privilege on the strength of the Government's case. Id. at 429 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court
further determined that the act of production was not incriminating since a taxpayer legally could employ
an accountant to prepare workpapers or to deliver them to the taxpayer. Id. at 412 (opinion of Court).
Finally, it rejected the argument that compelled production would constitute an implicit authentication of
the documents. Id. at 412-13.
50. 427 U.S. at 467-69.
51. Id. at 474.
52. Id. at 477. The Court maintained that although the illegality of the Boyd search provided the
requisite compulsion, the search in Andresen was valid. Id. at 472 n.6. Justice Brennan disputed the Court's
interpretation of Boyd and argued that the compulsion inherent in a seizure pursuant to a warrant is
sufficient to violate the fifth amendment because the owner of the premises is not free to resist. Id. at 487-89
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 474-75 (opinion of Court). The Court also rejected the argument that the warrant was
impermissibly general. Id. at 478-82. For all practical purposes, the combination of Fisher and Andresen
precludes any absolute immunity for private papers under the fifth amendment and probably the fourth
amendment as well. McKenna, The Constitutional Protection of Private Papers: The Role of a Hierarchical
Fourth Amendment, 53 IND. L.J. 55, 67 (1977); Note, Constitutionally Protected Privacy, supra note 40, at
978-79; Note, Life and Times of Boyd, supra note 40, at 206-11.
54. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
55. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 132-33 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (granting plaintiff's summary
judgment motion for declaratory relief), affd per curiam, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977) (en bane) (adopting
opinior of district court), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). The magistrate issued the warrant after law
enforcement officers demonstrated that they had probable cause to believe that the Stanford Daily
possessed photographs of an attack on the police by demonstrators. An extensive search failed to yield the
evidence. Shortly thereafter, the paper filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976) against the law enforcement officials who had conducted the search and the judge who had
issued the warrant. 436 U.S. at 551-52.
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from the jurisdiction in spite of a restraining order.56 Adopting the district
court's opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the decision. 57
The Supreme Court reversed, 58 separately addressing the issues of the
ordinary nonsuspect third party59 and the press.60 Initially, it observed that
the language and structure of the fourth amendment, precedent, the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the critical commentary did not support a
distinction between suspects and nonsuspects. 61 Moreover, the Court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the district court's
rule would not have a significant adverse effect on law enforcement. 62 The
police, for example, might be unable to determine during the early stages of an
investigation, when search warrants frequently are employed, whether a
seemingly innocent party was in fact a participant in criminal activity.63 The
Court also observed that the district court's rule might unduly impede law
enforcement since the subject of a subpoena, unlike the subject of a search,
may assert his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, signifi-
cantly delaying the investigation, if not effectively precluding access to
relevant evidence. 64 Consequently, the Court held that the Constitution does
not require the subpoena preference rule when the police seek evidence from
an ordinary nonsuspect third party.65
The Court then considered whether the first amendment mandates a
different result when the third party is a newspaper. After observing that the
fourth amendment does not explicitly provide any special protection for the
press,66 the Court concluded that the traditional fourth amendment safe-
guards of probable cause, specificity, and reasonableness, if properly applied,
would adequately protect first amendment values.67 Finally, the Court held
that since "no realistic threat of prior restraint" existed, a preseizure hearing
was not essential.68
56. 353 F. Supp. at 135.
57. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 550 F.2d 464,465 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (en banc), rev'd, 436 U.S.
547 (1978).
58. 436 U.S. 547, 568 (1978).
59. Id. at 553-63.
60. Id. at 563-67. Because it applied this bifurcated analysis, the Court failed to recognize that certain
important considerations, such as the status of the third party, were relevant to both questions. Reporters,
for example, are no more likely than attorneys to destroy evidence or act as criminal aceomplices.
61. Id. at 554-59.
62. Id. at 561-62. Upon receiving a subpoena, for example, a third party might alert the criminal
suspect out of friendship or loyalty or the suspect might learn about the subpoena while a motion to quash
was pending. In either event, the evidence might be removed before a court could enforce the subpoena. Id.
In drafting legislation to modify Zurcher, this concern has proven particularly troublesome to the
Department of Justice. See Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 39-40, 344 (testimony of Philip B. Heymann,
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division) (describing difficulty of determining who are innocent
third parties and whether they might destroy evidence).
63. 436 U.S. at 561.
64. Id. at 561-62n.8.
65. Id. at 562-63 & n.9.
66. Id. at 565. The Court found special significance in the absence of any explicit exception for the press
in the fourth amendment, particularly because the amendment largely was the product of the eighteenth
century struggle between the press and the crown. Id. at 564-65. Justice Powell also stressed the point in his
concurring opinion. Id. at 569-70 (Powell, I., concurring).
67. Id. at 565-66 (opinion of Court).
68. Id. at 567.
19801
12 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1
Justice Powell concurred, noting that magistrates should take first amend-
ment values into consideration when assessing the reasonableness of a
warrant to search press offices69 Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Marshall,
agreed that the fourth amendment does not bar the search of ordinary
nonsuspect third parties, 70 but dissented on the ground that the first
amendment requires the police to use a subpoena when seeking evidence from
the press.71 Justice Stevens also dissented, arguing that the search of a
nonsuspect third party violates the warrant clause of the fourth amendment
unless the police have reason to believe that the person would fail to comply
with a subpoena.72
To the extent that changes in legal doctrine influence the development oflaw enforcement practices, the recent outbreak of law office searches probably
is attributable to the rejection of the mere evidence rule, the demise of the
private papers doctrine and the legitimation of the third party search.
III. THE THREAT TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
The prospect of a law office search is a matter of serious concern because of
the threat it poses to the nature of the attorney-client relationship, the legal
devices that have evolved to promote and foster it, and the attorney's role in
the administration of justice.
iA. PROTECTIONS OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility emphasizes that "in our
government of laws and not of men, each member of our society is entitled to
have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the law; to seek any
lawful objective through legally permissible means; and to present for
adjudication any lawful claim, issue or, defense." 73 To achieve this ideal,
69. Id. at 568-70 (Powell, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 571 n.1, 576 (Stewart, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 570-71.
72. Id. at 577-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 [hereinafter ABA CODE]. The Preamble to
the Code develops the role of the attorney at an even more fundamental level:
The continued existence of a free and democratic society depends upon recognition of the
concept that justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in respect for the dignity of the
individual and his capacity through reason for enlightened self-government. Law so grounded
makes justice possible, for only through such law does the dignity of the individual attain
respect and protection. Without it, individual rights become subject to unrestrained power,
respect for law is destroyed, and rational self-government is impossible.
Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in in the preservation of society.
Id. at 1. See also Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958)(exploring role of lawyer in administration of justice and society).
With certain modifications, every state and the District of Columbia have adopted the Code as the basic
standard of legal ethics. M. PIaSIG & K. KIRWIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY 2 (3d ed. 1976). OnJanuary 30, 1980, the American Bar Association released a Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (ABA Model Rules). If approved by the House of Delegates, the Model Rules will
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"every person in our society should have ready access to the independent
professional services of a lawyer of integrity and competence" 74 to assist in
"secur[ing] and protect[ing] available legal rights and benefits. '75 In the
criminal law context, these entitlements flow from the sixth amendment's
guarantee that "the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense. '76 The Code further recognizes, as does the common
law, that if this goal is to be realized, "[a] client must feel free to discuss
whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to
obtain information beyond that volunteered by the client. ' 77 To create an
atmosphere in which such an interchange is possible, the Code has placed the
attorney under an "ethical obligation.., to hold inviolate the confidences and
secrets of his client. '78
To achieve this same objective of free and candid disclosure, the common
law long has provided that confidential communications made by a client to
an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice are privileged. 79 If the
replace the Code as the primary statement of the ethical standard of the profession. Many provisions of the
Code are retained. Others are clarified, extended, modified, or deleted. Furthermore, certain significant
new obligations have been added. The Model Rules probably will be debated heavily during the next year
or two. Regardless of whether, or to what extent, they will be adopted, the Model Rules are certain to have
a substantial effect on future conceptions about an attorney's professional responsibility.
74. ABA CODE, supra note 73, EC 1-1.
75. Id. EC 7-1.
76. U.S. CONSr. amend. VI.
77. ABA CODE, supra note 73, EC 4-1. The Code further emphasizes that
[a] lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his
client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his
independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant
and unimportant.
Id. The ABA Model Rules draw the same conclusion. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, Comment to rule 1.7 (Discussion Draft 1980) ("client-lawyer confidentiality facilitates legal
advice") [hereinafter ABA MODEL RULES]. See also Trammel v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 906, 913 (1980)
("lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to client's
reasons for seeking representation"); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and
Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 469-70 (1977) (identifying values promoted by candid
attorney-client communication) [hereinafter Note, Attorney-Client Privilege: Balancing].
78. ABA CODE, supra note 73, EC 4-1. "Confidence" is defined as "information protected by the
attorney-client privilege." "Secret" is defined as "other information gained in the professional relationship
that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be
likely to be detrimental to the client." Id. DR 4-101(A). A secret would seem to encompass virtually
anything arguably of interest to a client's adversary. Rule 1.7 of the ABA Model Rules also places the
attorney under a duty to avoid disclosure of confidential information concerning the client. Although the
distinction between "confidences" and "secrets" is dropped, the substituted concept of confidential
information concerning the client would seem to be almost as broad. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 77,
rule 1.7(a).
79. Wigmore provided the classic definition of the attorney-client privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4)-made in confidence (5)
by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or
by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection may be waived.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter WIGMORE]. For Judge
Wyzanski's frequently quoted definition, see United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357,
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attorney-client privilege is to serve its primary purpose of encouraging client
communication,80 substantial certainty about its applicability is essential.81
Consequently, when the privilege applies at all, its protection generally is
absolute.8 2
Although the attorney-client privilege has been criticized as an obstruction
to the search for truth, courts have not diluted it significantly.8 3 Nevertheless,
by construing its definitional limitations strictly8 4 and by adopting certain
358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). The attorney-client privilege is now recognized by common law or statute in every
state and in the federal courts. Tarlow, supra note 29, at 341. The scope of the privilege does vary somewhat
in different jurisdictions.
Although the purpose of the privilege is to encourage communications from client to attorney,
communications from attorney to client also may be privileged, at least to the extent that disclosure would
reveal the substance of communications from the client to the attorney. United States v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 986 (3d Cir. 1980); C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 89, at 182-83 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter MCCORMICK].
80. The privilege also protects privacy within the attorney-client relationship. United States v. Upjohn
Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3594 (Mar. 17, 1980); Gardner, A Re-
evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VILL. L. REV. 447, 513 (1963); Louisell, Confidentiality,
Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in the Federal Courts Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 110-13 (1956).
Additionally, the privilege encourages the attorney to devote his undivided loyalty to his client by
precluding him from being compelled simultaneously to assume the conflicting roles of "solicitor and the
revealer of the secrets of the case." 8 WIGMORE, supra note 79, § 2291, at 553.
81. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979). See also Note, Attorney-Client
Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424, 426 (1970) ("ad hoc
approach to privilege pursuant to a vague standard achieves the worst of possible worlds") [hereinafter
Note, Control Group Test].
82. Cf. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2017, at 134
(1970) ("Communications within the scope of the privilege are zealously protected") [hereinafter WRIGHT
& MILLER]. One student commentator has argued that a more flexible balancing approach should be
employed in the corporate area. Note, Attorney-Client Privilege: Balancing, supra note 7', at 473-74. Since
the present definitional standards are somewhat vague and subject to manipulation, however, the courts
probably balance competing values in order to define the scope of the privilege in a particular case. Hazard,
supra note 32, at 1064; Attorney-Client Privilege: Balancing, supra note 77, at 471-72. The proposed ABA
Model Rules apparently would diminish the absolute nature of the attorney-client privilege to a limited
extent. See note 157 infra and accompanying text (describing proposed revisions that would require
disclosure in certain instances).
83. Dean McCormick speculates that the staying power of the privilege, to some extent, is attributable
to the "sentiment of loyalty" that lawyers and judges attach to the attorney-client relationship.
MCCORMICK, supra note 79, § 87, at 176. As one commentator has emphasized, however, "assuming that
recognition of the privileges constitutes a perpetual threat to the ascertainment of truth in litigation...
there are things even more important to human liberty than accurate adjudication. One of them is the right
to be left by the state unmolested in certain human relations." Louisel, supra note 80, at 110. See generally
8 WIGMORE, supra note 79, § 2291, at 554 (recommending retention of privilege as matter of public policy,
but arguing it should be construed strictly).
84. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (privilege protects only those disclosures
necessary to obtain legal advice that might not have been made in absence of privilege); 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 79, § 554 (same). For example, communications to an attorney from a third party who is not the agent
of the client are not privileged. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 504 (1947). Communications made for
the purpose of obtaining primarily nonlegal advice also are not privileged. See United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359-60 (D. Mass. 1950) (communication between attorney and client
involving mere business advice not privileged).
In the corporate context, courts disagree about who speaks for the client. The majority of courts extend
the privilege to the "control group"-employees in a position to act upon the advice of counsel. Note,
Control Group Test, supra note 81, at 424. A minority of courts focus on whether the subject matter of the
communication was made by an employee at the direction of his superior in relation to the performance of
his employment duties. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970)
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qualifications to serve the demands of competing policies, the courts have
attempted to assure that the privilege is not extended beyond its justification.
Communications made in the course of furthering a crime or fraud, for
example, are beyond the scope of the privilege, 85 as are otherwise non-
privileged preexisting documents that have been transferred from a client to
his attorney for purposes of obtaining legal assistance. 86
Quite apart from the attorney-client privilege, the courts have developed
the work-product doctrine to protect litigating attorneys against exploitation
of their trial preparation by their adversaries.87 The Supreme Court initially
recognized the doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor.88 Because the Court believed
that wide-open discovery of trial preparation not only would cause many
attorneys to attempt to rely on the efforts of their adversaries, thereby
encouraging inadequate preparation, but also would discourage the commit-
ment of strategic considerations to writing,89 the Court created something
akin to a qualified privilege90 to protect material prepared "in anticipation of
(control group test "not wholly adequate;" employee protected if directed to speak about his duties), aff d
by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348"(1971); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 478 F. Supp. 368, 372 (E.D.
Wis. 1979) (applying Harper & Row test). The Eighth Circuit recently adopted a modified subject matter
test. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977) (rehearing en bane)
(modified test will exclude communication in which "employee functions merely as a fortuitous witness").
Presumably, the Supreme Court again will attempt to resolve the conflict in United States v. Upjohn Co.,
600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980), a case in which the Sixth Circuit
adopted the "control group" test.
85. In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (II), 48 U.S.L.W. 2745, 2745 (7th Cir. Apr. 30 1980); 8
WiGMORE, supra note 79, § 2298, at 572; MCCORMICK, supra note 76, § 95, at 199.
86. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403-04 (1976); MCCORMICK, supra note 79, § 89, at 184-85.
Since the documents could be obtained directly from the client, the Supreme Court has reasoned that the
absence of the privilege should not discourage transfer of documents to the attorney. 425 U.S. at 404.
87. For a discussion of the fumction of the work-product doctrine, see Cooper, Work Product of The
Rulesmakers, 53 MINN. L. REv. 1269, 1274-1300 (1969); Developments in the Law Discovery, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 940, 1028-29 (1961).
88. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman counsel for the plaintiff in a wrongful death action had sought
discovery of written statements made by witnesses to the defendant's attorney and the attorney's notes and
memoranda of oral witness statements. Id. at 498-500. The trial court cited defense counsel for contempt
for refusing to produce the requested items. Id. at 500. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the
material was privileged from discovery because it was part of the "work product of the lawyer." Hickman
v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1945), aff d, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In affirming the court of appeals,
the Supreme Court concluded that:
[iut is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary
intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client's case demands
that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant
facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference.
Id. at 510-11.
In United States v. Nobles, the Supreme Court reemphasized the point, observing that "[ait its core, the
work-product doctrine shelters the mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area within
which he can analyze and prepare his client's case." 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
89. 329 U.S. at 511-12.
90. The work-product doctrine generally has not been considered an evidentiary privilege. C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 82, at 407 (3d ed. 1976). Indeed, in Hickman the Supreme Court indicated
that the subject matter was not "privileged or irrelevant, as those concepts are used in [the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure]." 329 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1947). In United States v. Nobles, however, the Court declared
that Hickman had recognized a "qualified privilege." 422 U.S. 275, 337-38 (1975). Furthermore, the Court
seemed to indicate that the doctrine would apply in a criminal trial in much the same manner as a standard
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litigation." 91 To avoid precluding the discovery of evidentiary facts in the
possession of opposing counsel, the Court indicated that items such as written
witness statements could be obtained on a showing of necessity.92 The Court,
however, suggested that oral statements made by a witness to an attorney
should be accorded an extraordinary degree of protection in view of the risk of
the attorney's inaccurately recalling the testimony, the danger of transform-
ing the attorney into a witness (perhaps against his own client), and the
limited evidentiary value of the testimony. 93
The principles of Hickman not only have been embodied, clarified, and to
some extent broadened by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), but also
have been adopted widely by the states. 94 Although the work-product
doctrine originated in the context of civil discovery, courts have applied it at
trial,95 in criminal proceedings, 96 and in grand jury hearings. 97
Under the sixth amendment, a criminal defendant is entitled to effective
assistance of counsel. 98 Unless a client can frankly and openly communicate
evidentiary privilege. See id. at 239-40 (comparing work-product privileges to other privileges).
Subsequently, a district court indicated that the Supreme Court must have meant that the work-product
doctrine constitutes a "privilege" in the criminal, but not the civil, context. See In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 412 F. Supp. 943, 946 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (stating Nobles "did not overrule Hickman's
position that work product is not itself a privilege when asserted in civil discovery"). For simplicity, this
article often will refer to the work-product doctrine as a privilege.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
92. 329 U.S. at 512-13. The plaintiff in Hickman was unable to sustain his burden of demonstrating
"necessity" with respect to either the written or oral witness statements requested because he sought the
items merely to double check his own preparation pnd also because he could obtain all relevant
nonprivileged facts through interrogatories. Id.
93. Id. In the wake of Hickman courts frequently speak of the need to protect an attorney's "opinion
work product." See Note, Protection of Opinion Work Product Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
64 VA. L. REV. 333, 333 (1978) (describing information courts have considered "opinion work product")
[hereinafter Note, Opinion Work Product]. The courts, however, do not agree about the degree of
protection to be provided under the doctrine. Compare Duplin Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de
Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1974) (opinion work product immune from discovery), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 997 (1975) with In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1979) (interview
memoranda discoverable only in rare circumstances) and In re Subpoena (Murphy), 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th
Cir. 1977) (opinion work product discoverable only in rarest circumstances).
94. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER supra note 82, § 2022, at 189 n.98 (providing citations to state
codifications of work-product doctrine). See generally Comment, The Work Product Doctrine in the State
Courts, 62 MIcH. L. REv.1 199 (1964) (discussing various formulations of work-product doctrine embodied
in state laws).
95. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975) (work-product concerns "do not disappear
once trial has begun").
96. See id. at 236 (work-product doctrine applies to both criminal and civil litigation); FED. R. CRIM. P.
16(b)(2) (work-product doctrine prevents defendant from discovering internal Government documents
relevant to prosecution of case); Note, "Work Product" in Criminal Discovery, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 321,
326-44 (describing rationale behind and application of work-product doctrine in state criminal discovery).
But cf. Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94,101-02 (1976) (holding no work-product exemption to Jencks
Act).
97. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1979) (discovery byGovernmentin
grand jury proceeding subject to work-product rule); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840,
846 (8th Cir. 1973) (work-product doctrine provides exception to rule that "every Grand Jury witness must
tell 'all that he knows"'); In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (work-product
doctrine precludesGovernment from compelling lawyer to answer grand jury questions). But see A. v.
District Court, 191 Colo. 10, 27, 550 P.2d 315, 328 (1976) (en bane) (work product prepared in anticipation
of civil litigation not protected before grand jury unless investigation closely related to civil action), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
98. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932).
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with his lawyer and his lawyer can prepare a defense with some degree of
privacy, the lawyer cannot render effective legal assistance. Thus, many
courts and commentators have suggested that the sixth amendment right to
counsel, perhaps in conjunction with the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, encompasses the attorney-client privilege99 and the work-
product doctrine,100 or at least a comparable, if not broader, assurance of
privacy in communication and preparation. 10 1 These protections-the attor-
ney-client privilege, the obligation of confidentiality, the work-product
doctrine, and the right to counsel-are designed to achieve and maintain
conditions that are considered essential to the proper functioning of the
attorney-client relationship. In turn, these protections preserve the attorney's
role in the administration of justice. The prospect of the law office search as a
legitimate tool of law enforcement poses a severe threat to these doctrines
and, more importantly, to the underlying values they promote.
The functions of these rights and privileges are scarcely identical.10 2
Nonetheless, the nature of the threat and the impact of the law office search
99. See, eg., United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 1978) (open communication between
client and attorney "essential" if professional assistance guaranteed by sixth amendment to be meaningful;
for "adversary system to function properly," advice received after defendant's disclosures to attorney
"must be insulated from the government"); Hazard, supra note 32, at 1062 (without attorney-client
privilege, "counsel would become a medium of confession," thereby impairing accused's fifth and sixth
amendment rights); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege: Balancing, supra note 77, at 485-86 (without attorney-
client privilege, exercise of either fifth or sixth amendment right would require waiver of other); Note, The
Right of a Criminal Defense Attorney to Withhold Physical Evidence Received from his Client, 38 U. CHI. L.
REV.211,225-26 0970) (in criminal cases, attorney-client privilege "may be necessary to effectuate" fifth
and sixth amendment rights) [hereinafter Note, Physical Evidence]. See also R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG,
A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 659 (1977) (fifth amendment should not interfere with attorney-
client relationship; sixth amendment right to counsel "may mandate" privilege in criminal cases).
100. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Rosenbaum), 401 F. Supp. 807, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (compelling
attorney to disclose conversation with witness violates work-product doctrine, which in criminal context
implicates fifth and sixth amendment rights); In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 684-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(forcing attorney to disclose conversation with witness effectively deprives client of fifth and sixth
amendment rights); A. AmSEMRDAM, TRIAL MANuAL 3 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES, §
274(C), at 1-296.2 (student ed. 1978) (work-product doctrine "doubtless a federal constitutional
requirement") [hereinafter AMSTERDAM].
101. See, e.g., United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973) (dictum) ("essence of Sixth
Amendment right is, indeed, privacy of communication with counsel"), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974);
Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960) (right to counsel requires client be free of
"apprehension of disclosure"); Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d 742, 751, 598 P.2d 818, 822, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 658, 662 (1979) ("the right to counsel guaranteed by the California Constitution embodies the right
to communicate in absolute privacy with one's attorney"); Cf. Note, Professional Responsibility and In re
Ryder: Can an Attorney Serve Two Masters?, 54 VA. L. REV. 145, 159-60 (1968) (fifth and sixth
amendments, working in conjunction, might expand scope of attorney-client privilege) [hereinafter Note,
Professional Responsibility].
102. Because the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine have distinct purposes and
limitations, their coverage is not coextensive. Unlike the attorney-client privilege, for example, the work-
product doctrine does not necessarily require strict confidentiality. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 82, §
2024, at 210. The work-product doctrine applies to information obtained from third parties or created by
the attorney entirely on his own. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-13 (1947), and relates only to matter
prepared in anticipation of litigation. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). Also, to some extent, the doctrine requires
an explicit balancing of competing interests. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 511-13.
Just as they have with the attorney-client privilege, courts apparently will read a "crime or fraud"
exception into the work-product doctrine. See, e.g., In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II), 48 U.S.L.W.
2745, 2745(7th Cir. Apr. 30, 1980)(material received by attorney from client not protected by work-
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are sufficiently similar to warrant considering these rights and privileges
together. The attorney-client privilege and the attorney's obligation of
confidentiality are intended to promote candid communication. The obliga-
tion of confidentiality is significantly broader than the attorney-client privi-
lege since it is not limited to information communicated to the attorney by the
client. 103 However, an attorney may not invoke his obligation of confidentiali-
ty in order to resist disclosure of nonprivileged material if required by law or
court order.104 Consequently, an analysis of the danger to the attorney-client
privilege should apply to the parallel threat to the ethical obligation of
confidentiality. Even though an invasion of the attorney-client privilege or the
work-product doctrine might not be an absolute prerequisite for establishing a
constitutional violation, such an invasion might well constitute the most
serious threat to the sixth amendment right to counsel the law office search
presents. Accordingly, the danger to the attorney-client relationship may be
perceived best by focusing on the threat to the attorney-client privilege and
the work-product doctrine.
B. THREATS POSED BY LAW OFFICE SEARCHES
Seizure of Privileged Documents. The courts have not settled the issue
of whether third parties may assert an evidentiary privilege in response to a
search warrant.105 Consequently, courts in some jurisdictions might conclude
that since the subject of a search has no right to interfere with the execution of
a warrant, law enforcement officers simply could ignore an attorney's
assertion that certain documents specified in the warrant were privileged and
therefore not subject to examination and seizure. The attorney-client privilege
and the work-product doctrine would be undermined seriously if a law
product doctrine when ongoing fraud involved); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d
798, 802-03 (3d Cir. 1979) (crime-fraud exception bars assertion of work-product doctrine with respect to
alleged illegal activities of client); In re Subpoena (Murphy), 560 F.2d 326, 336 & n.19 (8th Cir. 1977)
(dictum) (work product might not be immune if illegal activities by attorney established). Finally, a waiver
of the attorney-client privilege is not a waiver of the work-product doctrine. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 82, § 2016, at 127-29.
103. The attorney-client privilege is narrower than the lawyer's ethical obligation of confidentiality
since the latter "exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that others share
the knowledge." ABA CODE, supra note 73, EC 4-4. See also ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 77, rule 1.7
& Comment (although based on same policy considerations as attorney-client privilege, confidentiality rule
broader since it applies to all information about client, regardless of source).
104. Despite the broad coverage of section DR 4-101(A) & (B), the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer may reveal ... [c]onfidences or secrets when permitted under
Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order." ABA CODE, supra note 73, DR-101(C)(2). Another
section of the Code declares that "a lawyer shall not... [c]onceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which
he is required by law to reveal." Id. DR 7-102(A)(3). Consequently, the Code seems to contemplate that an
attorney's obligation to disclose pursuant to legal process will be determined by the positive law of the
jurisdiction, including applicable rules of privilege. The ethical obligation of confidentiality does not in
itself create anything akin to an evidentiary privilege. The ABA Model Rules would strengthen the
attorney's obligation to disclose client confidences when required by law or ethical rules, as provided for in
DR- 101(C)(2), by substituting "shall" for the Code's may. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 77, rule 1.7(b).
105. Falk, supra note 30, at 18 (unclear whether evidentiary privileges bar to third-party searches); cf.
Note, Search and Seizure of the Media: A Statutory, Fourth Amendment and First Amendment Analysis, 28
STAN. L. REV. 957, 961 n.28 (1976) (appellate courts have not decided applicability of shield law or most
other testimonial privileges to press office searches) [hereinafter Search and Seizure of the Media].
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enforcement official armed with a search warrant could readily seize and
examine documents otherwise legally unobtainable.106 Fortunately, this result
seems unlikely since the courts that have confronted the issue generally have
indicated that law enforcement officials may not seize documents within the
scope of these doctrines during the search of a law office. 107
Rummaging Effect on Nonspecified Documents. Even if protected
items are not subject to seizure, the law office search might infringe the rights
and privileges necessary for the proper functioning of the attorney-client
relationship. In most searches for documentary evidence, the officials execut-
ing the warrant will need to examine many more items than are specified in
the warrant.108 This "rummaging" effect'09 becomes especially intrusive when
some of the nonspecified documents subject to examination are privileged. If
the attorney-client privilege is to serve its purpose of encouraging candid
client communication, the attorney must be able to assure his client not only
that protected communications never will be admitted into evidence against
him, but also that they will remain inaccessible to his adversaries, including
the state. Because disclosure invades the privilege, a breach that is largely
irreparable, the Minnesota Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Johnson concluded
106. As Superior Court Judge Pacht observed in the course of enjoining the search of the Kaplan &
Livingston firm, a warrant such as the one before him "could give agents the power to... go through a
lawyer's office and absolutely destroy any kind of privilege that existed as to any of their documents .. "
Luther, Judge Assails Conduct in Search, L.A. Times, Apr. 13, 1979, § II, at 4, col. 1. (quoting Superior
Court Judge Pacht). See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 579 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(under majority's holding innocent third parties have no opportunity to object to search); Privacy Hearings,
supra note 20, at 33 (statement of Sen. Mathias) (Zurcher permits government to circumvent confidential
privileges without providing affected parties opportunity to object).
107. In O'Connor v. Johnson the Minnesota Supreme Court implicitly held that the search of the office
of a nonsuspect attorney would be unconstitutional because of the very riskthat the search would infringe
the attorey-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (en banc).
In Deukmejian v. Superior Court the California Court of Appeals essentially concluded that the
amendments to the California Penal and Evidence Codes effectively would preclude the police from seizing
privileged material. 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 261-62, 162 Cal. Rptr. 857, 862-63 (Ct. App. 1980). An Oregon
trial court has held explicitly that material within the attorney-client privilege is not subject to seizure
under a search warrant. In re Stewart, No. DA-180-730-7910, slip op. at 3 (Or. D. Ct., Multnomah
County, Dec. 4, 1979). The Los Angeles Municipal Court apparently invalidated the warrant to search the
office of the Cotton & Bregman law firm as overbroad primarily because of the threat posed to established
privileges. Transcript at 4-5, In re Law Offices of Bregman, No. SW 15591 (L.A. Mun. Ct. June 4, 1979). A
Texas court invalidated the search of the Chagra law office specifically because the police had examined
privileged documents. In re Chagra, No. 32771-243, slip op. at 3 (Tex. D. Ct., El Paso County, Feb. 5,
1979). The court suggested that the conduct of the officers executing the warrant might have been criminal.
Id. at 4. In Burrows v. Superior Court the Supreme Court of California indicated that a warrant authorizing
the seizure of protected material would violate the attorney-client privilege. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 250-51, 529
P.2d 590, 598, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 174 (1974) (en banc) (dictum). And in National Cities Trading Corp. v.
United States the court sustained the search of an attorney's office but noted that the evidence sought
probably was not privileged. 487 F. Supp. 1332, 1335 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
108. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,482 n.11 (1976); see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547,
573 (1978) (Stewart, I., dissenting) (search warrant allows police to "ransack" files of newspaper in search
of documents specified in warrant); Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 241, 529 P.2d 590, 592, 118
Cal. Rptr. 166, 168 (1974) ("exhaustive search" of attorney's office not limited to documents specified in
warrant).
109. United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930). Judge Learned Hand argued that "the real
evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which consists
in rummaging about among his effects to secure evidence against him." Id.
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that law enforcement officers executing a search warrant at an attorney's
office must not be allowed to examine miscellaneous documents while
searching for those listed in the warrant.110 As the O'Connor court recognized,
"once [privileged] information is revealed to the police, the privileges are lost,
and the information cannot be erased from the minds of the police.""'
The consequences of permitting law enforcement officers to examine an
attorney's work product while searching for specified documents could prove
to be equally severe." 2 Unless the attorney can be assured that the govern-
ment will not exploit the revealed information either directly or indirectly, he
might feel compelled to alter his strategy in order to nullify any unwarranted
advantage that the state, as his adversary, otherwise might gain by possessing
the information. 13 As a result, the client might be deprived of the best
available defense (or offense).
Chilling Effect on Client Communication and Trial Preparation.
Perhaps the most serious consequence of the law office search stems from the
"chilling effect" it is likely to exert on client communications and attorney
trial preparation. 114 The client probably will be less inclined to discuss his
legal problems fully and freely with counsel if he is aware that the police, by
obtaining a warrant to search his attorney's office, might examine any of his
own or his lawyer's communications or thoughts committed to writing.
Moreover, the effect scarcely would be restricted to those attorneys whose
offices have been or are likely to become the targets of searches since "'fi]n the
area of searches and seizures, fears are almost as important as realities."" 5
The potential reaction of clients cannot be demonstrated empirically; but
neither can the basic premise of the attorney-client privilege. As Wigmore put
it, the "benefits [of the privilege] are all indirect and speculative; its
obstruction is plain and concrete."'" 6 Even so, the courts have assumed that if
110. 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (en banc).
111. Id. (footnote omitted). In the context of the privilege against self-incrimination, Chief Justice
Burger similarly summarized the problem from the client's perspective when he succinctly noted that
"appellate courts cannot always 'unring the bell' once information has been released." Maness v. Meyers,
419 U.S. 449, 460 (1975).
112. See O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400,405 (Minn. 1979) (en banc) (concluding that search of
attorney's office pursuant to otherwise valid warrant might destroy work-product doctrine).
113. If courts permit law office searches, they should extend something akin to the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine to invasions of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine in
order to preserve the integrity of these protections. See notes 475-88 infra and accompanying text
(discussing need for exclusionary rule and "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to provide direct remedy
for invasion of attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine).
114. "Chilling effect," a well-worn metaphor attributable to Justice Frankfurter, often is used in the
first amendment realm to describe the inhibition a person feels about exercising a right because of the fear
of a state-imposed sanction. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) ("inhibition of freedom of
thought, and of action of thought,... has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit
which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice"). See generally Schauer, Fear, Risk and the
First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REv. 685 (1978); Note, The Chilling Effect
in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 808 (1969).
115. Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 35 (testimony of Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division).
116. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 79, § 2291 at 554 See also Louisell, supra note 80, at 112 ("sheer
speculation" that attorney-client privilege essential for attorney to get all information). Cf Morgan,
Forward to ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 27 (1942) (no empirical support for rationale of attorney-
client privilege).
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the privilege is weakened, client communication will diminish both quantita-
tively and qualitatively. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that
[a]s a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging informa-
tion could more readily be obtained from the attorney following
disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client
would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult
to obtain fully informed legal advice.11 7
Confronted with this issue, the Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded that
the very "fear" that an attorney's office might be searched could destroy
"[t]he indispensable relationship of trust between client and attorney and the
adequate functioning of our adversary system of justice . ... ,118
Arguably, the prospect of a law office search would decrease communica-
tion only slightly because attorneys would remind their clients that they must
reveal confidences to obtain adequate representation.1 9 Often, though,
attorneys have difficulty convincing their clients of the need for full disclo-
sure. McCormick has observed that even when the conversation is fully
protected by the attorney-client privilege, "[Ihe tendency of the client in
giving his story to counsel to omit all that he suspects will make against him,
is matter of everyday professional observation. It makes it necessary for the
prudent lawyer to cross-examine his client searchingly about possible un-
favorable facts."120 Moreover, an attorney who believes that his office might
become the target of a search can no longer reassure his client by stressing the
rigorous protection guaranteed by the privilege.12 1
117. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). The Court has presumed the existence of a
similar "chilling effect" in the context of other "disclosural" privileges as well. See, e.g., United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (without presidential privilege, President probably would "temper candor
with concern for appearances and for.., own interest to the detriment of the decisionmaking process");
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86-87 (1973) (executive privilege indispensable to promotion of "open, frank
discussion" between government officials); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 308 (1967) (informer's
privilege essential to induce informers to come forward). But see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-95
(1972) (insufficient showing that constitutional privilege necessary to encourage confidential sources to
disclose information to reporters). The Court also has recognized that a "chilling effect" might hamper the
judicial process. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979) (grand jury
secrecy required to encourage witnesses to appear and testify); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933)
(secrecy of jury deliberations necessary to avoid stifling freedom of debate and independence of thought).
118. O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W. 2d 400,403 (Minn. 1979) (en bane); cf Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y
v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1038-39, 1052 (D. Hawaii 1979) (possibility that psychiatrists'confidential
records might be searched probably would deter people from seeking assistance and impair patients'
therapy). See also Tarlow & Johnston, The Criminal Law Office, in Searching Law Offices: a Delicate
Balance, L.A. LAW., Oct., 1979, at 42 (to create effective client relationship, lawyer must establish trust
and confidence).
119. See Note, Attorney-Client Privilege: Balancing, supra note 77, at 470. Inroads on the attorney-
client privilege might exert less influence on the typical corporate client, who must confer with attorneys as
a matter of business necessity, than on the individual criminal defendant, who often is wary of the legal
system and fearful of self-incrimination. Id. at 473-74, 477-78. Cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d
1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979) (because of need to comply with extensive regulations, corporations must rely on
attorneys even though not all conversations protected by attorney-client privilege).
120. MCCORMICK, supra note 79, § 87, at 176. See also Paul, The Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser, 63
HARV. L. REv. 377, 382-83 (1950) (tax clients "experts at forgetting what needs to be remembered and at
remembering what needs to be forgotten").
121. Cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 572 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (legitimation of
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The effect on work-product preparation might be equally serious. In
Hickman the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that if an attorney's work
product were available to his adversary,
much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten.
An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own.
Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably devel-
op in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for
trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And
the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly
served. 122
If law enforcement officials were permitted to examine an attorney's work
product during a search, many attorneys litigating against the government
might refrain from committing important strategic considerations to writing.
The search for truth probably would suffer if attorneys were forced to rely on
their memories more than they already do. 123
Although the chilling effect of a diminished work-product doctrine on trial
preparation cannot be proved empirically,124 many of the courts that have
considered the issue since Hickman have concluded that if they were to
impair the work-product doctrine, they would inhibit the creation of trial
preparation material.125 Even if the prospect of a search does not discourage
lawyers from preparing work product, it might still induce the "inefficiency"
recognized in Hickman126 by encouraging attorneys to record their notes in
code or to store trial preparation material away from their offices. 127 More
newsroom searches will preclude reporters from being able to assure sources that information will remain
confidential). See also Cowger, Will Lawyers Be Giving Stanford Warnings?, 64 A.B.A. J. 1211, 1211 (1978)
(suggesting that if law office searches become standard practice, attorneys might have to warn clients that
police could discover confidential communications during course of law office search).
122. 329 U.S. at 511 (1947).
123. See In re Subpoena (Murphy), 560 F.2d 326, 333-35 (8th Cir. 1977) (work-product protection
improves client representation by encouraging attorney to maintain written records); Duplan Corp. v.
Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 736 (4th Cir. 1974), (if attorney inhibited from
recording thoughts "truth... will become lost in the murky recesses of memory"), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
997 (1975). But see Cooper, supra note 87, at 1277-79 (arguing that benefits of preserving written trial
preparation materials so outweigh threat of discovery that attorneys will not be deterred from creating trial
preparation material regardless of existence or scope of work-product doctrine).
124. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1945), affld, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
125. See In re Subpoena (Murphy), 560 F.2d 326, 333- 35 (8th Cir. 1977) (permitting discovery of
opinion work product even on showing of need would deter attorney from recording mental impressions);
Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 736 (4th Cir. 1974) (discovery of
opinion work product incompatible with adversary system since it restricts attorney's freedom to record
mental impressions), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); cf United States v. Colacurcio, 499 F.2d 1401, 1404
(9th Cir. 1974) (compelling attorney to testify before grand jury regarding trial preparation might chill
advocacy); In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (questioning attorney before grand
jury about witness interview slightly chills functioning of criminal defense counsel). But cf. Note, Opinion
Work Product, supra note 93, at 339-40 (discovery of work product has inhibiting effect only if frequent
and standards unclear).
126. 329 U.S. at 511.
127. The California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, an association of 1,600 criminal defense attorneys,
has argued that attorneys probably will take these types of precautions if their offices are subject to search.
The association contends that such practices would not constitute "bad faith" by attorneys but rather
would be an attempt to honor their obligations to their clients. Amicus Brief of California Attorneys for
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generally, a law office search, as an invasion of the attorney's enclave of
privacy, probably would exert the type of demoralizing effect on the bar that
both the majority opinion and concurrence sought to avoid in Hickman.128
Denial of Effective Assistance of Counsel. Finally, the search of a law
office, particularly the office of a criminal defense attorney, implicates the
right to effective assistance of counsel. 129 Even though confidentiality is
essential to effective assistance of counsel,130 not every government intrusion
into the attorney-client relationship will necessarily violate the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. In Weatherford v. Bursey,131 for example, the Supreme
Court held that an undercover agent's participation in meetings between an
attorney and his client did not deprive the client of his right to counsel. 32 As
the Court noted, the agent had been invited by the defense and did not convey
any information acquired to the prosecution. 133 The Court implied, however,
Criminal Justice at 25-26, Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 162 Cal. Rptr. 857 (Ct.
App. 1980). See Tarlow & Johnston, supra note 118, at 42-43 (reiterating argument of California attorneys'
amicus brief, which they wrote).
Reporters have stated that in the wake of Zurcher they have been keeping their notes in code and
secreting them away from their offices. See, e.g., Teeter & Singer, Search Warrants in the Newsroom: Some
Aspects of the Impact of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 67 Ky. L.J. 847, 865 (1979) (reporters use password
method to protect information stored on computer printing systems); Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at
83, 85 (statement of Grant Dillman, Vice President and Washington Manager, United Press International)
(reporters destroying some notes and keeping others at home); id. at 401 (testimony of Richard Cady,
investigative reporter, Indianapolis Star) (daily memoranda filed by number, not name, and hidden in
special places).
128. See 329 U.S. at 511 (if attorney's thoughts not protected, "[ifnefficiency, unfairness and sharp
practices" would develop in giving of legal advice and preparing cases"); id. at 516 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("no practice more demoralizing to Bar" than forcing attorney to disclose thoughts to
adversary). In Zurcher the Court considered and rejected the contention that the physical disruption
inherent in the search ofa newsroom would delay or inhibit the publication of news. 436 U.S. 547, 563-66
(1978). If the police removed many important documents or files, an attorney, like a reporter, might have
difficulty meeting his commitments and deadlines. Cf VonderAhe v. Howland, 508 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir.
1974) (doctor's practice allegedly disrupted for two weeks after IRS seized business records). This problem
could be avoided by requiring the police to return promptly copies of all documents seized. Quite possibly,
an attorney's professional reputation might suffer ifa well publicized search of his office caused members of
the public to conclude erroneously that he is unethical or is implicated in criminal conduct. See Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 580 & n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (individuals might suffer injury to reputation
as result of search). His reputation might not be injured, however, since many people will recognize that an
attorney has legitimate needs for possessing incriminating evidence. Such a concern is irrelevant when the
search is legal because the damage to his reputation represents a cost of law enforcement that the attorney,
like the ordinary citizen, must bear. When the search is illegal, he should pursue a damage action under
federal or state law.
129. In O'Connor v. Johnson the Minnesota Supreme Court declared that a court must weigh a client's
right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota
Constitution in determining whether the search of an attorney's office is unreasonable. 287 N.W.2d 400,
404 (Minn. 1979) (en banc).
130. See United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973) (privacy of communication with
counsel essence of sixth aniendment right), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974).
131. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
132. Id. at 556.
133. Id. at 557. In O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345, 345 (1967) (per curiam), and Black v. United
States, 385 U.S. 26, 29 (1966) (per curiam), the Supreme Court had vacated summarily criminal
convictions when the Government confessed that the FBI unlawfully had monitored conversations
between attorneys and clients even though the information obtained from the monitorings had not been
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that if the Government had planned the intrusion, if the agent had communi-
cated the defense strategy to the prosecution, or if any of the evidence
introduced against the defendant had been a direct or indirect product of
these meetings, then the sixth amendment might have been violated. 3 4
If law enforcement officials search an attorney's office and examine or seize
privileged or confidential client files, a client might assert in a criminal
proceeding that the search deprived him of his right to effective assistance of
counsel. To support his assertion, the client would have to prove either that
law enforcement officials intended to interfere with the attorney-client
relationship or that the prosecutor directly or indirectly used privileged
materials against him at trial. The defendant might even support his claim by
demonstrating that by examining the privileged documents, these officials
chilled future attorney-client communications, thus diminishing his right to
effective assistance of counsel. 35
used by the prosecutors. In Weatherford the Court distinguished O'Brien and Black on the ground that
they involved fourth amendment violations. 429 U.S. at 552. The Court also noted that in Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), it did not hold that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies "a right to
be free from intrusion by informers into counsel-client consultations," but merely assumed that a
conviction would have been reversed if an informer overheard and reported the client-counsel communica-
tions pertaining to the trial. Id. at 553.
Dissenting in Weatherford, Justice Marshall argued that O'Brien and Black required that the Court
vacate the conviction because the police had intercepted attorney-client consultations. Id. at 566-68
(Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting); see Note, Government Intrusion Upon Attorney-Client
Relationships-Weatherford v. Bursey, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 203, 206-13 (1977) (agreeing with Justice
Marshall's dissent in Weatherford). Justice Marshall further argued that any government intrusion into a
criminal defendant's relationship with his attorney threatens to upset the adversary balance between the
state and the accused, permits government witnesses to plan or shade their testimony to meet expected
defenses, and chills attorney-client communications by diminishing the right of the client to confidential
communication with counsel, a right that derives independently from the sixth amendment. 429 U.S. at 56-
64 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Marshall argued that a defendant would
have difficulty proving either that theGovernmentintended to intrude on his attorney-client relationship or
that the undercover agent transmitted the information to the prosecution. Id. at 565-66.
134. Id. at 558 (opinion of Court); see United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209-10 (3d Cir. 1978) (even
though no showing of prejudice, actual disclosure of defense strategy requires dismissal of indictment);
Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d 742,752, 598 P.2d 818, 828, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658, 669 (1979) (charges
dismissed because informant intentionally participated in attorney-client meeting and then disclosed
defense information to superiors); AMSTERDAM, supra note 100, § 363 (G), at 1-366 (Weatherford
strongly suggests "Sixth Amendment would be infringed by governmental eavesdropping on lawyer-client
conversations"); C. WHrrEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 25.02, at 519 (1980) (intrusion probably
violates sixth amendment if evidence used at trial).
The Supreme Court recently held in United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980), that government
officials violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel by planting an informant in the
defendant's jail cell and then using at trial incriminating evidence elicited by the informant. Id. at 2189.
135. In Weatherford the Court recognized that an intrusion into the attorney-client relationship can
cause a "chilling effect" on client communications. 429 U.S. at 555 n.4; cf. Henry v. Perrin, 609 F.2d 1010,
1013 (1st Cir. 1979) (possible disclosure of privileged information obtained during prison inspection of
attorney's case file posed threat to defendant's right to effective counsel), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1652
(1980).
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IV. THE SUBPOENA PREFERENCE RULE AS AN ACCOMMODATION OF
COMPETING INTERESTS
In view of the destructive potential of the law office search, the question
remains whether the legitimate needs of law enforcement can be satisfied
without significant sacrifice to the values of the attorney-client relationship.
A. THE SUBPOENA PREFERENCE RULE
The need to obtain evidence from attorneys is not a problem of recent
origin. Traditionally, when law enforcement officials have had reason to
believe that an attorney possessed incriminating evidence, they have sought
production of this evidence by a subpoena duces tecum.136 Grand juries and
courts occasionally have issued subpoenas duces tecum even when an attorney
has been the subject of an investigation. 137 The subpoena is preferable to the
136. A subpoena duces tecum has been issued to an attorney in many cases. See, eg., In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Thompson), 624 F.2d 17, 18 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury, 603 F.2d 469, 471-72 (3d Cir.
1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d
839, 868 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979); In re Subpoena (Lowthian), 575 F.2d 1292, 1293 (9th
Cir. 1978) (per curiam); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 570 F.2d 562, 563 (6th Cir. 1978); Beckler v.
Superior Court, 568 F.2d 661, 661 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Subpoena (Murphy), 560 F.2d 326, 330 (8th Cir.
1977); In re Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 1976); In re Subpoena (Fish & Neave), 519 F.2d 116,
117 (8th Cir. 1975); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666, 668 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840, 841 (8th Cir. 1973); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 484 F. Supp 1099,
1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 478 F. Supp. 368, 370 (E.D. Wis. 1979); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena (Victor), 422 F. Supp. 475, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis),
412 F. Supp. 943, 945 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Attorney General v. Covington & Burling, 411 F. Supp. 371, 372
(D.D.C. 1977); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecur, 406 F. Supp. 381, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); People v. Doe, 59 Ill. App.
3d 627, 628, 375 N.E. 2d 975, 977 (3d Dist. 1978); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Levy), 165
N.J. Super. 211, 212, 397 A.2d 1132, 1134 (Sup. Ct. Law Div. (Crim.) 1978); State v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d
828, 829, 394 P.2d 681, 682 (1964). The Department of Justice routinely uses subpoenas duces tecum to
obtain documentary materials from third party attorneys. Letter from Roger A. Pauley, Director, Office of
Legislation, United States Department of Justice, to Lackland H. Bloom, Jr. (Sept. 11, 1979) (copy on file
at Georgetown Law Journal).
The Internal Revenue Service also frequently has served summons on attorneys in an effort to secure
documentary evidence. See, eg., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 394 (1976); United States v.
Osborne, 561 F.2d 1334, 1336 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1176 (10th Cir.
1974); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 634 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); Baird v.
Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 625 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Holley, 481 F. Supp. 61, 62 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
Attorneys also have been served with subpoenas ad testificandum when a grand jury was seeking
testimonial rather than physical or documentary evidence. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated
Nov. 8, 1979, 622 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 568 F.2d 555, 556 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978); In re Grand Jury Appearance of Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882, 885
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); United States v. Colacurcio, 499 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir.
1975); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Field), 408 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); In re Stolar, 397 F.
Supp. 520, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
137. See, eg., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (law firm's
records subpoenaed by grand jury investigating possible tax law violations by partner); In re Grand Jury,
529 F.2d 543, 545 (3d Cir.) (law firm's financial records subpoenaed by grand jury investigating possible
tax law violations by firm members), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976); Schwimmer v. United States, 232
F.2d 855, 858 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 853 (1956); United States v. Mandel, 437 F. Supp.
258, 260-61 (D. Md. 1977) ("day- timer" records of law firm used to contain personal entries and prepare
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search warrant as a means of protecting the attorney-client relationship in
two significant respects. The subpoena duces tecum enables the attorney to
gather and produce requested documents, thereby eliminating the threat that
law enforcement officers will examine and possibly seize privileged and
irrelevant documents in the course of a search authorized by a warrant. 138
Moreover, before producing the evidence the attorney may obtain a judicial
ruling on the applicability of any relevant privilege by filing a motion to
quashl 3 9 This approach might diminish substantially any chilling effect on
the interests protected by the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine because the client and the attorney will be afforded the full extent of
protection conferred by these respective privileges. 140
Assuming that the subpoena preference rule would adequately protect the
attorney-client relationship, the question remains whether it also would
accommodate the legitimate needs of law enforcement. The proposed rule is
only one of preference for the subpoena. It does not require that the
government use a subpoena whenever an attorney possesses evidence. Rather,
it accommodates law enforcement needs by allowing the police to search an
attorney's office when they have reason to believe that he might destroy,
conceal, or otherwise fail to produce nonprivileged material; that he is
criminally culpable; or that he will fail to comply with a final judicial
enforcement order.141 Such a search should be subject to certain protective
billings subpoenaed during trial of firm member); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 358 F. Supp.
661, 662 (D. Md. 1973) (law firm records subpoenaed by grand jury investigating partner); In re State
Grand Jury Investigation, 136 N.J. Super. 163, 166-67, 345 A.2d 337, 338-39 (1975) (law firm records
subpoenaed by grand jury investigating corrupt activities of members); Cunningham & Kaminy, P.C. v.
Nadjari, 53 A.D.2d 520, 521, 384 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384 (1976) (law firm records subpoenaed by grand jury;
firm members under separate indictment).
138. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 573 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (unlike subpoena,
search warrant allows police to ransack newspaper files and read each document, thereby exposing
confidential information).
139. O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400,405 (Minn. 1979) (en bane). The party also may challenge
the validity of a subpoena on the ground that it is oppressively overbroad or indefinite. See Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 n.1 (1974) (district court ordered production of law firm partnership papers; court
expressly excluded client files from scope of enforcement order); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 75-80 (2d
Cir.) (subpoena may be challenged under fourth amendment as overbroad), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867
(1973); FED. R. CRiM. P. 17(c) (subpoena may be quashed or modified if compliance would be
unreasonable or oppressive); AMstRDAM, supra note 100, § 163, at 1-151 (oppressively overbroad or
indefinite both grounds for quashing subpoena duces tecum). See generally Note, Search and Seizure of the
Media, supra note 105, at 979 n.130 (modem judicial trend emphasizes courts' power to exercise
restraining force over grand juries).
140. Furthermore, as long as all legitimate claims of privilege are respected, compliance with a
subpoena duces tecum would constitute an infringement of the sixth amendment right to counsel in only
unusual circumstances. Any potential for disruption or stigma would be minimized if the attorney is
permitted to select and produce the requested materials. See notes 396-411 infra and accompanying text
(discussing attorney cooperation in selecting and tendering documents).
141. In O'Connor v. Johnson the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the search of an attorney's office is
unreasonable "when the attorney is not suspected of criminal wrongdoing and there is no threat that the
documents sought will be destroyed." 287 N.W.2d 400,405 (Minn. 1979) (en banc). Presumably, the court
would permit law enforcement officials to obtain a search warrant if either of these facts had been
established. The O'Connor court, however, did not indicate how strong a showing of potential criminal
culpability or risk of destruction the police must demonstrate before they can obtain a search warrant. A
court should require the police to demonstrate probable cause, a familiar and established standard under
the fourth amendment. The recently enacted Privacy Protection Act of 1980 substitutes a subpoena
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procedures designed to diminish the threat to the privileges. 142 Further
inquiry is necessary, however, to determine whether this compromise would
satisfy the law enforcement need for expeditious access to criminal evi-
dence. 143
B. THE THREAT TO EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT
As the Supreme Court noted in Zurcher1 44 and as law enforcement
spokesmen subsequently have maintained, the subpoena preference rule
might frustrate effective law enforcement in many ways. Evidence might be
removed, concealed, or destroyed while the validity of the subpoena is
litigated on a motion to quash, 145 or it might be rendered inaccessible by a
party asserting his privilege against self-incrimination. 146 The delay inherent
in the opportunity for precompliance litigation might frustrate criminal
investigations. 147 Furthermore, the subpoena duces tecum might not be
preference rule for the Zurcher holding and requires a showing of probable cause. Pub. L. No. 96-440
(1980). The Act permits law enforcement officials to search only upon establishing "probable cause to
believe that the person possessing the materials has committed or is committing the criminal offense for
which the materials are sought." Id. §§ 101(a)(1), 101o(b)(1). The Act, however, would permit a search
when "there is reason to believe that the giving of notice pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum would result
in the destruction, alteration, or concealment ofthe materials." Id. § 101(b)(3). The latter exception readily
could swallow the former rule. In contrast to the Act the recent California legislation requires special
procedural safeguards governing law office searches only if law enforcement officials do not have a
"reasonable suspicion" that the attorney is criminally implicated. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1524(c) (West
Supp. 1980). This standard appears to be less exacting than the probable cause standard.
In Zurcher the Court concluded that law enforcement efforts would be impeded if the courts, before
issuing a search warrant, required police to show probable cause supporting their belief that an ordinary
nonsuspect third party possessed evidence. 436 U.S. 547, 555-56, 560-62 (1977). A court, however, should
not adopt this reasoning if the police believe an attorney possesses the evidence. See notes 149-79 infra and
accompanying text (arguing that legal and ethical obligations will lead most attorneys to produce
subpoenaed evidence, even if damaging to client). If the probable cause standard was considered too
stringent in the context of law office searches, a more lenient standard such as "reasonable suspicion"
would be preferable to nothing at all. That standard, however, might prove insuffiently protective and
unnecessarily confusing. See Note, Third Party Searches in the Face ofZurcher v. Stanford Daily: Toward a
Set of Reasonableness Requirements, I 1 CoNN. L. REV. 660, 679-80 (1979) (despite absence of probable
cause, magistrate should consider police suspicion of third party's criminal involvement in determining
whether to issue warrant to search premises of nonsuspect third party).
142. See text accompanying notes 296-501 infra (discussing protective procedures).
143. In United States v. Nixon the Supreme Court observed that
[t]he need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and
comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be
founded on a partial or speculative presentation of facts. The very integrity of the judicial
system depends on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of
evidence.
418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). See also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975) (primary responsibility
of adversary system to develop all relevant facts).
144. See notes 62-65 supra and accompanying text (discussing Zurcher).
145. S. 1790 Hearings, supra note 22, at 22-23, 31 (statement of Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division); Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 319 (statement of Paul L. Perito, National
District Attorneys Ass'n).
146. S. 1790 Hearings, supra note 22, at 31 (statement of Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division).
147. See, eg., Zurcher Hearings, supra note 33, at 157-58 (statement of Richard J. Williams, Vice
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available in some jurisdictions during the earlier stages of the investigation. 148
Although these arguments have some merit when an ordinary nonsuspect
third party possesses evidence, they are considerably less persuasive when the
Government is seeking evidence from an attorney.
Potential Loss of Evidence. After law enforcement officers have served
a subpoena on an attorney, a client probably could not readily retrieve
evidence from his attorney's office without the attorney's knowledge and
consent. The pertinent question then is not whether the client can suppress
the evidence, but whether the attorney will. In view of the attorney's
obligations as a professional and as an officer of the court, and given the
integrity of the bar, law enforcement officials usually will not encounter
difficulties in obtaining evidence from attorneys by service of a subpoena
duces tecum. Although law enforcement officials doubtlessly fear that the
average attorney, given his ethical obligations of confidentiality and loyalty,
will not produce evidence that adversely affects his client, they should
remember that "a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for
the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of
his clients."'149 The attorney thus incurs special ethical and legal obligations'50
that may outweigh his responsibilities to his client. 151
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility has attempted to reconcile
the attorney's apparently conflicting duties of confidentiality and candor.152
The attorney is obligated under the Code to represent the client "zealously"
President, National District Attorneys Ass'n) (risk of loss or destruction of evidence inherent in subpoena
process); Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 347 (supplement to prepared statement of Philip B. Heymann,
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division) (opportunity to challenge subpoena can delay investiga-
tions); id. at 319 (prepared statement of Paul L. Perito, National District Attorneys Ass'n) (protracted
hearings and adversarial maneuverings might delay investigations and allow destruction of evidence).
148. S. 1790 Hearings, supra note 22, at 28 (statement of Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division); Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 319-20 (statement of Paul L. Perito,
National District Attorneys Ass'n).
149. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). The Preamble of the ABA Model Rules commences
with the same premise: "A lawyer is an officer of the legal system, a representative of clients, and a public
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice." ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 77, at 1.
150. See ABA CODE, supra note 73, DR 1-102(A) (lawyer shall not engage in personal or professional
misconduct, including violation of disciplinary rule; illegal conduct involving moral turpitude; conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; or conduct prejudicial to administration of
justice); ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 77, rule 10.4(b) (attorney shall not commit crime or deliberately
wrongful act that reflects adversely on lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law).
151. Cf. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 77, rule 3.1(b) (when lawyer discovers he has presented false
evidence or testimony he shall make disclosure and attempt to rectify even if that requires disclosing client
confidence or implicating client).
152. The tension between the attorney's obligations to the client and to the court has been a source of
persistent debate. Eg., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHIcs IN AN ADVERSARY SYSEM (1975); Callan &
David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality-Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an
Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332 (1976); Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975). The proposed ABA Model Rules tip the balance toward disclosure in certain
instances. See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 77, rule 1.7(b) (lawyer shall disclose confidential
information about client when necessary to prevent client from committing act that would result in death
or serious bodily harm); Memo from John Greacen, Chairman, Committee on the Exclusionary Rule, to
Richard Gerstein, Chairperson, ABA Criminal Justice Section (arguing that "[ain attorney's ethical
responsibilities in receiving and safeguarding possibly incriminating evidence from a client are far from
clear.") [hereinafter Revised Report, Exclusionary Rule] (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
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but "within the bounds of law." 153 Thus, the attorney may not "[c]onceal or
knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal. 154
Moreover, although an attorney may not knowingly reveal a confidence or a
secret of his client,155 he may do so "when required by law or court order." 15 6
The recently proposed ABA Model Rules clarify and strengthen this duty by
providing that the attorney "shall" disclose confidential information about a
client to the extent necessary "to prevent the client from committing an act
that would result in death or serious bodily harm to another person and to the
extent required by law or the rules of professional conduct."15 7
153. ABA CODE, supra note 73, Canon 7. Thus, DR 7-102(B) provides that
[a] lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (1) His client has, in the course
of representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and ifhis client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud
to the affected person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication.
Id. The scope ofthe duty set forth in this rule, however, was diminished significantly by ABA Opinion 314,
which construed "privileged communications" to include "secrets" as well as "confidences." ABA COMM.
ON ETHics AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, RECENT ETHIcS OPINIONS, No. 341 (1975); see
Kramer, Clients' Fraud and Their Lawyers' Obligations: A Study in Professional Irresponsibility 67 GEO.
L.J. 991, 994 (1979) (Opinion 341 rewrote privileged communication exception of DR-7102(B) by
providing that disclosure of client fraud required except when information protected by DR 4-101;
interpretation swallows rule); But see Gruenbaum, Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations: A
Response to Professor Kramer, 68 GEO. L.J. 191, 211-12 (1979) (code, administrative agencies, and courts
may impose greater disclosural obligations on attorneys than Professor Kramer assumes).
In contrast to the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, the new ABA Model Rules require that the
attorney correct a manifest misapprehension attributable to false testimony or evidence presented by the
attorney. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 77, rule 3.1(d). Disclosure is required even when the
misapprehension results from fraudulent conduct by the client or involves disclosure of a client confidence.
Id. rule 3.1(b). This obligation does not apply to criminal defense counsel, however, unless positive law
mandates disclosure. Id. rule 3.1(0(1). The drafters considered and rejected a proposal "requiring the
disclosure of facts known to a lawyer which 'would probably have a substantial effect on the determination
of a material issue."' Id. comment to rule 3.1(b).
154. ABA CODE, supra note 73, DR 7-102(A)(3). The Disciplinary Rule also declares that a lawyer
shall not "(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent. (8)
Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct contrary to a Disciplinary Rule." Id. DR 7-102(A)(7), (8). See
ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 77, rule 2.3 (attorney generally prohibited from rendering advice when
reasonably foreseeable that client will use advice to further an illegal course of conduct, contrive false
testimony, or make wrongful misrepresentation); id. rule 1.3 (attorney prohibited from pursuing course of
action on behalf of client contrary to law or rules of professional conduct).
155. ABA CODE, supra note 73, DR 4-101(B).
156. Id. DR 4-101(C)(3). Despite the use of the permissive term "may" in the rule, the attorney is not
vested with complete discretion to disclose information. If an attorney is required to disclose pursuant to
local law or court order and if under the Code he ethically may do so, he must disclose the information as a
practical matter to avoid criminal conviction or citation for contempt. The courts therefore can relieve the
attorney of this ethical dilemma by finding an independent duty to reveal information under state law. See
In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 369 (E.D. Va.) (per curiam) (attorney under duty to disclose proceeds of
bank robbery and illegal weapon used in robbery received from client), affd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967);
Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1212 (Alaska 1978) (attorney under duty to reveal evidence received from
nonclient third party concerning commission of crime by client). But see Note, Physical Evidence, supra
note 99 (disclosural obligation should not depend on existence of independent state law duty). See
generally, Note, The Problem of an Attorney in Possessiori of Evidence Incriminating His Client: The Need
for a Predictable Standard, 47 U. CINN. L. REv. 431 (1978).
157. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 77, rule 1.7(b). This section may be the most controversial
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Through an emerging body of case law, courts are attempting to define the
attorney's legal, as opposed to ethical, duty to produce evidence in his
possession that incriminates his client.158 The Alaska Supreme Court recently
concluded that
a criminal defense attorney must turn over to the prosecution real
evidence that the attorney obtains from his client. Further, if the
evidence is obtained from a non-client third party who is not
acting for the client, then the privilege to refuse to testify concern-
ing the manner in which the evidence was obtained is inapplica-
ble.159
Although this conclusion is perhaps an oversimplification of a complex and
controversial problem, it reflects the trend of the relevant case law. The courts
strive to reconcile the attorney's legal and ethical duties of confidentiality
with the public's need for evidence. To ensure that law offices do not become
depositories for criminals, some courts have held that the attorney-client
privilege does not apply when the client has tranferred "contraband, fruits or
instrumentalities" of a crime to his attorney. 160 Other courts deem the
change proposed under the Model Rules. Although the provision addresses the attorney's ethical
obligation of confidentiality, it makes no exception for otherwise privileged material. The requirement of
disclosure to prevent death or bodily harm is unlikely to have any significant effect unless courts construe it
to require disclosure of otherwise privileged information pertaining to potentially dangerous products or
business practices.
The meaning of the requirement to disclose information required by law or rules of professional conduct
is not immediately clear. Expansively construed, it could destroy the obligation of confidentiality and the
attorney-client privilege by permitting the state to apply ordinary disclosure obligations to material that
would otherwise be privileged or confidential. Presumably, the requirement is not intended to be so
construed. Alternatively, the provision might be read to mean that the attorney is under no obligation to
disclose privileged material, at least pursuant to "law," unless the disclosure duty is recognized as an
independent exception to the relevant privilege.
The Association of Trial Lawyers of America has drafted an alternative code bf legal ethics that would
attempt to protect confidentiality to a significantly greater extent than the proposed ABA Model Rules.
One commentator has reported that it "would forbid a lawyer to reveal client confidences except to the
extent required by law or court order, or to defend himself from formal criminal charges brought by the
client." Burke, ATLA Unveils Ethics Code, Nat'l L.J., June 23, 1980, at 7, col. 2.
158. See, e.g., In re January Grand Jury (Genson), 534 F.2d 719, 729 (7th Cir. 1976) (attorney must
comply with subpoena requesting production of money received from clients shortly after clients allegedly
robbed bank); In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 369 (E.D. Va.) (per curiam) (attorney suspended from
practice for transferring evidence of client's guilt from client's safe deposit box to own with intent to
withhold until after trial), aff'd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967); Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1211-12
(Alaska 1978) (no denial of right to counsel when former attorney assisted defendant's friend in producing
for police kidnapping plan discovered in defendant's house and then testified about source of evidence);
People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d 514, 526, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715, 722 (Ct. App. 1970) (proper for attorney to
produce shoes received from client's wife that client used to kick victim and to testify about source of
evidence); People v. Doe, 59 Ill. App. 3d 627, 633, 375 N.E.2d 975, 980 (Ct. App. 1978) (attorney must
produce client's suicide note apparently obtained from another client); State ex rel Sowers v. Olwell, 64
Wash. 2d 828, 833, 394 P.2d 681, 684 (1964) (attorney must produce knife, presumably received from
client, alleged to be murder weapon). But see New York Ethics Op. No. 479 (Feb. 28, 1978) (attorney acted
properly in not divulging that client had revealed location of bodies of two persons he had murdered).
159. Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1210 (Alaska 1978). See generally Note, Professional Responsibili-
ty, supra note 101.
160. See In re January 1976 Grand Jury (Genson), 534 F.2d 719, 728 (7th Cir. 1976) (attorney cannot
assert attorney-client privilege asjustification for taking possession of possible fruits of violent crime); In re
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"communication" within the privilege but limit its traditionally absolute
character by balancing the competing interests.1 61 Similarly, when an attorney
claims that the work-product doctrine protects the relevant evidence, the
courts generally balance the policies favoring nondisclosure against the need
for evidence.1 62
Despite an evolving duty to produce evidence incriminating their clients,
attorneys often will not produce such evidence sua sponte because "[w]hile
serving as an advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor of his clients doubts
as to the bounds of law."'163 Cases indicate that the attorneys who have been
Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 365 (E.D. Va.) (per curiam) (attorney-client privilege inapplicable when attorney
took initiative in transferring stolen money and illegal weapon from client's safe deposit box to own), affd,
381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967). This result is justifiable either on the theory that the transfer was made for the
express purpose of secreting the evidence rather than obtaining legal advice or simply as a matter of policy
to ensure that the privilege does not provide a shield for withholding evidence in these circumstances. The
attorney-client privilege does not permit an attorney to withhold evidence received from a third party. See
Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1210 (Alaska 1978) (privilege does not permit attorney to withhold
incriminating information about client's kidnapping plan received from client's friend); People v. Lee, 3
Cal. App. 3d 514, 527, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715, 723 (Ct. App. 1970) (privilege does not permit attorney to
withhold physical evidence received from client's wife that incriminates client).
The sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and the traditional restrictions on discovery
from the criminal defendant both caution against transforming an attorney into an unwilling source of
evidence against his client, even when that evidence might not fall within one of the applicable privileges.
Cf. In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (compelling attorney to testify about witness
interview would impair counsel's effectiveness at trial). See generally Seidelson, The Attorney-Client
Privilege and the Client's Constitutional Rights, 6 HoFSrRA L. Rav. 693 (1978). The ABA Model Rules
recognized the problem and explicitly declined to extend certain of the proposed disclosural obligations
into the criminal context, at least to the extent that a duty was not already imposed by positive law. ABA
MODEL RULES, supra note 77, rule 1.7(0.
161. See In re Stolar, 397 F. Supp. 520, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (attorney-client privilege protects against
disclosure of client's name and address; production not required because privilege policy outweighs
government need for evidence); Sepler v. State, 191 So.2d 588, 590-91 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966) (attorney-client
privilege protects against disclosure of names of other attorneys; privilege balanced against state's need for
evidence); People v. Beige, 50 A.D.2d 1088, 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771, 771-72 (App. Div. 1975) (per curiam)
(attorney-client privilege precludes indictment of defense counsel for failing to report death occurring
without medical attendants when client apparently informed counsel of location of bodies of murder
victims; privilege balanced against public interest), affd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377 (1976) (per
curiam); State ex rel Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 833, 394 P.2d 681, 684 (1964) (transfer of murder
weapon from client to attorney within attorney-client privilege; production required because of state's need
for evidence and policy against allowing attorney to be'depository of criminal evidence outweighs privilege
but prosecution prohibited from revealing source of evidence to trier of fact).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 987-88 (3d Cir. 1980) (law
enforcement need outweighs work-product protection of attorney's list of interviewees not revealing mental
processes of attorney); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 512 (2d Cir. 1979) (law enforcement need
insufficient to outweigh work-product protection of employee questionnaires when company provides all
nonwork product requested by Government); United States v. Colacurcio, 499 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.
1974) (grand jury may question attorney about preparation of criminal case when subject of questioning
collateral to case issues); In re Grand Jury (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840, 849 (8th Cir. 1973) (good cause not
shown for production of work product because witnesses known and accessible to grand jury); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, 484 F. Supp. 1099, 1103-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (need for evidence to obtain indictments
outweighs work-product protection of attorney's tape of witness interviews when no alternative source of
evidence exists); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 406 F. Supp. 381, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (law
enforcement need outweighs work-product protection of attorney's interview memoranda when witness no
longer available).
163. ABA CODE, supra note 73, EC 7-3; cf. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 77, comment to rule 1.7
(lawyer ordinarily shall invoke applicable privilege on behalf of client unless client waives). Nevertheless,
the attorney's duty to produce evidence might not depend upon a formal request by the prosecution. Cf
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confronted with this problem conscientiously have attempted to pursue an
ethical course of action.164 Attorneys frequently will move to quash subpoenas
for client files or firm records because a motion to quash is the proper method
for obtaining judicial review of claims of privilege and for challenging the
validity of a subpoena.165 Similarly, an attorney might risk receiving a
contempt citation by failing to comply with a trial court order enforcing a
subpoena; 166 in many jurisdictions this is the accepted and often the only
method of obtaining precompliance appellate review. 167 The overwhelming
majority of attorneys, however, undoubtedly would comply with a judicial
enforcement order once all legitimate avenues of review had been exhaust-
United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 868 (4th Cir. 1979) (reversal not required when defense counsel
informed prosecutor that they possessed tapes incriminating clients), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1980);
State ex rel Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 833, 394 P.2d 681, 684-85 (1964) (attorney bound to
produce evidence on own motion). An attorney also might produce evidence pursuant to an informal
request by the prosecution; therefore the prosecutor would need neither a search warrant nor a subpoena.
See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 77, comment to rule 3.2 (conscientious lawyer should honor
opponent's request for relevant evidence without formal demand unless good reason exists to require
demand); cf. Department of Justice Policy with regard to the Issuance of Subpoenas to, and the
Interrogation, Indictment or Arrest of Members of the News Media, 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(c) & (d) (1979)
(before obtaining subpoena, Department of Justice attorney must attempt to obtain information through
negotiation with news media) [hereinafter Justice Media Subpoena Policy].
164. The attorneys frequently sought guidance from bar ethics committees or judges. See Morrell v.
State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1206 (Alaska 1978) (attorney sought advice on production of incriminating evidence
from ethics committee); In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 362, 364 (E.D. Va.) (per curiam) (attorney sought
advice from former bar association officer and judge), affd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967). Of course, the
reported cases probably will involve the ethically insensitive attorney only rarely because his failure to
produce evidence seldom will be discovered.
165. To determine whether an attorney has asserted an unwarranted claim of privilege, judges can
examine the evidence in camera.
166. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1979) (attorney held in contempt for
failing to comply with trial court order enforcing grand jury subpoena). An attorney may not be held in
contempt for failing to comply with a subpoena until the court issues an order enforcing it. Brown v.
United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49-50 (1959). The court may not enforce the subpoena until after the attorney
has had an opportunity to present claims of privilege and challenge the validity of the subpoena in an
adversary proceeding. Id.
167. See In re Subpoena (Lowthian), 575 F.2d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (contempt
judgment for noncompliance with subpoena orderly and statutory method to seek appellate review of
subpoena's validity). In Maness v. Meyers the Supreme Court held that an attorney could not be held in
contempt for advising his client not to comply with a trial court order enforcing a subpoena. 419 U.S. 449,
460-63 (1975). The Court based its decision on the client's privilege against self- incrimination. Id. Because
disclosure pursuant to an erroneous order could have resulted in irreparable injury, the Court considered
the attorney's refusal to comply with the trial court order an appropriate method of obtaining judicial
review. Id. The Court expressly reserved the question of whether the same would be true with respect to a
common law or statutory privilege such as the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 461.
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit recently held, by analogy to Maness, that a party may not be cited for
criminal contempt if the district court improperly enforced a subpoena requiring the production of material
protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine. In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(McCoy & Sussman), 601 F.2d 162, 169-72 (5th Cir. 1979); cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC), 604
F.2d 798, 800 (3d Cir. 1979) (party has standing to appeal denial of motion to quash only if initially cited
for contempt pending appellate review). See generally Note, Attorney-Client Privilege-Contempt: The
Dilemma in Non-Disclosure of Possibly Privileged Information, 45 WASH. L. REV. 181 (1970); Note,
Attorney Client Privilege: The Remedy of Contempt, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 1192.
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ed. 168 As the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized in O'Connor v. Johnson,169
the attorney's status an as officer of the court should raise a strong
presumption that the attorney will comply with a judicial order. 170 In Geders
v. United States,171 Justice Marshall similarly observed in a concurring
opinion that "[i]f our adversary system is to function according to design, we
must assume that an attorney will observe his responsibilities to the legal
system, as well as to his client."' 172 Moreover, the proposed ABA Model Rules
explicitly provide that an attorney shall not destroy, conceal, falsify, or
obstruct another person's access to evidence. 173
168. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 459 (1975) (once court rules, counsel must comply with
order); ABA CODE, supra note 73, DR 7-106(A) (lawyer may in good faith test validity of tribunal's
standing ruling made in course of proceeding, but may not disregard such ruling); ABA MODEL RULES,
supra note 77, rule 3.7(b)(4) (lawyer shall not refuse compliance with tribunal ruling unless open refusal
based on good faith belief that compliance not legally required); cf. S. 1790 Hearings, supra note 22, at 78-
79 (testimony of Nathan Lewin) (white-collar criminal defendants usually represented by reputable
attorneys who will advise them to comply with subpoenas for documentary evidence).
169. 287 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1979) (en banc).
170. In O'Connor v. Johnson the court emphasized that "[a]ttorneys are required by statute, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the oath of admission to the bar to preserve and protect the judicial
process. Thus, attorneys must respond faithfully and promptly, while still being allowed the opportunity to
assert applicable privileges by a motion to quash." Id at 405. But see Report with Recommendations of
ABA Criminal Justice Section Committee on the Exclusionary Rule (Jan. 18, 1980) (copy on file at
Georgetown Law Journal) (concluding that "the Minnesota position is extreme, putting unwarranted
confidence in the honesty and truthfulness of lawyers .... mT1he change that lawyers would destroy the
sought evidence is sufficient to require some procedure by which the materials may be placed beyond the
reach of the lawyer"). The Committee reiterated its concern in its revised report. Revised Report,
Exclusionary Rule, supra note 152, at 2-3. The Council of the Criminal Justice Section apparently
disagreed with the Committee's assessment, however, since it adoptl the subpoena preference rule over
the Committee's recommendation to the contrary See note 294 infra.
171. 425 U.S. 80 (1976). In Geders the Court held that an order prohibiting a criminal defendant who
was on the witness stand when the court adjourned for the day from consulting with his attorney during an
overnight recess violated the sixth amendment. Id at 91.
172. 1I at 93 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall also indicated that it was "difficult to
conceive of any circumstances that would justify a court's limiting the attorney's opportunity to serve his
client because of fear that he may disserve the system by violating accepted ethical standards." Id.; cf Case
v. Andrews, 226 Kan. 786, 791, 603 P.2d 623, 627 (1979) (because attorney is officer of court, presumption
raised that when representing incarcerated client attorney will uphold credibility and standards of judicial
system rather than subvert them).
173. ABA MODEL RULES, supra, note 77, rule 3.2(b)(1). The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
places the attorney under an ethical obligation to conform his conduct to the positive law of the relevant
jurisdiction with respect to the suppression of evidence. ABA CODE, supra, note 73, DR 7-102(5), (7), (8);
id. EC 7-27. See also Note, Legal Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665 (1979) (Code
should explicitly prohibit attorneys from advising clients to destroy evidence possibly relevant to pending
or foreseeable litigation) [hereinafter Note, Destruction of Evidence]. The ABA Model Rules essentially
implement this proposal. See ABA MODEL RuLEs, supra note 77, rule 2.5 (lawyer shall not advise client to
alter or destroy document or other material when lawyer should know material relevant to foreseeable
proceeding). The comment notes that the attorney necessarily would be prohibited from transferring such
material to a client "when the client plainly intends to destroy it." Id. comment 2.5.
One leading commentator has noted recently that "[a]ctive involvement by a lawyer in the concealment
of evidence, no matter how cautiously accomplished, is undoubtedly unethical and, depending upon state
law, may constitute an obstruction of justice even when the suppression arises out of a confidential
communication." Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978 DUKE L.J. 921, 941.
Currently, the destruction of evidence is punishable in the federal courts as criminal contempt, 18
U.S.C. § 401(3) (1976), or obstruction ofjustice, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505 (1976), once the items have been
subpoenaed. Many states have enacted statutes prohibiting the destruction of evidence with the intent to
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Despite these pronouncements, not all lawyers will act ethically in every
situation. Likewise, no code of ethical precepts, regardless of careful
draftsmanship or strict enforcement, can achieve this ideal. 174 Some lawyers
violate the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, 175 and others destroy
evidence or unjustifiably refuse to comply with legal process. 76 On the whole,
however, most lawyers conscientiously honor the law, their ethical obliga-
tions, and the mandates of the courts. 77 The traditional reliance of law
enforcement officials on the subpoena as the primary, if not the exclusive
method, of obtaining criminal evidence from attorneys, 78 attests to the basic
integrity of the bar. 79
preclude production of that evidence in litigation. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 918.13(1)(a) (1975); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3816 (1974); MD. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 27 (1976). Other states require intent plus imminent
production of the evidence. CAL. PENAL CODE § 135 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40(2)
(McKinney 1975).
174. The events commonly known as Watergate are the most celebrated, but not the only, recent
instances of criminal behavior by members of the bar. Cf. S. 1790 Hearings, supra note 22, at 35 (statement
of Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division) (significant number of federal
prosecutions involve attorneys as defendants); id. at 69 (statement of Oliver B. Revell, III, Deputy
Assistant Director, FBI) (recent federal investigations suggest attorneys may "engineer or serve as conduits
for illegal financial transactions"); Berentson, Are Lawyers Honest? Thirteen of Them Are Put to the Test,
AM. LAW., May, 1980, at 15-18 (five of 13 personal injury attorneys agreed to present claim based on
pejured testimony); Wehrwein, Lawyer Loses Appeal on Entrapment, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 15, 1980, at 7, col. 2
(Minnesota Supreme Court affirms conviction of attorney for defrauding insurance company on client's
behalf); Lavine, Miami Law Firm Guilty in False Visa Scheme, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 24, 1979, at 1, cols. 3-4
(describing first instance in which law firm convicted of criminal offense).
175. See STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE AND THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ABA, STATISTICAL REPORT RE: PUBLIC DISCIPLINE OF
LAWYERS By DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES 1975-1978, at chart III (part 1) (Sept. 1979) (2,901 attorneys
disciplined in state disciplinary systems between 1975 and 1978; 420 attorneys reinstated after disciplinary
measures taken); id. at chart II (part 2) (498 attorneys disciplined in federal disciplinary systems and
federal agencies between 1975 and 1978; 40 attorneys reinstated after disciplinary measures taken); Burke,
Disbarment: Coping With Disgrace, Nat'l L.J., May 7, 1979, at 11, col. 1 (ABA statistics show 467
attorneys disbarred and 299 resigned between 1974 and 1978 with disciplinary charges pending); American
Lawyers: "A Sick Profession"?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 25, 1974, at 23 (ABA statistics show
694 attorneys disbarred and 319 resigned between 1965 and 1974 with disciplinary charges pending). See
generally ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, FINAL DRAFT,
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (June 1970).
176. See S. 1790 Hearings, supra note 22, at 71 (statement of Oliver B. Revell, III, Deputy Assistant
Director, FBI) (citing example of attempt by attorney to suppress subpoenaed evidence); cf. Kiechel, The
Strange Case of Kodak's Lawyers, FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 188-94 (attorney lied under oath about
destruction of evidence). See generally Annot. Fabrication of Suppression of Evidence as Ground of
Disciplinary Action Against an Attorney, 40 A.L.R.3d 169 (1970).
177. A relatively recent empirical study of the Boston bar concluded that although the bar tended to be
both ignorant of ethical considerations and apathetic towards their enforcement, "most lawyers in most
situations will conduct themselves properly." Burbank & Duboff, supra note 31, at 106. Moreover, the
study found "no gross deviations from standards of behavior established by the canons of ethics and from
basic social norms." Id. Consequently, the authors were able to conclude that with respect to their sample,
"most attorneys apparently are not unscrupulous." Id. Since that survey was conducted, the ABA has
instituted a requirement that all accredited law schools provide instruction in the duties and responsibilities
of the legal profession. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS § 302(a)(iii) (1975). Over time, this requirement should help diminish lawyer ignorance about
ethical considerations.
178. See notes 136-37 supra (listing cases demonstrating law enforcement officials' traditional reliance
on subpoena).
179. See O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (en bane) (absence of reported cases
regarding seizure by warrant of client's files from attorney's office indicates subpoena used with
satisfactory results).
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In summary, although some evidence undoubtedly would be lost by
requiring law enforcement officials to proceed by subpoena when seeking
items from nonsuspect attorneys, the loss probably would not be substantial.
When balanced against the threat to the attorney-client relationship, such a
loss cannot justify the search of a law office.
Assertion of Privilege. Because the subject of a subpoena may assert the
fifth amendment privilege against self- incrimination,180 he might delay or
deny law enforcement officials access to relevant evidence. When law
enforcement officials serve a lawyer with a subpoena, his opportunity for
asserting his privilege against self-incrimination might be greater than the
opportunities available to a third party. In addition to claiming his own
privilege, 81 the attorney might preserve his client's privilege against self-
incrimination with respect to pre-existing documents by asserting the attor-
ney- client privilege. 182 However, the stringent "act of production" analysis of
Fisher v. United States,183 substantially diminishes the prospects of an
attorney's prevailing on such a claim. 18 4 Apart from the privilege against self-
incrimination, the attorney could preclude law enforcement access to speci-
fied items through assertion of the attorney- client privilege and the work-
product doctrine. Nonetheless, a law enforcement practice is scarcely justifia-
ble simply because it facilitates the circumvention of significant rights or
privileges.
Delay. The delay inherent in a motion to quash a subpoena might
represent the most serious obstacle to the subpoena preference rule because it
180. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473-474 (1976). Although Andresen severely limits an
attorney's ability to assert the privilege when confronted with a search warrant, it does not eliminate that
potential altogether because instances might occur in which the police will need the attorney to perform
some affirmative task such as opening a locked file cabinet or retrieving information stored in a computer.
See also Teeter & Singer, supra note 127, at 864 (courts overlook problem of searching officer's access to
reporter's information stored in newspaper's computer; might be impossible to retrieve information except
through specially trained editors or technicians); Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 78-82 (statement of
Robert Lewis, Society of Professional Journalists) (many newspapers converted to electronic systems with
video display terminals and computers to process and store copy); N.Y. Times, July 27, 1980, § I, at 1, 32,
cols. 1, 4 (employees of Boise, Idaho, television station subjected to search refused to operate monitoring
equipment that would have permitted police to view tapes). Under the "act of production" analysis of
Fisher v. United States, however, a court probably would not consider actions of this nature "testimonial."
Thus, the privilege would be inapplicable. See note 49 supra and accompanying text (discussing Fisher's
"act of production" analysis).
181. The attorney cannot claim his privilege against self-incrimination in response to a subpoena for
firm records unless he is a sole practitioner. See United States v. Mandel, 437 F. Supp. 258, 261 (D. Md.
1977) (attorney cannot assert privilege against self-incrimination with respect to subpoena for calendar
supplied by partnership).
182. In Fisher v. United States the Supreme Court indicated that the privilege against self-incrimination
may not be asserted vicariously. 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976). An attorney, however, may invoke the attorney-
client privilege to protect the client's privilege against self-incrimination with respect to preexisting
documents transferred to the attorney for purposes of obtaining legal advice if the documents would have
been protected by the client's privilege against self-incrimination while in the client's possession. Id. at 397-
405. Recent cases suggest that an attorney confronted with a search warrant ultimately may assert these
same privileges. See note 107 supra and accompanying text (listing courts holding that documents within
scope of attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine may not be seized during law office search).
183. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
184. See notes 44-49 supra and accompanying text (discussing Fisher).
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can derail a criminal investigation. 8 5 If litigation over a motion to quash
proceeds at a routine pace, the consequent delay might prove substantial.186
Prosecutors fear the resulting loss of physical evidence and investigatory
leads, the fading of memories, and the disappearance or intimidation of
witnesses.187 Furthermore, procedural delays might cause statutes of limita-
tions to run or grand jury terms to expire.
Not all of the potential harm attributable to delays inherent in the
subpoena process can be overcome. Nevertheless, any harm might be
minimized substantially by using a "forthwith" subpoena 88 in extreme cases
and by applying procedures designed to expedite the litigation of motions to
quash in all instances. 189 The subpoena preference rule could allow law
enforcement officers to conduct a search after a court has issued an
enforcement order but before all appellate remedies have been exhausted
when the officers demonstrate that further delay would result in a specific and
severe injury to the interests of justice. 190 Prosecutors might fear that defense
185. The Supreme Court has balked at allowing courts to employ procedures that threaten to delay
criminal investigations. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-50 (1974) (extending exclusionary
rule to grand jury proceeding would unduly delay criminal investigations); United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (requiring preliminary showing of reasonableness by grand jury before ordering witness to
submit to voice exemplar would frustrate public interest in expeditious administration of criminal law).
186. One law enforcement representative has noted that "[i]n the hands of an innovative and creative
defense counsel ... litigation [involving the validity of a subpoena] can consume months of time.
Irrevocable damage to an investigation is almost inevitable." Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 320
(statement of Paul L. Perito, National District Attorneys Ass'n). But see Letter from Sen. Birch Bayh to
Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, at 4 (May 21, 1980) (delay should not pose serious problem in
white collar-crime cases because investigations routinely run for months or years and rarely demand
emergency action).
187. See Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 328 (statement of Paul L. Perito, National District
Attorneys Ass'n) (observing that immediate search minimizes hazards of fading memories, loss or
destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses).
188. See Bekavac, Third Party Searches, in Searching Law Offices: A Delicate Balance, L.A. LAW., Oct.,
1979, at 12, 14 ("forthwith" subpoena useful when speed critical to investigation). The "forthwith"
subpoena requires the recipient to produce immediately the materials requested by a grand jury, a court, or
a prosecutor. The primary purpose of this device is to frustrate the removal, concealment, or destruction of
the items sought. See United States v. Re, 313 F. Supp. 442, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (use of "forthwith"
subpoena of accounting files upheld when accountant might allow defendant to tamper with files).
189. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(c)(2) (West Supp. 1980) (court must hear motion that documents
seized from attorney's office privileged or confidential within three days of execution of warrant or at
earliest practicable date); cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (1976) (agency must determine whether to comply
with Freedom of Information Act request within 10 days and determine appeal within 20 days); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161 (1976) (federal courts must meet specified time limits in indictment and trial of federal criminal
defendants); 28 U.S.C. § 1826(b) (1976) (federal court of appeals must dispose of appeal from civil
contempt confinement order within 30 days of filing of appeal notice). See also Cantrell, Zurcher Third
Party Searches and Freedom of the Press, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 35, 44-45 (1979) (proceedings on motion to
quash cause short delay with expedited hearing).
190. The recently enacted Privacy Protection Act of 1980, which generally prohibits the searches or
seizures of documentary materials held for public dissemination, does allow for such searches when the
materials have not been produced in response to a court order directing compliance with a
subpoena duces tecum and-
(A) all appellate remedies have been exhausted; or
(B) there is reason to believe that the delay in an investigation or trial occasioned by further
proceedings relating to the subpoena would threaten the interests of justice.
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attorneys will use the motion to quash as a dilatory tactic to undermine
investigations of the defendants. Although an attorney may employ those
procedures provided by the adversary system for his client's protection, 191 the
bar has recognized that the manipulation of the legal process for "no
substantial purpose other than delay" constitutes improper conduct.
192
Furthermore, the traditional reliance on subpoenas as the standard method of
seeking evidence from attorneys suggests that the police and prosecution have
adapted to the attendant delay. If the procedures suggested above are
employed, the delay inherent in the subpoena preference rule should be
reduced to an acceptable level.
Availability of Subpoenas. In some jurisdictions subpoenas are not
readily available during the early stages of an investigation. 193 In these
jurisdictions, a subpoena preference rule might create a significant problem by
banning all law enforcement access to pertinent evidence. Nonetheless, the
problem might be solved by maintaining a grand jury on standby status, by
permitting a rural prosecutor to obtain a subpoena from a grand jury in
another jurisdiction, or by vesting a prosecutor with the limited authority to
issue a subpoena for evidence believed to be in the possession of an attorney.
The severe threat to the attorney-client relationship justifies placing on the
state the burden of developing investigatory procedures less intrusive than the
search warrant.194
Pub. L. No. 96-440 § 101(b)(4)(A), (B), (1980). This exception is limited by other provisions in the Act. For
example, the Act's exception does not apply to work product held in connection with the public
communication of information. Id. § 101(a). Prior to production, the person in possession of the items has
the opportunity to submit an affidavit explaining why a seizure should not occur. Id. § 101(c). See S. REP.
No. 959, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980) (ennumerating factors to be considered in applying interests of
justice exception). Despite these protections, the breadth and generality of the exception are matters of
concern. Although the exception probably is necessary to accommodate the needs of law enforcement, it
could become a significant loophole in the subpoena preference rule. See Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at
412 (testimony of Richard Gottfried, Assemblyman and Chairman of the Codes Committee, New York
State Assembly) (arguing that proposed exception to subpoena preference rule must be tightly drafted to
avoid gaping loophole).
191. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,480 (1966) (when attorney advises client to exercise right to
remain silent, thereby delaying investigation, he merely fulfills sworn duty).
192. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 77, rule 3.3(a). The Model Rules remind each lawyer that he
must "make every effort consistent with the legitimate interests of the client to expedite litigation." Id.; cf.
ABA CODE, supra note 73, DR 7-102(A)(1) (attorney shall not take any action on behalf of client that
might "serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another").
193. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563 n.10 (1978) (California law and practice may
preclude use of subpoena as investigatory technique). Generally, the authority to issue a subpoena is vested
in the grand jury but withheld from the prosecutor and the police. See Note, Search and Seizure of the
Media, supra note 105, at 984 (states reserve subpoena power to grand jury); cf. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-801
(1977) (subpoena power granted to prosecuting attorney to investigate own cases). Outside of urban areas,
grand juries do not always sit on an ongoing basis. See Brief of Attorney General of Minnesota as Amicus
Curie at 6 n.9, O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1980) (en banc) (most counties do not have
grand juries that meet on regular basis); Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 312 (testimony of James Zagel,
National District Attorneys Ass'n) (grand juries sit once every six months in some counties). In some
jurisdictions, the subpoena duces tecum may not be available at all. Id. at 319 (testimony of Paul L. Perito,
National District Attorneys Ass'n).
194. See Revised Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 152, at 9 (recommending that states enact
legislation authorizing issuance of subpoenas to attorneys before criminal charges filed or grand jury
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C. THE SUBPOENA PREFERENCE RULE ON BALANCE
The subpoena preference rule offers the best practicable accommodation of
the interests of the prosecution and the defense.195 The attorney-client
relationship is fundamental to our system of judicial administration. The
search of a lawyer's office undermines the privilege of confidentiality and
thereby threatens the attorney-client relationship.
The objections raised to the subpoena preference rule often are overstated
or irrelevant and can be remedied easily. Given the legal and ethical
obligations of the bar and its traditional fulfillment of those obligations,
attorneys served with subpoenas usually will not either suppress evidence or
fail to comply with a final judicial enforcement order. Furthermore, the
possibility that defendants might assert constitutional or statutory privileges
in response to a subpoena is not a legitimate concern. Any delay in the
enforcement process can be minimized substantially through the use of
"forthwith subpoenas," the adoption of expedited procedures, and the
creation of a carefully defined exception for specific prejudice to significant
interests of justice. State legislatures can cure any gap in the ability of law
enforcement officials to obtain a subpoena during the early stages of an
investigation.
Finally, the rule proposed is only one of preference. When the police have
probable cause to believe that an attorney is implicated in criminal activity,
would suppress evidence, or would fail to comply with a final judicial
enforcement order, a magistrate should issue a search warrant. 196 The social
benefits achieved by preserving the integrity of the attorney- client relation-
ship, including the benefits to the administration of justice, more than
investigation instituted even though subpoena preference rule should not be imposed as legal obligation);
Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 295 (statement of Dominic P. Gentile, National Ass'n of Criminal
Defense Lawyers) (Congress should not refrain from placing on state legislatures burden of making
subpoena power available for investigatory purposes). See also Jones, The Aftermath of Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily: The Need for Legislation to Prohibit Third Party Search Warrants for Lawyers' Files, ARIZ. BAR J.
11, 22 (Feb. 1980) (discussing proposed legislation that would amend Arizona law to implement subpoena
preference rule with respect to press, clergy, attorneys, physicians, and other subjects of privileged
communications and explicitly would grant local law enforcement agencies authority to obtain subpoenas
for evidence).
195. Cf O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400,405 (Minn. 1979) (en bane) (subpoena preference rule
limits police ability to obtain information; rule necessary to preserve attorney-client privilege).
196. The ABA Criminal Justice Section Committee on the Exclusionary Rule has argued that a
subpoena preference rule will encourage "prosecutors to allege conspiracy between lawyer and client,"
which in turn will discourage attorneys from representing white-collar criminals. Moreover, it will prove
exceedingly difficult to establish that an attorney is likely to destroy evidence in response to a subpoena.
Revised Report, Exclusionary Rule, infra note 152, at 2-3.
The Committee apparently holds as low an opinion of prosecutors as it does of the defense bar in that it
assumes they would behave improperly by alleging that fellow attorneys are criminally culpable in the
absence of adequate evidence. Cf. ABA CODE, supra note 73, DR 7-103 (prosecutor shbuld not institute
criminal charges when obvious they are not supported by probable cause). There is no reason to believe that
the average prosecutor would disregard ethical considerations and tender unsupported allegations to the
magistrate. Consequently, there is no reason to believe that this possibility would cause any significant
number of attorneys to turn away frequently lucrative white-collar criminal defense work or to violate their
professional duty to assist in making legal counsel available to those in need. See ABA CODE, supra note
73, Canon 2 (lawyer should assist legal profession in fulfilling duty to make legal counsel available).
Finally, it may be true that it will often be difficult to prove that a nonsuspect attorney might destroy
evidence subject to legal process, but to a large extent the difficulty of proof will be a function of the fact
that such misconduct will rarely occur.
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outweigh the social costs of slower or less thorough criminal investigations
resulting from abuse of the rule. Assuming that the rule is socially desirable,
the question arises whether the rule is required by the Constitution or may be
implemented through legislation.
D. IS THE SUBPOENA PREFERENCE RULE CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED?
The search of an attorney's office implicates the fourth amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. The argument that the fourth amendment requires the
police to proceed by subpoena when seeking evidence from a nonsuspect
attorney is straightforward. The first clause of the amendment establishes
"the right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and
seizures." 197 A court determines the reasonableness of a search by "balancing
the need to search against the invasion which the search entails." 198 Con-
sequently, the concept of reasonableness permits the courts to evaluate the
constitutionality of search and seizure procedures according to the demands
of the situation. 199 Warrantless searches generally are unreasonable per se,200
and a court might hold that a search pursuant to a warrant is unreasonable if
it exceeds the scope of the warrant or is significantly more intrusive than
necessary. 201 Arguably, a court should hold that the search of a nonsuspect
attorney's office conducted pursuant to a warrant is unreasonable because the
evidence sought probably could be obtained with the significantly less
intrusive subpoena duces tecum. Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court
adopted this rationale in O'Connor v. Johnson.202
Despite these arguments, recent Supreme Court decisions may have
foreclosed the issue. In Andresen v. Maryland203 the Court sustained the
search of an attorney's office.204 Furthermore, in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily205
197. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
198. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967); accord Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
654 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976). See generally Greenberg, The
Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since
Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1011 (1973).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-58 (1976) (uniform checkpoint stops
reasonable given need to patrol border); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505-06 (1973) (warrantless
seizure of film before public showing unreasonable when sheriff had time to seek warrant); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (warrantless blood test reasonable when police believed blood
composition changes with passage of time).
200. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 357 (1967).
201. 2 LAFAVE TREATISE, supra note 36, § 4.10(d), at 160-61. In Zurcher the Court acknowledged that
it was not asserting that "searches, however or whenever executed, may never be unreasonable if supported
by a warrant issued on probable cause and properly identifying the place to be searched and the property to
be seized." 436 U.S. at 559-60. As a practical matter, however, a court usually will find that a search
conducted pursuant to a valid warrant is reasonable. See Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment,
42 U. CHI. L. REv. 47, 69-70 (1974) (fourth amendment reasonableness requirement overcome when
warrant satisfies probable cause, particularity, and oath requirements).
202. 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (en banc). The value of this decision as a fourth amendment
precedent is limited, however, because the court relied upon both the United States Constitution and the
Minnesota Constitution.
203. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
204. Id. at 484.
205. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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the Court explicitly held that under some circumstances the subpoena
preference rule is not mandated constitutionally. 206 To determine whether the
subpoena preference rule has been foreclosed by the Supreme Court, these
decisions will be analyzed.
Significance of Andresen v. Maryland. Although Andresen v. Maryland
approved the search of an attorney's office, neither the majority opinion nor
the dissent suggests that such a search deserves special consideration. The
Court's silence on this point might be interpreted as establishing that the
subpoena preference rule is not constitutionally required for law office
searches.207 The case, however, can be read more narrowly. The constitutional
implications of invading the attorney-client relationship in a law office search
pursuant to a warrant were neither presented to the Supreme Court,208 nor
considered by the state court of appeals. 209 Even if the issue had been
presented to the Supreme Court, it would have been waived if it had not been
presented to the lower courts in a timely manner.210 Furthermore, as a matter
of policy, the Court limits the scope of its review to questions presented in the
petition for certiorari.211 Finally, even though it could have done so, the Court
206. Id. at 567-68.
207. See Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 260, 162 Cal. Rptr. 857, 862 (Ct. App.
1980) (Andresen establishes search warrants for attorney's office files not per se unreasonable as violative of
fourth amendment).
208. The petition for certiorari as granted was limited to the following questions:
I. May an attorney at law, who is a sole practitioner, invoke his privilege against self-
incrimination under Amendment V to the Constitution of the United States, to prevent the
introduction of his personal handwritten notes and memoranda, books and records, which
were seized from his desk and files in his personal office, under a search warrant held to be
otherwise reasonable, into evidence against him at his criminal trial?
II. Was the search of petitioner's offices violative of Amendment IV to the Constitution of the
United States?
44 U.S.L.W. 3200-01 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975).
Although the statement of the issues, particularly issue II, would have permitted the Court to focus on the
particular problem posed by a law office search, the questions did not expressly address the issues of
confidentiality and privilege. Thus, the Court did not consider these issues. The petitioner's most direct
reference to these concerns was his assertion that the "inner sanctum of petitioner's law offices" had been
invaded. Brief of Petitioner at 5, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
209. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reviewed 28 separate points of error, including a laundry
list of fourth amendment claims, which were raised by the petitioner. Andresen v. State, 24 Md. App. 128,
134-36, 331 A.2d 78, 100 (Ct. Spec. App. 1975), affd, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). The list of errors did not
include any issues relating to the attorney-client privilege. Apparently, at one point in the state court
proceedings, the petitioner asserted that items protected by the attorney-client privilege had been seized.
Brief of Respondent at 20, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). This contention, however, was not
addressed by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. Of course, one might argue that the parties failed to
raise, and the courts therefore failed to address, this issue because they assumed that a law office is not
entitled to special protection. That point, however, was not obvious, particularly prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Zurcher.
210. See New York ex rel Cohen v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 317 (1937) (Court will not review federal
question not raised or considered by state court); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
§ 6.27, at 457 (5th ed. 1978) (Court considers only questions raised, argued, and briefed in lower court); C.
WRIGHT, supra note 90, § 108, at 552 (Court considers only federal questions properly presented to state
courts).
211. See Sup. Cr. R. 21(l)(a) (only questions set forth in petition or fairly included therein considered
by Court); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 210, § 6.27 at 457-58 (same); C. WRIGHT, supra note 90,
§ 108, at 552 (same).
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surely would not have resolved sub silentio an issue so important to the legal
profession and society.212
Conceivably, the factual setting in Andresen precluded discussion of both
the attorney-client privilege and the subpoena preference rule. It is possible
that none of the documents seized was protected by either the attorney-client
privilege or the work-product doctrine.213 Alternatively, a magistrate could
readily have found that officials might have considered a subpoena duces
tecum impracticable and a warrant necessary because the police suspected
that the attorney was involved in criminal conduct. 214 Because Andresen
involved a criminally suspect attorney, it presented facts distinguishable from
the most of the more recent law office search litigation.
215
Significance of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily. The Supreme Court held in
Zurcher that the fourth amendment does not require a subpoena preference
rule when police seek evidence in the possession of an ordinary nonsuspect
third party.216 The Court also held that the first amendment does not require
the rule when the third party is a newspaper.217 Unless a constitutional
distinction exists between attorneys and journalists, the same rule apparently
would apply to the search of a law office.
The Court recognized that the rationale of its decision could be extended to
the search of a law office. In his dissenting opinion Justice Stevens explicitly
observed that the consequences of the Court's decision could be extensive
because "[c]ountless law-abiding citizens-doctors, lawyers, merchants, cus-
tomers, bystanders-may have documents in their possession that relate to an
ongoing criminal investigation. ' 218 The Court, however, did not explicitly
212. Cf. Bells v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92 n.2 (1974) (Court not bound by prior decision in similar
case when issue in controversy had not been raised).
213. The Supreme Court opinion indicates that many of the documents seized were standard papers
that related to real estate transactions. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 468, 484 (1976); accord,
Andresen v. Maryland, 24 Md. App. 128, 166-167, 178-179, 331 A.2d 78, 102-03, 109-10 (Ct. Spec. App.
1975). Because documents of this nature usually are not prepared in anticipation of litigation, they
probably would not be protected by the work-product doctrine. See WRGrr, supra note 90, § 82, at 409
(documents prepared in regular course of business not protected by work-product doctrine).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's reference to the seized papers as "business records" suggests the
papers were not protected by the attorney-client privilege. 427 U.S. at 465. To the extent that any
documents fell within the protection of the privilege, the privilege might have been waived by its holders.
The testimony offered against Andresen by his former clients, 427 U.S. at 465-72, suggests the possibility of
such a waiver.
214. See 427 U.S. at 466 (state officials had probable cause to believe attorney had committed state
crime of false pretenses).
215. See 287 N.W.2d 400, 402 (Minn. 1979) (en bane) (Andresen distinguishable because attorney
suspected of criminal offense).
216. 436 U.S. 547, 559 (1978).
217. Id. at 565-66.
218. Id. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Stanford Daily raised the following hypothetical in its
petition for rehearing:
A lawyer's file contains evidence relevant to a criminal investigation of his client. The
documents sought are kept in a file room containing files of numerous clients. As would
ordinarily be the case with an attorney's files, the specified documents are in a file surrounded
by other documents, not sought by the warrant, protected by the attorney-client privilege.
The police have no reason to believe the lawyer, who is believed to be reputable, would
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acknowledge these implications. Rather, the Court accorded great weight to
the lack of constitutional precedent for applying a subpoena preference rule to
searches involving either nonsuspect third parties or the press.219 Similarly, no
authority supports the application of the rule to law office searches. 220
The subpoena preference rule embodies an application of the least drastic
alternative principle often employed in constitutional analysis. This principle
provides that a state must use the least drastic, practicable means of achieving
its objective when its action threatens to intrude on a fundamental constitu-
tional right.221 The Court occasionally has declined to apply the least drastic
alternative analysis in fourth amendment cases. 222 Indeed, Zurcher might be
construed as rejecting the doctrine since the Court refused to prohibit the
third party search despite the availability of the less intrusive subpoena
preference rule.223 If Zurcher is so construed, the subpoena preference rule is
not constitutionally required in the context of a law office search. Like
disregard a subpoena or destroy the evidence. They nevertheless obtain a warrant and appear,
without warning, and demand immediate access to the file room. The lawyer's request that he
be permitted to locate the documents sought by the subpoena is denied, the police explaining
that they are entitled to look and select for themselves in accordance with the warrant.
Respondents Petition for Rehearing at 6, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
219. See 436 U.S. at 554-59 (opinion of Court) (indicating that neither language of fourth amendment
nor precedent supports distinction between suspects and nonsuspects).
220. As Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion, "[tihere is no authority either in history or in
the Constitution itself for exempting certain classes of persons or entities from its reach." Id. at 570
(Powell, J., concurring). Although law enforcement officials are not required under the fourth amendment
to use a subpoena when they have probable cause to believe that evidence will be found in a law office, a
substantial body of case law confirms that they have done so in the past. See notes 136-37 supra (cases
demonstrating frequent use of subpoenas). The Court essentially responded to the suggestion that a
prosecutor should use a subpoena by noting that because subpoenas generally are easier to obtain than
search warrants, "[w]here ... subpoenas would suffice, it can be expected that they will be employed by the
rational prosecutor." 436 U.S. at 563 (opinion of Court).
221. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980) (state utility commission
regulation completely banning public utility advertising that promoted use of electricity violates first and
fourteenth amendment when commission failed to show that it could not achieve its objective through a
less restrictive regulation); see Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 425 U.S. 366, 376-77 (1976)
(Mississippi regulation restricting sale of milk in state invalidated under commerce clause; state could
accomplish its objective by less burdensome means). See generally Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the
Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REV. 254 (1964); Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitu-
tional Adjudication: An Analysis, A Justification and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1974); Note,
Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
222. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n.12 (1975) (logic of less restrictive
alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to exercise of search and seizure powers); cf.
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51- 52 (1970) (debatable whether seizure of automobile while warrant
obtained less intrusive than immediate search). But see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-61 (1979)
(stopping automobile for license and registration check in absence of articulable suspicion or systematic
plan unreasonable under fourth amendment when less intrusive alternative available).
223. In rejecting the subpoena preference rule, the Court stressed that
[t]he Fourth Amendment has itself struck the balance between privacy and public need, and
there is no occasion or justification for a court to revise the Amendment and strike a new
balance by denying the search warrant in the circumstances present here and by insisting that
the investigation proceed by subpoena duces tecum, whether on the theory that the latter is a
less intrusive alternative or otherwise.
436 U.S. at 559. But cf Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 362 (statement of Jerome B. Falk, Jr., counsel
for the Stanford Daily) (Zurcher Court erred in failing to employ reasonableness analysis).
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Andresen, however, Zurcher can be read more narrowly. The Court might
have declined to apply the doctrine not because it is irrelevent in fourth
amendment analysis, but because its proponents failed to establish that it
would accomplish the state's objective of preventing the loss of evidence and
avoiding potential delay.224 To some extent, the crucial fourth amendment
concept of reasonableness would seem to embody the least drastic alternative
analysis. 225 This result is particularly true when police practice threatens both
the fourth amendment right to privacy and other constitutional protections
such as the sixth amendment right to counsel. 226 Assuming that Zurcher has
not foreclosed the least drastic alternative analysis, the question becomes
whether the subpoena preference rule offers prosecutors a means to obtain
evidence from attorneys that is substantially as effective as a search. As was
noted above, the attorney's ethical obligations as an officer of the court
significantly minimize the danger that evidence will be destroyed.227 In this
regard, attorneys can be distinguished from ordinary nonsuspect third parties
and, to a lesser extent, from the press. Like attorneys, reporters, as "institu-
tional third parties" may legitimately acquire criminal evidence in the course
of their work, and seldom will they be criminal accomplices or participate in
or condone the destruction of evidence. 228 Yet in Zurcher the Court declined
to consider whether the status of the party believed to be in possession of the
evidence was important.229 There is no reason to believe that the Court would
proceed any differently in a case involving an attorney.
Legislation can cure the problems of delay and the unavailability of
subpoenas during the early stages of an investigation. 230 After Zurcher,
224. 436 U.S. at 561-62 (record fails to demonstrate subpoena serves purpose of search warrant without
hampering criminal investigation).
225. See Note, The Reasonableness of Warranted Searches of Third Parties, 44 AiLB. L. REV. 212, 232
(1979) (fourth amendment reasonableness analysis may require use of least drastic means test) [hereinafter
Note, Searches of Nonsuspect Third Parties]; 86 HARV. L. REV. 1317, 1324-26 (1973) (fourth amendment
reasonableness analysis allows for requirement that police use least intrusive means); Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Civil Rights, Report on Legislative Response to Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, reprinted in S. 1790 Hearings, supra note 22, at 188 (least intrusive alternative principle
rooted in fourth amendment privacy); cf. Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 58 (statement of Philip B.
Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division) (stating that as matter of policy law
enforcement officials should resort to search only if request or subpoena would threaten legitimate law
enforcement purposes).
226. Cf. Henry v. Perrin, 609 F.2d 1010, 1013-14 (1st Cir. 1979) (trial court directed to determine
whether state could achieve objective of prohibiting contraband smuggling by procedures less threatening
to right to counsel than visual screening of attorney's case file), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1652 (1980). In
Henry the First Circuit based its decision on the sixth rather than the fourth amendment. Id.
227. See notes 149-79 supra and accompanying text (discussing ethical and legal obligations of
attorneys). The Court in Zurcher noted that although the "ethical stance" of the nonsuspect third party
might be relevant, "it is doubtful that he should... be permitted to object to the search... and insist that
the officers serve him with a subpoena duces tecum." 436 U.S. 547, 560 (1978).
228. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REv. 57, 206-07 (1978) (neutral third parties
possessing evidence "extremely unlikely" to be culpable or sympathetic to criminals). In Zurcher Justice
Powell noted that as a matter of principle the Stanford Daily "had announced a policy of destroying any
photographs that might aid prosecution of protesters." 436 U.S. at 568 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
Counsel for the newspaper subsequently explained that, when taken in its proper context, the policy
contemplated destruction of photographs only prior to service of a subpoena. Privacy Hearings, supra note
20, at 362 n.1 (statement of Jerome B. Falk, Jr., counsel for Stanford Daily).
229. 436 U.S. 547, 560 (1978).
230. See notes 185-94 supra and accompanying text (discussing legislative efforts to alleviate problems
of delay and unavailability of subpoenas).
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however, there is little room to argue that the fourth amendment requires the
states to take such steps.
In Zurcher the Stanford Dailycontended that the prospect of a newsroom
search impaired the freedom of the press by causing physical disruption that
could delay publication, by deterring confidential sources from providing
information to reporters, by discouraging reporters from recording and
preserving their recollections, by inhibiting the processing of news since
internal editorial deliberations might be disclosed, and by encouraging the
press to engage in self-censorship to conceal information of interest to the
police.231 The law office search similarly threatens the attorney-client rela-
tionship. The prospect of a search would inhibit client communication, deter
attorneys from creating and preserving work product, encourage inefficient
practices designed to keep seizable privileged materials beyond the grasp of
the police, and impede compliance with deadlines. 232 The Court concluded in
Zurcher, however, that the fourth amendment's procedural safeguards will
adequately preserve first amendment values.233 Unless a constitutional
distinction exists between the threat to a free press and the threat to the
attorney-client relationship, the same conclusion should follow with respect
to the law office search.
The values protected by the attorney-client privilege are at least as
fundamental as those protected by the freedom of the press. Although the
sixth amendment right to counsel is implicated by the attorney-client
relationship, the first amendment specifically guarantees freedom of the press.
The law office search differs from the newsroom search in that it threatens a
well-established common law privilege. The search of an attorney's office
endangers both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine.
The Court in Zurcher, however did not suggest that privileged material was
examined or seized during the search of the Stanford Daily's office.234 Thus,
the Zurcher search is factually distinguishable from the typical search of a law
office. This distinction, however, will not always exist. A slight majority of
the states now have recognized a reporter's privilege, which in certain
circumstances permits members of the press to withhold the identity of
confidential sources or the contents of their communications. 235 Con-
231. 436 U.S. at 563-64.
232. See notes 105-35 supra and accompanying text (discussing Zurcher's potential impact on attorney-
client relationship).
233. 436 U.S. 547, 565-66 (1978).
234. See id. at 552 (Stanford Daily did not advise police that areas searched might contain confidential
materials); id. at 574 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (Stanford Daily did not claim evidence sought privileged from
disclosure).
235. To date, 26 states have adopted a reporter's privilege. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1976); ALASKA
STAT. § 09.25.150-.220 (1973); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (West Supp. 1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
43-07 (1964); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 4320-4326 (1975);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 111-119 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3.5-1 (Burns Supp.
1978); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Bobbs-Merrill 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1451-1454 (Vest
Supp. 1978); MD. CIS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.5e (1978);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.021023 (West Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-601.1-.2 (Allen-
Smith Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1977); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-21 (West Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Allen-Smith Supp. 1975);
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-03.2 (1976); OHIO REV.
CODE AN. § 2739-04 (Page Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West Supp. 1978); OR. REV,
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sequently, in many jurisdictions, the search of a newsroom, like that of a law
office, might threaten a recognized evidentiary privilege.
The Supreme Court in Zurcher enigmatically remarked that "state shield
law objections that might be asserted in opposition to compliance with a
subpoena are largely irrelevant to determining the legality of a search warrant
under the Fourth Amendment. '236 Presumably, the Court believed that these
statutes were intended to apply only in formal testimonial proceedings. 237 If
the states that have recognized a reporter's privilege disagree, then they may
provide explicitly that the immunity is intended to apply in the search and
seizure context. California, for example, enacted such a provision following
the Supreme Court's opinion in Zurcher.238
Assuming that both law office and newsroom searches threaten evidentiary
privileges, the courts still might permit newsroom searches more readily than
a law office search. The Supreme Court has observed that although privileges
promote important policies and values, they "are not lightly created nor
expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth. '239
The Court's statement suggests that the attorney- client privilege and, to a
lesser extent, the work-product doctrine are distinguishable from the report-
er's privilege on the basis of pedigree. The attorney-client privilege is the
oldest of the testimonial privileges240 and currently is recognized in all state
and federal courts.241 Although the Supreme Court did not recognize the
work-product doctrine formally until 1947,242 it is now well established and
widely recognized in the states.243 In contrast, the common law has never
recognized a "reporter's privilege."' 244 Although many states have either
enacted a reporter's shield statute or adopted a reporter's privilege judicially,
these developments are relatively recent and are not universal.245 Moreover,
STAT. § 44.510-530 (1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Purdon Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-
I to -3 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-113 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1978).
Federal legislation establishing a similar privilege has not been enacted. See Zurcher Hearings, supra
note 33, at 105-07 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) (proposed reporter's privilege legislation failed because
of lack of congressional consensus).
236. 436 U.S. 547, 567 (1978).
237. But see Note, Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 105, at 962-71 (language, legislative
history, and purpose of most reporter's shield laws indicate they apply in search and seizure context).
238. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1980) (member of press has immunity from citation for
contempt for refusing to disclose unpublished information).
239. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). In Nixon, however, the Court established a
qualified, constitutional privilege for presidential communications. Id. at 708-09; cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153, 175 (1979) (evidentiary privileges not favored).
240. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE § 503 [02], at 503-15 (1975).
241. Tarlow, supra note 29, at 341.
242. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1947). Prior to the Court's decision in Hickman, much
of the material that is now protected by the work-product doctrine was protected by other devices,
including the attorney-client privilege. 4 W. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.63(3)-(4) (1979) [hereinaf-
ter MOORE].
243. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 82, § 2022, at 189 n.98 (providing citations to state
codifications of work-product doctrine).
244. See Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80
YALE L.J. 317, 321 (1970) (common law requires reporter to testify concerning information received from
confidential sources).
245. See note 235 supra. Nine of the 26 states that have recognized a reporter's privilege have done so
since 1971. See DEL. CODE tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1975) (adopted 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, §§ 111-119
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the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes246 declined to derive a qualified
reporter's immunity from grand jury subpoenas under the first amendment,
despite an alleged threat to free press values.247 Apparently the courts will
protect an established privilege more readily than an emerging one.248
The contrast between the Supreme Court's recent treatment of the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine and its consideration
of the asserted constitutionally-based reporter's privilege evidences this
judicial inclination. In Fisher v. United States,249 for example, the Court
accepted the underlying premise of the attorney-client privilege-that clients
would be reluctant to confide in their attorneys if they believed that their
adversaries had access to the contents of their communications. 250 Similarly,
in United States v. Nobles251 the Court explicitly reaffirmed the assumption
made in Hickman that open discovery of an attorney's work-product would
inhibit the creation and preservation of trial preparation material. 252 In
Branzburg v. Hayes,253 however, the Court was unwilling to assume that the
grand jury power to subpoena a reporter to appear and disclose his sources
would cause confidential sources to withhold information from reporters or
restrict the dissemination of information to the public. 254 In Zurcher, the
Court observed that, as in Branzburg v. Hayes, it was not convinced "that
(Smith Hurd Supp. 1978) (adopted 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.021-.023 (West Supp. 1978) (adopted
1973); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1977) (adopted 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-03.2 (1976)
(adopted 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West Supp. 1978) (adopted 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §
44-510-530 (1978) (adopted 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-1 to -3 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1979) (adopted
1971); TENN. CODE-ANN. § 24-113 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1978) (adopted 1973).
246. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
247. Id. at 667.
248. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Trammel v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 906 (1980), does not
suggest otherwise. In Trammel the Court held that only a witness spouse may invoke the federal privilege
against adverse spousal testimony. Id. at 914. In the course of its decision, however, the Court
distinguished the spousal immunity doctrine from other confidential communications privileges, such as
the attorney- client privilege. Id. at 913. Indeed, the Court noted that its holding did not disturb the
independent privilege for confidential interspousal communications. Id. Moreover, the Court observed that
because the rationale underlying the privilege against adverse spousal testimony is antiquated, the privilege
has been rejected by an increasing number of states. Id. at 911-12. The attorney-client privilege, however,
continues to serve its purpose and is still retained in all federal and state jurisdictions. Tarlow, supra note
29, at 341.
249. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
250. Id. at 403. In Fisher, however, the Supreme Court ultimately decided that the documents were not
within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. Thus, the Court did not act on the assumption that a client
will hesitate to confide in his attorney if that confidence is available to an adversary.
251. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
252. Id. at 236-38. The acknowledgement, however, was dictum because the Court ultimately held that
the work product had not been impermissibly invaded. Id. at 239-40.
253. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
254. Id. at 690-91, 693. The Court concluded that it had no reason to believe that a large percentage of
all confidential news sources were implicated in criminal activity or possessed information of interest to
grand juries.-Id. at 691. Although the Court conceded that some sources might be deterred, it concluded
that "[e]stimates of the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas on the willingness of informants to make
disclosures to newsmen are widely divergent and to a great extent speculative." Id. at 693-94. The Court
further reasoned that any chilling effect on confidential news sources would be mitigated because the grand
jury might never call the reporter, the prosecution might not require a reporter to appear, and the sources
might need to publicize their views. Id. Moreover, the Court noted that grand jury hearings are conducted
in secret and law enforcement officials are experienced at protecting witnesses. Id.
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confidential sources will disappear and that the press will suppress news
because of fears of warranted searches." 255
Considering the inherently speculative nature of this chilling effect, the
Court in Branzburg and Zurcher seems to have saddled the press with an all
but impossible burden of proof.25 6 Indeed, as Wigmore earlier had recognized,
attorneys would have difficulty meeting such a standard of proof and
demonstrating that candid client communications would decline or that the
quality of representation would suffer 257 if the attorney-client privilege or the
work-product doctrine were impaired.258 The courts, however, have accepted
the premises of these doctrines on faith.25 9 The contrast between, this
deferential approach to the underpinnings of the attorney-client privilege and
the work-product doctrine and the skeptical view of the reporter-source
privilege might not be satisfying intellectually. It does suggest, however, that
the courts are more willing to protect the attorney-client privilege against
infringement. Conversely, the pronounced judicial inclination to construe all
evidentiary privileges restrictively260 might obliterate any such distinction.
255. 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978). Consequently, the Court concluded that any incremental effect on the
availability of confidential sources as a result of possible newsroom searches "does not make a
constitutional difference." Id. But see id. at 571 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (newspaper office search more
likely to inhibit confidential sources than subpoena). The Carter administration has concluded that
Zurcher poses a serious threat to the ability of the press to gather and disseminate information. Carter
Administration Stanford Daily Announcement, reprinted in Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 350;
Statement of Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, to Members of the Press (Dec. 13, 1978), reprinted in id. at
348-49. The House Committee on Government Operations made a similar finding. Search Warrants and
the Effects of the Stanford Daily Decision, Report of the House Comm. on Government Operations, H. R.
REP. No. 95-1521, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1978). [hereinafter Search Warrants Report].
256. In his dissent in Branzburg Justice Stewart argued that the evidence in the record did in fact prove
the existence of a chilling effect. 408 U.S. 665, 749-51 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Furthermore, he
indicated that "[tihe impairment of the flow of news cannot, of course, be proven with scientific precision,
as the Court seems to demand .... Id. at 733. See also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 570, 571-74
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (common sense and journalist's testimony demonstrate chilling effect of newsroom
search pursuant to warrant).
257. See generally, 8 WIGMORE, supra note 79, §§ 2290-2329, at 541-641.
258. See notes 116, 124 supra and accompanying text (discussing lack of empirical proof demonstrating
benefits of privileges).
259. See, eg., In re Subpoena (Murphy), 560 F.2d 326, 333-34 (8th Cir. 1977) (assumption that
restrictions on access to attorney's files necessary to protect legal profession); Duplan v. Moulinage et
Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 736 (4th Cir. 1974) (assumption that uninhibited attorney-client
conversations necessary for justice), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); United States v. Colacurcio, 499
F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1975) (assumption that requiring disclosure of attorney-client confidences will
have chilling effect).
In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court held that presidential communications are presumptively
privileged because disclosure would tend to chill expression of candid opinions by the President and his
advisors. 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974). The Court characterized this as a "broad, undifferentiated claim of
public interest in confidentiality," id. at 706, and held that this claim must yield to a "demonstrated,
specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial." Id. at 713. Superficially, this statement suggests that
the public interest in obtaining relevant criminal evidence must always prevail over the general interest in
encouraging confidential communication whether between president and advisor or attorney and client.
The implications of Nixon, however, should not be extended beyond the peculiar facts of the case. See
Kurland, United States v. Nixon: Who Killed Cock Robin?, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 68, 74 (1974) (validity of
Nixon Court's reasoning on proper balance between confidential communications privileges and law
enforcement needs restricted to that case).
260. See, eg., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977) (attorney work-
product doctrine strictly construed because of adverse effect on disclosure of truth); In re Ampicillin
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Even if the issue remains technically open, Zurcher suggests that no
constitutional basis exists for the subpoena preference rule in the law office
context. Although the rule attempts to reconcile the competing interests,
Zurcher discourages any such judicial accommodation under the rubric of
"Fourth Amendment reasonableness."' 26' Rather, as the Court stated, the
"Fourth Amendment has itself struck the balance. '262 The Court identified
legitimate threats to law enforcement, 263 but did not seriously consider the
character or dimension of the potential intrusion into the privacy of innocent
third parties. Instead, the Court concluded that "the net gain to privacy
interests by the District Court's new rule would not be worth the candle. '' 264
The Court acknowledged the dangers to the press of a newsroom search, 265
but simply failed to consider the institutional character of the press and the
interest of the press in preventing the disappearance of evidence.
Although the Court has indicated a willingness to adjust the standards of
probable cause and particularity to unique situations, 266 it properly viewed the
adoption of the subpoena preference rule as a major modification of standard
search and seizure procedure. 267 The Supreme Court indicated in Zurcher
that the district court, as a practical matter, had prohibited searches in what
could be a significant class of cases.2 68 Because the Court viewed the search
warrant as a valuable tool of law enforcement, it allocated the all but
insurmountable burden of proving the negligible effect of the subpoena
preference rule on law enforcement to the rule's proponents. 269 The Court
may have had two reasons for concluding that the burden has been sustained.
The rationale supporting the rule cannot be proven with certainty; further-
more, if conscientiously applied to all ordinary nonsuspect third parties, the
rule would indeed have a significant impact. Although the adverse effect of
the subpoena preference rule would be minimal if applied solely to law offices,
the bar might not be able to establish this effect. While the facts of Zurcher
dealt only with the press, the Supreme Court suggested in its opinion that the
Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 384 (D.D.C. 1978) (because work-product doctrine obstacle to truth,
it should be construed strictly); Cohen v. Uniroyal, 80 F.R.D. 480, 483 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (because attorney-
client privilege obstacle to truth, it should be construed strictly).
261. 426 U.S. 547, 560 (1978); see Note, Searches of Nonsuspect Third Parties, supra note 225, at 226
(Zurcher did not mandate showing of reasonableness if procedural requirements for warrant satisfied).
262. 436 U.S. at 559.
263. See id. at 560-61 (threats to law enforcement inherent in subpoena process include concealment of
evidence and misidentification of suspects).
264. Id. at 562; cf. id. at 579-83 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (rule permitting searches of nonsuspect third
parties will invade parties' privacy). Because the nonsuspect third party rarely would become a criminal
defendant and thus would not have standing to invoke the exclusionary rule, the Court rejected the
argument that the extra protection of the subpoena preference rule was necessary in this context. Id. at 562-
63 n.9 (opinion of Court).
265. Id. at 563-64.
266. See, e.g., id. at 564 (scrupulous exactitude requirement applies to search of press office); Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978) (special probable cause standard for OSHA inspection);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (special probable cause standard for civil
administrative searches); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (warrant must describe evidence
arguably protected by first amendment with scrupulous exactitude).
267. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 550 (1978) (contrary holding would reconstrue
fourth amendment); id. at 554 (no direct authority for district court's sweeping revision of fourth
amendment); id. at 567 (no reason to reinterpret fourth amendment).
268. Id. at 553.
269. Id. at 560-62.
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subpoena preference rule is not constitutionally required in any context.270
Indeed, it might have proven embarrassing for the Court to have created a
special exception for attorneys from its seemingly comprehensive holding.271
Such a restrictive application would be especially troublesome in the wake of
the Court's rejection of similar arguments by its most vociferous critic, the
press.272
The Court also might conclude that the law office search is not a
sufficiently serious problem to warrant limiting Zurcher or to justify extend-
ing the fourth amendment. In Zurcher, for example, the Court noted that law
enforcement officials had searched only a few newsrooms, which "hardly
suggests abuse; and if abuse occurs, there will be time enough to deal with
it."273 No comprehensive count exists of how frequently police have at-
tempted to search attorneys' offices. Although some sources estimate that law
enforcement officials have searched more than two dozen law offices in recent
years, fewer than half of these searches have been documented in any detail.274
Even if the Supreme Court believed that the problem was sufficiently
serious to warrant a response, it probably would follow the reasoning of
Zurcher and hold that the judiciary can protect the attorney-client relation-
ship through conscientious application of traditional fourth amendment
procedural safeguards. Similarly, the Court might conclude that nonconstitu-
tional protections are more than adequate. The California legislature, for
example, has enacted provisions designed to minimize significantly the
intrusive impact of the search.275 The Minnesota Supreme Court, however,
interpreted its own state constitution to prohibit the search of a nonsuspect
attorney's office in O'Connor v. Johnson.276
To the extent that the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on the federal
constitution in O'Connor, its decision was inconsistent with Zurcher. The
270. See id. at 560-63 (discussing "remarkable conclusion" of district court requiring subpoena
preference rule).
271. Cf Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1945) (because enunciated and applied by
individuals deriving benefit from its application, work-product doctrine open to criticism), affd, 329 U.S.
495 (1947).
272. For an example of the outpouring of press rage over Zurcher, see Zurcher Hearings, supra note 33,
at 158-59 (Appendix D to Statement of Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press).
273. 436 U.S. at 566. At the time the police searched the Stanford Daily, approximately one half dozen
newsroom searches had been reported. Amicus Brief of the Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press
at 11-12, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); cf. Note, Search and Seizure of the Media, supra
note 105, at 957 n.3 (listing searches of newspapers and radio stations in California).
Police searched newsrooms in Boise, Idaho, and Flint, Michigan, recently. Theses searches are the only
two reported instances of newsroom searches since the Supreme Court's decision in Zurcher. N.Y. Times,
July 27, 1980, § 1, at 1, 32, cols. 1, 4. At one point, the Boise incident raised the possibility of a law office
search as well. The police appeared at the office of the television station's attorney after being informed that
he was in possession of the originals of the tapes they were seeking. They were informed that he had
removed the tapes from his office but would not remove them from the jurisdiction. Boise Prosecutor
Fulfills Fears Created by "Stanford Daily", BROADCASTING, Aug. 4, 1980, at 2. The police also searched
the home of an editor of an Albany, Georgia, newspaper recently and seized documentary evidence
pertaining to the editor's role in a widely publicized prison escape. 6 MED. L. RE'. News Notes (BNA)
(Aug. 19, 1980).
274. See notes 19-27 supra and accompanying text (discussing law office searches in past four years); cf
S. 1790 Hearings, supra note 22, at 34 (statement of Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division) (no demonstrated pattern of abusive federal searches of professionals).
275. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524 (West Supp. 1980).
276. See 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (en bane) (search of nonsuspect attorney's office
impermissible under state constitutional provision prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures).
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O'Connor court, however, purported to distinguish Zurcher on two grounds.
First, the court noted that the record in Zurcher indicated that the newspaper
had announced that it might intentionally destroy documents of interest to
the police.277 The court then observed that it had no reason to believe that a
typical attorney would assume a similar stance in view of his ethical
obligations and the possibility of a contempt citation.278 Although this factual
distinction is valid, the majority in Zurcher did not cite the Stanford Daily's
policy. 279 Second, the court distinguished Zurcher by basing its holding in
part on the Minnesota Constitution. 280 Thus, the decision is legally justifiable,
despite its inconsistency with Zurcher. Although other state courts similarly
might attempt to distinguish Zurcher, the Supreme Court's decision effective-
ly has foreclosed the argument that the subpoena preference rule is required
by the fourth amendment when law enforcement officials seek evidence
possessed by an attorney.281
E. CAN THE SUBPOENA PREFERENCE RULE BE IMPLEMENTED
THROUGI3 NONCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?
Assuming that the subpoena preference rule represents the best practicable
accommodation of the competing interests, various nonconstitutional meth-
ods exist for implementing it. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged in
Zurcher that "the Fourth Amendment does not prevent or advise against
legislative or executive efforts to establish non-constitutional protections
against possible abuses of the search warrant procedure .... "282
The Court also might have noted that the fourth amendment does not
preclude judicial efforts to establish such nonconstitutional protections. In
recent years, judicial construction of state law, particularly state constitu-
tional provisions, has supplemented the protections of the federal Constitu-
tion.283 Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor v.
277. Id. at 405.
278. Id.
279. Justice Powell, however, did discuss the newspaper's policy in his concurring opinion. 436 U.S.
547, 568-69 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). Compare id. (Stanford Daily announced it would destroy
photographs that might aid prosecution) with Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 362 n.l (testimony of
Jerome B. Falk, Jr., counsel for Stanford Daily) (Stanford Daily policy not to destroy evidence covered by
subpoena).
280. 287 N.W.2d at 405.
281. Cf Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 117 (testimony of John Shattuck, Director, American Civil
Liberties Union) (police may search offices of doctors and lawyers as result ofZurcher); id. at 33 (statement
of Sen. Mathias) (Zurcher provides methods for circumventing confidential relationships including lawyer
and client); Falk, supra note 30, at 17 (law office can be searched after Zurcher).
282. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 547 (1978).
283. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 545, 531 P.2d 1099, 1109-10, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315,
325 (1975) (en banc) (state court can impose higher standards than federal Constitution; California
Constitution limits search to patdown for weapons in arrest for minor offense); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii
254, 260, 492 P.2d 657, 661 (1971) (state constitution may give greater protections to criminal defendants
than federal Constitution; Hawaii Constitution forbids introduction of evidence concerning defendant's
criminal record when testifying); State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160, 165 (Me. 1974) (state constitution may be
interpreted differently than federal Constitution; Maine Constitution guarantees jury trial right in all
criminal prosecutions). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Falk, The Supreme Court of California 1971-72-Foreword, The State
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Johnson exemplifies this trend. This precedent could be followed in other
jurisdictions because all fifty state constitutions contain either a provision
analogous if not identical to the fourth amendment 284 or a provision
establishing a more generalized right to privacy.28 5 Alternatively, state courts
might limit law office searches by a broad construction of state constitutional
provisions safeguarding the right to counsel286 or the state's version of
attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine. In some jurisdictions,
the local rules of criminal procedure also might impose restrictive limitations
on the issuance of warrants. In addition, because many state supreme courts
exercise inherent supervisory power over the administration of criminal
justice within their jurisdictions,287 that power might be used to protect the
attorney-client relationship in the context of law office searches.
The prospect of a legislative solution to the law office search problem is
promising. Following the searches of three Los Angeles law offices in the
spring of 1979, the California legislature amended the state Penal Code to
provide significant procedural protection to nonsuspect attorneys, physicians,
and clergy who might be subjects of searches for documentary evidence. 288
Although the new legislation does not adopt the subpoena preference rule, it
does embody procedures designed to significantly minimize the effect such
searches have on on evidentiary privileges. 289 At the federal level, Congress
Constitution: A More than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273 (1973); Howard, State
Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976); Wilkes, More
on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. LJ. 873 (1975); Wilkes, The New Fedralism in
Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. LJ. 421 (1974); Project Report,
Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 271 (1973).
284. All 50 state constitutions contain provisions that are either virtually identical or are substantially
equivalent to the fourth amendment guarantee. Eg., IOWA CONST. art. I, § 8; Mo. CONST. art I, § 15; TEX.
CONST. art I, § 9. For a complete listing of the 50 state constitutions, see Memo from David Seybold to
Lackland H. Bloom, Jr. (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
285. At least nine state constitutions contain general provisions protecting the "right to privacy."
ALASKA CONST. art. I § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art I, § 1; HAWAII CONsT. art I, § 5;
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONSr. art I. § 5; MONT. CONSr. art IL § 10; S.C. CONST. art I, § 10; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 7.
286. Cf. Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d 742, 756, 598 P.2d 818, 826, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658, 666
(1979) (state constitutional right to counsel violated when undercover deputy sheriff present during
attorney-client consultation; indictment dismissed). All 50 state constitutions guarantee the right to
counsel. E.g., IOWA CONST. art I, § 10; Mo. CONsT. art. I § 18(2); TEx. CONST. art I, § 9. See also
Memo from David Seybold to Lackland H. Bloom, Jr. (citing all 50 state constitutions) (copy on file at
Georgetown Law Journal).
287. See Revised Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 152, at 9 (courts should implement
recommended modifications to search and seizure procedure when evidence believed to be in law office by
court rule if states do not enact legislation). Cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943) (court
may rely on supervisory power over lower courts to exclude evidence). See also People v. Cowdrey, 360 111.
633, 634, 196 N.E. 838, 839 (1935) (Illinois Supreme Court has inherent power to make rules governing
practice in inferior courts); Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEo. LJ.
1050, 1051 (1965) (some state supreme courts assert broad supervisory powers over inferior courts). See
generally Supervisory Power in the United States Courts of Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 642 (1978); Note,
The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1656 (1963).
288. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524 (West Supp. 1980).
289. Id. § 1524(c). See notes 492-501 infra and accompanying text (discussing search procedures
required under California legislation). Eight states have adopted legislation designed to protect either the
press or ordinary nonsuspect third parties. H.R. REP. No. 1064, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980). See 1979 Ill.
Laws 81-806 (search warrant for press materials issued only if belief exists that evidence will be destroyed
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recently passed the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 which implements the
subpoena preference rule in the newsroom context.290 Although Congress
declined to extend the coverage of the Act to ordinary nonsuspect third
parties or privilege-holders, 291 the Act does require the Attorney General to
or party suspect); TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art 18.02 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1980) (search warrant may not
authorize seizure of mere evidence from newsroom); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-813 (Supp. 1979) (search
warrant for press materials issued only if party suspect); 1980 Wash. Legis. Serv. 52 (Vest) (subpoena
duces tecum required for press material unless belief that evidence will be destroyed or party suspect); 1979
Wis. Legis. Serv. 81 (West) (search warrant for press materials issued only if party suspect). See also Ariz.
H.B. 2333 1980 Sess. (press and privilege-holders not enacted).
290. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440 (1980). The law extends protection against
search and seizure to work-product materials and documentary evidence "possessed by a person
reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other
similar form of public communication, in or affecting . . . commerce." Id. § 101(a). The legislation
expresses an implied preference for employment of the subpoena duces tecum. A search for otherwise
protected documentary material is permissible if (1) federal law enforcement officials have probable cause
to believe the person in possession has committed or is committing a crime, (2) they have reason to believe
immediate seizure is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury, (3) they have reason to believe that
notice pursuant to a subpoena would result in destruction, alteration, or concealment of the evidence, or (4)
the materials have not been produced pursuant to a court order enforcing the subpoena and all appellate
remedies have been exhausted or the officers have reason to believe that further delay would threaten the
interests of justice. Id. § 101(b)(l)-(4). Only the first two exceptions apply to work-product materials. Id. §
101(b). See generally Note, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: The Legislative Debate, 17 HARV. J. LEO. 152
(1980) (discussing various congressional proposals to modify Zurcher) [hereinafter Note, The Legislative
Debate].
All four exceptions could be included in a law office search bill without significantly damaging the
attorney-client relationship. Such a bill would be preferable, however, if the third exception, regarding the
potential loss of evidence were altered to require a showing of probable cause rather than mere "reason to
believe." Such a change would avoid an undermining of the "committing a crime" exception. See note 141
supra (discussing implications of each standard).
The Court in Zurcher held that the fourth amendment does not forbid the states from issuing warrants
to search for evidence in possession of nonsuspect third parties. 436 U.S. 547, 560 (1977). Commentators
disagree about whether section five of the fourteenth amendment provides congressional power to regulate
nonsuspect third party searches by state and local authorities. Compare Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at
339-41 (statement of Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division) (section five of
fourteenth amendment does not permit Congress to regulate state searches ofnonsuspect third parties) with
id. at 372-75 (statement of Paul Bender, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School) (section
five of fourteenth amendment permits Congress to require adversarial hearings before third party searches
by state authorities) and id. at 375-79 (statement of William Cohen, Professor of Law, Stanford Law
School) (section five of fourteenth amendment permits congressional imposition on state authorities of
subpoena procedure for obtaining evidence from third parties) and Zurcher Hearings, supra note 33, at 61-
64 (statement of Mark V. Tushnet, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School) (section five of
fourteenth amendment permits Congress to limit press searches if reasonable way of advancing first
amendment interests). See generally Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal
Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975). The commerce clause probably provides a sufficient basis for
legislation pertaining to searches of the press by state authorities. Cf. Search Warrants Report, supra note
255, at 8-9 (Congress possibly unable to impose search limitations if no commerce clause relationship).
Because the practice of law affects interstate commerce, the commerce clause probably permits Congress to
legislate on matters pertaining to law office searches. But see Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 339
(testimony of Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division) (question whether
practice of law affects commerce more difficult than whether press does).
291. Title II of the original Senate version of the Act would have protected work-product material and
documentary evidence held by a person in a jurisdiction that considered these materials privileged. Id. S.
1790, § 201, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Title III similarly called for protection of such materials held by a
nonsuspect third party. Id. § 301. H.R. 3486, a parallel House bill, also extended protection to nonsuspect
third parties when reported out of the House Committee on the Judiciary. These provisions were deleted as
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establish guidelines which would recognize the "special concern for privacy
interests in cases in which a search or seizure for.., documents would intrude
upon a known confidential relationship. ... 292
Rulemaking by law enforcement agencies is another method of limiting law
office searches, however, law enforcement officers probably will not voluntar-
ily restrict their authority in this manner.293 In some jurisdictions, law
enforcement officers and the local bar association jointly might draft guide-
lines to implement the subpoena preference rule.294 Finally, prosecutors, as
members of the bar, should recognize the threat to the attorney-client
relationship and exercise their influence and authority to discourage law
office searches that are not essential to law enforcement needs.295
a result of vigorous opposition by the Department of Justice. See S. 1790 Hearings, supra note 22, at 62-64
(prepared statement of Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division) (because
proposed restrictions "severe," Department of Justice unwilling to accept them).
292. Pub. L. No. 96-440 § 201(a)(3) (1980). The Act also requires that the guidelines consider the
privacy interests of nonsuspect third parties, and encourage the use of the least intrusive method of
obtaining evidence which does not substantially jeopardize its availability or usefulness. Id. § 201(a)(1)-(2).
The Act explicitly prohibits the litigation of an issue pertaining to noncompliance with the guidelines. Id. §
202.
293. But see Blumenthal, Prosecutors Move to Curb Abuse of Newsroom Searches, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 25,
1978, at 30 (United States Attorney for Connecticut adopts guidelines to minimize intrusiveness of press
searches). In a memorandum directed to all assistant United States attorneys, Richard Blumenthal, United
States Attorney, District of Connecticut, described the guidelines his office would follow in searching news
media organizations in an attempt "to allay the potential chilling effect of the Supreme Court's [Zurcher]
decision." Memorandum from Richard Blumenthal, United States Attorney, District of Connecticut, to all
Assistant United States Attorneys, at 1 (June 20, 1978) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal). Of
particular interest, the guidelines require that "[n]o... search warrant should be sought unless there are
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of a crime is in jeopardy of being destroyed, or a subpoena
duces tecum would be otherwise impracticable." Id. at 3. See generally K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION
(1975); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 416-39 (1974)
[hereinafter, Amsterdam, Perspectives]; McGowan, Rule Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659
(1972).
294. See L.A. DA/Bar Guidelines, supra note 20 (following meeting with Los Angeles County Bar
Association, district attorney developed special procedures for law office searches). In August 1979, the
Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association recommended that the ABA support federal and
state legislation extending the subpoena preference rule to "all innocent third parties." Section of Criminal
Justice, American Bar Association House of Delegates, Reports No. 102, 1 (Aug. 1979). The ABA House
of Delegates rejected the recommendation. 65 A.B.A. J. 1289 (1979). The Section of Criminal Justice then
directed its Exclusionary Rule Committee to study the law office search problem. The Committee
recommended that various adjustments to search and seizure procedure would provide the best practicable
accommodation of the competing interests. Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 170. See also Lancaster,
Searching Lawyers' Offices: Recommendations from the ABA Criminal Justice Section Exclusionary Rule
Committee, Voice for the Defense, May-June 1980, at 45 (setting forth recommendations). At its mid-year
meeting in February 1980, the Council of the Criminal Justice Section rejected the Committee's
recommendations, voted to adopt the subpoena preference rule and directed the Committee to redraft its
report to that effect. Minutes of the Meeting of the Council of the Criminal Justice Section, Feb. 14, 1980,
at 5 (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal). The Committee declined to adopt the subpoena preference
rule, instead submitting a modified version of its initial recommendations. Revised Report, Exclusionary
Rule, supra note 152. The Council rejected the report and approved a resolution adopting the subpoena
preference rule combined with the Committee's adjustments to search and seizure procedure when the
attorney is a suspect. Minutes of the Meeting of the Council of the Criminal Justice Section, June 3, 1980,
at 4 (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
295. See Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 312 (testimony of Paul L. Perito, National District
Attorneys Ass'n) (subpoena preferred by Justice Department when third party professionals in possession
of criminal evidence). S. 1790 Hearings, supra note 22, at 154 (testimony of Richard J. Williams, Vice
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The subpoena preference rule offers the best practicable accommodation of
the legitimate needs of law enforcement and the important values of the
attorney-client relationship. In the wake of Zurcher, courts probably will not
hold that the rule is required by the federal Constitution. Therefore, the
problem must be resolved either by judicial interpretation or state law or
through the legislative or administrative process. Congress has taken impor-
tant steps toward accommodating the competing interests when a search
would pose a threat to first amendment values. To protect the attorney-client
relationship, however, greater federal and state efforts are essential.
V. ADJUSTING THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROCEDURE TO
ACCOMMODATE COMPETING INTERESTS
Even if attorneys do not have the protection of the subpoena preference
rule, courts can reconcile the interests of the attorney-client relationship with
the needs of law enforcement. The Zurcher Court's refusal to hold that the
subpoena preference rule was constitutionally necessary for a free press
essentially depended on the Court's belief that "[p]roperly administered, the
preconditions for a warrant- probable cause, specificity with respect to the
place to be searched and the things to be seized, and overall reasonableness-
should afford sufficient protection against the harms that are assertedly
threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices. ' 296 If the Court is
President, National District Attorneys Ass'n) (prosecutors will hestitate to seek search warrants for
attorneys' offices for fear of offending local bar).
A prosecutor could exercise his influence in a white collar crime investigation, which might include a
law office search, because he usually directs the investigation from its outset. See Zurcher Hearings, supra
note 33, at 178 (testimony for Richard J. Williams, National District Attorneys Ass'n) (prosecutors
involved at early stage in financial, white-collar, and organized crime investigations).
296. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1977). The Court went on to state that
there is no reason to believe, for example, that magistrates cannot guard against searches of
the type, scope, and intrusiveness that would actually interfere with the timely publication of
a newspaper. Nor, if the requirements of specificity and reasonableness are properly applied,
policed, and observed, will there be any occasion or opportunity for officers to rummage at
large in newspaper files or to intrude into or deter normal editorial and publication decisions.
Id. Likewise, after observing that the magistrate should consider first amendment values before issuing a
warrant to search a newsroom, Justice Powell noted in his concurrence that "the magnitude of a proposed
search directed at any third party, together with the nature and significance of the material sought, are
factors properly considered as bearing on the reasonableness and particularity requirements." Id. at 570 n.2
(Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
In the same vein, the Court previously had recognized that
there are grave dangers inherent in executing a warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a
person's papers that are not necessarily present in executing a warrant to search for physical
objects whose relevance is more easily ascertainable. In searches for papers, it is certain that
some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether
they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized. Similar dangers, of course, are
present in executing a warrant for the "seizure" of telephone conversations. In both kinds of
searches, responsible officials, including judicial officials, must take care to assure that they
are conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.
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correct, perhaps courts might apply traditional fourth amendment procedures
in the law office context to protect the attorney-client relationship against
abuse by law enforcement officials.297 Whether the Court's confidence in the
protective capacity of the fourth amendment is justified depends, as the Court
seemed to recognize, on how courts apply the amendment. If law enforcement
officials follow standard search and seizure procedure without modification
when they execute a warrant at a law office, existing safeguards probably
cannot protect the attorney-client relationship sufficiently. On the other
hand, if courts tailor the procedures to respond to the specific problems
presented by this unique kind of search, they might minimize significantly the
potential injury. The fourth amendment is not necessarily inadequate because
its crucial concept of reasonableness, even if insufficiently elastic to embody a
subpoena preference rule, still is capable of adjustment to address the peculiar
problems of the law office search.298
Not all of these proposed adjustments comport with existing precedent. In
reconstruing the basic concept of reasonableness, courts should differentiate
between the kind of search and seizure procedures allowed when law
enforcement officers have no reason to believe that privileged documents will
be found during a search and the kind of procedures that this article will
suggest officers should follow during a law office search. This proposal is not
a radical suggestion because the Supreme Court has recognized that "[a]
seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one setting may be
unreasonable in a different setting or with respect to another kind of
material." 299
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976). Arguably, the Court only paid lip service in
Andresen to this realization. See id. at 492-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court for upholding
validity of search warrants authorizing police to seize "overwhelming quantity" of material that was
suppressed or returned to defendant); 2 LAFAvE TREATISE, supra note 36, § 4.6(d), at 106-07 (criticizing
Court for "not ... hav[ing] been very demanding" in requiring search warrants to describe documents
particularly).
297. But see Tarlow & Johnston, supra note 118, at 42-43 Tarlow and Johnston argue that a court
cannot reconcile the state's interest in compelled seizure of documents and the attorney-client interest in
preserving constitutional protections and evidentiary privileges by adjusting search and seizure practice.
Id. They indicate that a legislature can accommodate these competing interests only by barring law
enforcement officials from using warrants to search for documentary evidence and by requiring them to
seek such evidence with a subpoena duces tecum. Id.
298. See, e.g., Note, Searches of Nonsuspect Third Parties, supra note 225, at 228, 232 (urging adoption
of reasonableness test for searches of nonsuspect third parties that would allow courts to require
subpoenas); Note, Search and Seizure of a Third-Party Newspaper: Zurcher, Chief of Police of Palo Alto v.
Stanford Daily, 20 B.C. L. REv. 783, 815 (1979) (urging adoption of reasonableness test for searches of
nonsuspect newspapers, which would allow courts to require subpoenas or procedure of "informal contact
and negotiation"); Note, Third-Party Searches in the Face of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: Toward a Set of
Reasonableness Requirements, 11 CoNN. L. REv. 660, 679 (1979) (urging adoption of reasonableness test
for searches of nonsuspect third parties that would allow issuance of warrant only upon showing of
suspicion of criminal involvement, imminent commission of serious crime, or involvement of particular
type of evidence); Note, A Procedural Standard of Reasonableness for Searches of Nonsuspect Third Parties,
64 IowA L. REv. 367, 380, 384-85 (1979) (urging adoption of "flexible reasonableness" test for searches of
nonsuspect third parties that would protect against inspection of documents that warrant fails to specify as
well as allow issuance of warrant only upon meeting particularity requirements and upon showing
sufficient governmental need).
299. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973), quoted with approval in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978). In OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Tex. 1978), the district court
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Since some of the suggested modifications are more susceptible to recogni-
tion through constitutional interpretation than others, an attempt will be
made here to assess the extent to which each proposal might be embodied
within the fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness. As with the
subpoena preference rule, nonconstitutional means might more readily
effectuate some, if not all, of the recommendations. Because not all of the
proposals are equally meritorious, some will be considered but rejected. Other
proposals might be viewed as alternative methods of achieving a single
objective. A legislative solution that provides for a comprehensive and
interdependent procedural framework is most desirable. Several existing
legislative and administrative models provide guidance with respect to
specific procedures as well as comprehensive plans. 300
The following suggested adjustments to search and seizure procedure are
not simply alternatives to the subpoena preference rule but also would
supplement the rule if it were adopted. The subpoena preference rule would
still permit police to search a law office if they have probable cause to believe
that the attorney either is criminally culpable or would fail to comply with a
final judicial enforcement order. In such a situation the absence of procedural
safeguards creates the potential for damage to the attorney-client relationship
and its associated privileges. The proposals can be understood best by
dividing the search and seizure process into three chronological segments-
issuance of the warrant, execution of the warrant, and postseizure proceed-
ings.
A. ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS
Courts rarely will sanction a warrantless search of an attorney's office since
none of the recognized warrant exceptions seems relevant. 301 Consequently,
explicitly recognized the application of this principle to attorney-client privilege materials:
Roaden teaches that in determining the reasonableness of the [Security & Exchange
Commission's] possession and use of [a report subject to the attorney-client privilege], this
court should consider the value of the attorney-client privilege ....
Because documents enjoying the attorney-client privilege have an intrinsic high expecta-
tion of privacy, arguably, a more rigorous fourth amendment standard ought to be applied to
their seizures than to seizures of other materials.
Id. at 552.
300. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(a) (West Supp. 1980) (procedures for search of attorney's
office); Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 170 (same); Revised Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note
152 (same); Law Office Search Procedure Proposed by the Attorney General of California, Exhibit 11 to
Petition of the Attorney General of California for Modification and/or Rehearing of Alternative Writ of
Mandate, Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 162 Cal.Rptr. 857 (Ct. App. 1980) (same)
[hereinafter Cal. Atty. Gen. Proposal]; L.A. DA/Bar Search Guidelines, supra note 20, at 1-2 (same). See
also title III, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976)
(procedures for intercepting wire and oral communications); Justice Media Subpoena Policy, 28 C.F.R. §
50.10(d) (1979) (procedures for use of subpoenas against media); ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAtoN-
MENT PROCEDURE § SS 220.5 (Proposed Official Draft, Apr. 15, 1975) (proposal for execution and return
of warrants for intermingled documents) [hereinafter ALI MODEL CODE].
301. The warrant requirement exceptions include exigent circumstances, hot pursuit, Terry stops,
searches incident to arrest, consent, administrative searches, vehicle searches, plain view, border searches,
and inventory searches. For a discussion of these exceptions to the warrant requirement, see Project, Ninth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1978-1979, 68
GEo. L.J. 279, 298-326 (1979) [hereinafter Criminal Procedure Project].
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all further discussion in this article will assume that law enforcement officials
conduct the search pursuant to a warrant. Adjustments can be made to the
procedure for issuing warrants to search law offices that will minimize
significantly the potential injury to the attorney-client relationship.
Limit and Centralize Authority to Apply for Warrants. Only the chief
prosecuting official of a jurisdiction should have the authority to seek a search
warrant for an attorney's office because lower-level officials might not assess
carefully the degree of law enforcement necessity, the severity of the threat to
the attorney-client relationship, and the possibility of less intrusive alterna-
tives. 302 Because such an official often will be politically accountable he is less
likely to abuse this power. As long as the law office search remains the
exception rather than the rule, this requirement should not be unduly
burdensome, particularly if the chief prosecuting officer may share the
authority with an explicitly designated assistant. Although potentially useful,
this procedure is not constitutionally mandated. Nonetheless, the federal
eavesdropping law303 and the Connecticut Newsroom Search Guidelines304
provide models for adopting this procedure.
Vest Authority to Issue Warrants in Courts of General Jurisdiction.
The majority in Zurcher placed great faith in the ability of magistrates to
protect the press against overly intrusive searches. 305 Magistrates, however,
might be institutionally incapable of adequately evaluating the subtle and
complex constitutional considerations that are implicated when police seek a
warrant to search a newsroom. 306 This view in part reflects the widespread
belief that magistrates do not sufficiently safeguard ordinary fourth amend-
ment privacy interests.307 Just as a magistrate's consideration of the fourth
302. See O'Neill, Effective Law Enforcement, in Searching Lawyers' Offices: A Delicate Balance, L.A.
LAw., Oct., 1979, at 46 (suggesting authority to issue warrant could be vested in "high ranking member of
the prosecutorial agency involved"); Revised Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 152, at 6 (warrant to
search law office may only be issued by chief prosecutor).
303. See title HI, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1976) (only
Attorney General or specially designated Assistant Attorney General or principal prosecuting attorney of
state or political subdivision may authorize order for wiretap).
304. The United States Attorney for Connecticut adopted guidelines that prohibit law enforcement
officials from seeking a warrant for the search of a newsroom without the express approval of both the
United States Attorney and the Attorney General of the United States. Blumenthal, supra note 293, at 30,
col. I. The Department of Justice Media Subpoena Policy also provides that no member of the Department
of Justice may request the issuance of a subpoena for use against a member of the news media without the
express authorization of the Attorney General. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(d) (1979).
305. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978) (stating there is "no reason to believe...
magistrates cannot guard against searches ... that would actually interfere with the timely publication of a
newspaper").
306. See Cantrell, supra note 189, at 51-52 (magistrates incapable of adequately fashioning scope of
warrant because they do not have definitive guidelines, do not receive input from press, do not have
sufficient training, and tend to sympathize with police); Teeter & Singer, supra note 127, at 858-59(magistrates incapable of protecting press because they do not have sufficient training and tend to
sympathize with police); Search Warrants Report, supra note 255, at 4 n.8 (magistrates often not lawyers
and usually unlikely to protect first amendment interests); cf Weinreb, supra note 201, at 71-72 (although
magistrate "neither detached nor very competent," search warrant procedure useful because it compels
police to specify and rationalize scope of search).
307. See, e.g., S. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 58, 126 (1980) ("theoretical
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amendment aspects of a newsroom search will be affected by the complexity
and sensitivity of first amendment considerations, his assessment of the fourth
amendment aspects of a law office search will be complicated by the various
privileges of the attorney-client relationship.
In response to this general concern, Professor Sam Dash has observed that
"[w]hether we believe that magistrates obey the law, whether we believe they
are rubber stamps for prosecutors, they are all we have." 308 In view of the
serious threat to the attorney-client relationship, the complexity of the issues,
and the exceptional nature of the police practice, however, a court of general
jurisdiction should be vested with the exclusive authority to issue a warrant to
search a law office. 309 This proposal would ensure that before a magistrate
issued a warrant, a truly neutral, detached, and legally-trained judicial officer
would have the opportunity to balance carefully the competing interests, to
evaluate the threat to recognized privileges, to assess the possibility of
alternative sources of evidence, and to assure that the police employ
procedures designed to minimize the intrusion.
Because the Supreme Court has reiterated its belief that a magistrate can
adequately protect both first310 and fourth amendment31 interests, the Court
probably will not hold that the fourth amendment requires such a procedure.
If some of the proposals set forth below are adopted, then courts of general
jurisdiction will not have to replace magistrates in this limited context. 312
magistrate" who protects fourth amendment interests "is largely a myth"); LaFave, Improving Police
Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part I: Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L.
REV. 391, 411-13 (1965) (magistrates do not effectively scrutinize police practices); LaFave & Remington,
Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MIcH. L.
REV. 987, 991-93 (1965) (same); Miller & Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision: A Study
of Current Practices, 1964 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 4-7 (same).
308. Privacy Hearings, supra note 20, at 63 (testimony of Sam Dash, Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center).
309. Cf. id. at 300 (Paul L. Perito, National District Attorneys Ass'n) (judge, not magistrate, should
issue search warrant particularly for search of newsroom).
310. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978) (stating magistrate capable of guarding
against searches that would interfere with timely publication of newspaper); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S.
483, 492 (1973) (dictum) (suggesting magistrate capable of issuing warrant for seizure of allegedly obscene
fim).
311. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-50 (1971) (plurality opinion) (stating neutral
and detached magistrate protects fourth amendment interests against overzealous police officers); Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (same). In Shadwick v. City of Tampa the Supreme Court held
that the fourth amendment does not prohibit a nonlegally trained magistrate from issuing arrest warrants
for violation of city ordinances provided the magistrate is neutral, detached, and capable of determining
whether probable cause exists. 407 U.S. 345, 354 (1972). Arguably, in the typical law office search, in
which the substantive crime might be a complex fraud and in which delicate questions of privilege will
arise, a nonlegally trained magistrate is incapable of adequately assessing probable cause. Thus, a court
might distinguish the Shadwick holding in applying the warrant clause of the fourth amendment to the law
office search. See 2 LAFAvE TREATISE, supra note 36, § 4.2(c), at 34 (nonlegally trained magistrates may
not be capable of making complex determinations concerning probable location of specific objects in
specific place at specific time). As an alternative to vesting exclusive authority in a court of general
jurisdiction, a legislature iight prohibit a nonlegally trained magistrate from issuing a warrant for a law
office search. See generally Federal Magistrate Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631(b) (1976) (magistrates appointed by
federal district court judges must be qualified members of bar unless no such individuals available).
312. The federal eavesdropping statute provides a legislative model for this proposal. See title III,
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1969, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(9)(a), 2518(1) (1976) (only federal
judges and state judges of courts with general criminal jurisdiction may authorize electronic surveillance).
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Require Consideration of Potential Invasion of Privileges. In an ex parte
hearing before a magistrate, neither the attorney nor his client has an
opportunity to assert claims of privileges before the magistrate issues a
warrant.3 13 To ensure that neither the magistrate nor the officers seeking the
warrant will overlook the potential effect of a search on the attorney-client
privilege or the work- product doctrine, the officers should establish that they
have probable cause to believe that the documents specified in the warrant are
unprivileged; the magistrate should make specific fimdings to that effect.314
Since the police are likely to find privileged documents in a law office, this
requirement is neither unfair nor unreasonably burdensome. The requirement
merely ensures that the items sought legitimately are subject to seizure
without violating a privilege. The Supreme Court of California apparently
recognized this need in Burrows v. Superior Court315 when it declared that the
attorney-client privilege "was clearly violated by the failure of the warrant to
limit the search to material relevant to the charge of misrepresentation. '3 16
At the preseizure hearing, police should not be required to establish with
any certainty that the documents sought are not privileged because only the
attorney and client might have that information. If the officers can describe
the evidence with constitutionally sufficient particularity, establish probable
cause to believe that the evidence will be found on the premises, and
demonstrate a nexus between the criminal activity and the evidence, a court
should allow them to demonstrate that the documents probably are un-
privileged. Beyond simply showing that the evidence has no relationship to
the attorney-client privilege, the police may demonstrate that they have
probable cause to believe that the items are not subject to the privilege by
establishing that (1) they have reason to believe that the items held by the
client are preexisting documents not otherwise privileged, (2) the client made
the communications contained in the documents to further a continuing or
313. Cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 549, 576 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (issuance of search
warrant does not provide opportunity for pre-execution challenge).
314. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Civil Rights, Report on
Legislative Response to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, reprinted in S. 1790 Hearings, supra note 22, at 216
(recommending court be required to make affirmative finding that no probable cause exists to believe that
documents subject to seizure privileged before issuing search warrant); Jones, supra note 194, at 20, 22
(suggesting judge make presearch determination that documents not privileged). But cf. In re Walsh, 623
F.2d 489, 493-94 (7th Cir. 1980) (Government need not establish that information and materials sought
from attorney nonprivileged before attorney subpoenaed to appear before grand jury because burden of
establishing existence of privilege rests on party asserting it).
The recent California legislation and the procedures adopted in 1979 by the Los Angeles Distric't
Attorney and County Bar Association require the warrant application to state that an attorney controls the
premises the law enforcement officiais intend to search. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1525 (West Supp. 1980); L.A.
DA/Bar Guidelines, supra note 20, at 1-2. Neither this legislation nor these procedures, however, will
ensure that magistrates will not issue warrants authorizing the seizure of privileged material.
315. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
316. Id. at 251, 529 P.2d at 598, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 174. Burrows concerned an attorney who allegedly
misappropriated a client's funds. Id. at 240, 529 P.2d at 591, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 167. Under an arrangement
suggested by the attorney, the client made child support payments to the attorney, who promised to
forward them to the court trustee, who in turn would forward them to the child's mother. Id. at 241, 529
P.2d at 592, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 168. The attorney allegedly kept the payments. Id. This financial
arrangement presumably did not involve confidential communications between the attorney and client as
the court indicated by finding that the warrant authorized seizure only of financial records relevant to the
transaction. Id. at 250, 529 P.2d at 598, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 174. Therefore, such evidence would have been
beyond the scope of the attorney-client privilege.
1980]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
future crime or fraud, (3) either the client or the attorney talked to a third
party about the documents for purposes unrelated to legal advice, (4) the
client did not make the communications embodied in the documents to obtain
legal advice, or (5) any other exception to the privilege probably is applica-
ble.317
Similarly, the police may establish that they have probable cause to believe
that the work-product doctrine does not apply by demonstrating that they
have reason to believe that (1) the lawyer did not prepare the evidence in
anticipation of litigation, (2) the evidence contains purely factual material
essential to the prosecution's case that is unavailable from alternative sources,
or (3) the lawyer prepared the material to further a continuing or future crime
or fraud. 318
Even if the magistrate correctly determines that a document is not
privileged, he unwittingly might authorize the seizure of privileged material
when either the attorney or his client previously made privileged notations on
the otherwise unprotected item. Nevertheless, many protected documents
could be excluded from the scope of the warrant if, before issuing the warrant,
the magistrate considered thepossibility that the police might seize privileged
materials. To ensure that this protective function is performed and to provide
a means for review, the magistrate should make a record of the Government's
showing and his findings.
By analogy, the Supreme Court frequently has emphasized that the police
may not seize purportedly obscene material pursuant to a search warrant if
there is "no step in the procedure before seizure designed to focus searchingly
on the question of obscenity. ' 319 The Court requires this procedure to
decrease the chance that law enforcement officials will remove from circula-
tion materials protected by the first amendment. 320 Comparably sensitive
procedures are necessary to minimize the potentially irreparable harm to the
policies of attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine if an officer
examines or seizes materials within their scope. Courts construe the first and
fourth amendments together as providing an increased measure of protection
when values implicated by the free speech guarantee of the first amendment
are threatened by a practice that courts ordinarily would permit under the
fourth amendment. 321 Similarly, courts should require the same type of
protection under the sixth and fourth amendments when a warranted search
317. See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text (describing exceptions to attomey-client privilege).
318. If the police demonstrate that the evidence is unlikely to constitute opinion work product and if
they establish sufficient necessity to override the qualified immunity of nonopinion work product, the
magistrate should issue the warrant. See notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text (describing scope of
protection for opinion and nonopinion work product).
319. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717,732 (1961). Compare Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496,
506 (1973) (unlawful to seize allegedly obscene film without warrant) and Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia,
392 U.S. 636, 636-37 (1968) (per curiam) (unlawful to seize allegedly obscene films pursuant to warrant
issued by magistrate on basis of policeman's affidavit that stated only titles of films and policeman's
determination that films obscene) with Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 485, 492 (1973) (lawful to seize
allegedly obscene film pursuant to warrant authorized by magistrate who viewed fdm). For a discussion of
the special procedures required when law enforcement officials conduct a search for obscene material, see
F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBsCENrrY 206-19 (1976); Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83
HARv. L. REV. 518, 520-24, 532-39(1970).
320. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 493 (1973); F. SCHAUER, supra note 319, at 206.
321. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501-05 (1973).
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endangers the privileges central to the concept of effective assistance of
counsel.
Ensure that No Substantially Equivalent Alternative Source of Evidence Exists.
To render effective representation, an attorney must acquire a significant
quantity of nonconfidential as well as confidential information concerning his
client's affairs. 322 Law enforcement officials might discover that many of the
nonprivileged documents held by an attorney also are held by other sources,
including clients, accountants, banks, realtors, private investigators, insur-
ance companies, or government agencies.323 Indeed, many documents an
attorney possesses might be nonprivileged and seizable solely because they
have been circulated to other parties.
Law enforcement officers might conclude that because an attorney must be
a collector of sundry materials, a law office search offers the best opportunity
to obtain incriminating evidence. To discourage the police from exploiting the
attorney-client relationship, a magistrate should require the officers to search
any other location where the police have probable cause to believe the
evidence will be found before executing a search warrant at a law office.
Alternatively, the magistrate should demand that the police submit an
affidavit attesting either that they have no probable cause to believe that the
evidence will be found elsewhere or that they have probable cause to believe
that the search of another location would risk destruction or removal of the
evidence believed to be in the law office. Since the police could discharge their
burden by showing an absence of probable cause to believe that the evidence
might be found elsewhere, they should not have to search every other
conceivable location before directing their attention to an attorney's office.
Rather, the magistrate should be satisfied if the police have conducted a
reasonable investigation of potential alternative sources and have concluded
that none exists.
Arguably, by imposing a duty of reasonable investigation upon law
enforcement officials, a magistrate might interfere with police discretion and
unreasonably delay criminal investigations. As a matter of sound investigative
practice, however, the police presumably will have tried to determine whether
the evidence they hope to find in a law office can be located elsewhere.
Furthermore, the magistrate should apply this requirement of reasonable
investigation flexibly. Rather than second-guess particular police practices,
the magistrate could discharge his responsibility by concluding, based on the
description tendered by the officer, that a good faith effort had been made. A
court reviewing the search should defer to the magistrate's conclusion.
Good police practice may dictate that when officers have probable cause to
believe that evidence can be found at more than one location, they will search
many locations simultaneously to prevent an alerted suspect from destroying
322. See Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d 742, 751, 598 P.2d 818, 822, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658, 662
(1979) (right to effective assistance of counsel places defense attorney under duty to "gather as much
information as possible about the case").
323. The warrant for the search of the Kaplan & Livingston firm, for example, authorized the seizure of
contracts, letters, and other business documents of the client that the police probably could have found at
other locations. Indeed, the warrant authorized simultaneous searches for these documents at six locations
in addition to the law firm. Petition of Attorney General for Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition and for
Stay Order, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Exhibit 3 (search warrant), Deukmejian v. Superior
Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 255, 162 Cal. Rptr. 857, 859 (Ct. App. 1980).
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or removing the evidence. 324 When the police can show that they have
probable cause to believe that an attorney is a suspect or that evidence would
disappear if they delayed the search, the magistrate should not require them
to search other locations first and thereby risk losing the evidence. When the
risk of destruction is not as great, the magistrate could issue warrants to
search all feasible locations, including the law office, on the condition that the
police not search the law office until they had searched the other locations
and failed to discover the evidence sought. In some instances, the police will
have probable cause to believe that some, but not all, of the documents sought
could be found at other locations. Because the police would have no
substantially equivalent alternative means of acquiring the remaining evi-
dence, the magistrate should allow them to search the law office immediately.
These options represent applications of the least drastic alternative doctrine.
Assuming that Zurcher does not foreclose employment of this principle in the
fourth amendment area,325 its use is justified only if the alternative constitutes
a substantially equivalent means of achieving the law enforcement objective.
Even though the attorney might destroy or remove evidence of interest to the
police once he has been notified of a pending search, courts should presume
that the attorney can be trusted to preserve the evidence. 326
Existing statutory and administrative procedures suggest that this proposal
would not unduly burden law enforcement. Under federal law, for example, a
court may not approve a prosecutor's request to wiretap or engage in
electronic surveillance until he shows and the court finds that "normal
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear
to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous .... - 327 Similarly, the
Department of Justice will not even consider serving a subpoena on the news
media until law enforcement officials have made "all reasonable attempts" to
obtain the material from alternative sources. 328 Finally, the Privacy Protec-
tion Act of 1980 directs the Attorney General to draft guidelines requiring
that in all third party searches federal officers employ the least intrusive
324. Cf. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 466 (1976) (suspect's law and real estate offices searched
simultaneously). In both the Kaplan & Livingston and the Masry searches in Los Angeles, the police
simultaneously searched the offices of the attorney and his client. See Petition of Attorney General for Writ
of Mandamus and/or Prohibition and for Stay Order; Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Exhibit 3(search warrant), Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 255, 162 Cal. Rptr. 857, 859 (Ct.
App. 1980) (both Kaplan & Livingston firm and health clinic searched for financial records); Work, Raids,
supra note 16, at I, col. 2 (police searched both Masry's office and client's office for church financial
records).
325. See notes 221-26 supra and accompanying text (arguing that Zurcher does not foreclose use of least
drastic alternative principle).
326. See notes 149-79 supra and accompanying text (arguing that attorneys unlikely to destroy
evidence).
327. Title III, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1976). See
also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (nonopinion work product discoverable only upon showing that party could
not obtain substantially equivalent material by other means without undue hardship).
328. Justice Media Subpoena Policy, 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(b) (1979). See also In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1976). In this case the district court noted that it was
"disturbed by the practice of calling a lawyer before a grand jury which is investigating his client, especially
where the government does not have good grounds for belief that the lawyer possesses unprivileged,
relevant evidence that cannot be obtained elsewhere." Id. at 945 (dictum). But see In re Walsh, 623 F.2d
489, 493 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that Government need not establish absence of other available source of




method of obtaining evidence which does not substantially jeopardize its
availability. 329 Like this proposal, each of these examples signifies an attempt
to assure that law enforcement officials employ a particularly intrusive law
enforcement practice only as a last resort. Even if this requirement causes
delay or loss of evidence, it makes sense because as a matter of policy the law
should not encourage the police to rely on nonsuspect attorneys as a source of
criminal evidence.
Do Not Require that Evidence Be Essential to Investigation. Because of
the threat that the law office search poses to the attorney-client relationship,
courts might limit its use to only the most compelling circumstances, such as
those instances in which law enforcement officials can establish that they have
probable cause to believe that evidence essential to a criminal investigation
can be found in a law office. This limitation would restrict police action far
more than the fourth amendment does; because under current law, a
magistrate may issue a warrant only when the law enforcement officials have
demonstrated that they have probable cause to believe that any seizable item
is on the premises, 330 regardless of its importance. The Department of Justice
has suggested this more restrictive policy by refusing to issue a subpoena to
law enforcement officials seeking information from the press unless the
officials have "reasonable ground to believe that the information sought is
essential to a successful investigation-particularly with reference to directly
establishing guilt or innocence. The subpoena should not be used to obtain
peripheral, non-essential or speculative information. ' 331 Neither legislatures
nor courts should adopt this proposal. Because the restriction is so inconsist-
ent with the prevailing interpretation of the fourth amendment, courts are
unlikely to implement it through constitutional interpretation. More impor-
tantly, an "essential to the investigation" standard or another standard
intended to achieve the same result would prove extremely difficult to apply,
might affect law enforcement adversely, and would not protect the attorney-
client relationship in a rational manner.
Before an investigation has been completed, the police would have
difficulty determining and articulating whether and why an otherwise seizable
item of evidence is essential to the investigation. Much evidence might be
highly useful, though not essential. Furthermore, the police probably will find
documentary evidence in a law office. Thus, even when the police have
probable cause, they often will not be able to determine how essential a
particular piece of evidence is until they seize it, read it, and compare it with
hundreds of other items.
If police are allowed to seize only those items of evidence that initially
appear to be essential, one of two results probably will follow. If magistrates
329. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, § 201(a)(2). See also Revised Report,
Exclusionary Rule, supra note 152, at 6 (prosecutor should be under ethical obligation to use least intrusive
method of obtaining information from attorney).
330. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556-57 n.6 (1978) (quoting Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiN. L. REv. 349, 358 (1974)) (magistrates may issue warrants only for
"criminally related objects").
331. Justice Media Subpoena Policy, 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(e)(2) (1979); see Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353
F. Supp. 124, 135 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (search warrant for newsroom will issue only upon clear showing that
"important materials will be destroyed or removed" despite restraining order) (emphasis in original), aff d
per curiam, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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enforced the limitation strictly, the police often would be precluded from
obtaining enough pieces to complete the puzzle. Alternatively, faced with that
possibility, magistrates probably would find that virtually all evidence was
essential to the investigation until the defense could prove otherwise. An
"essential to the investigation" standard would protect the attorney-client
relationship in the same way that the "mere evidence" rule protected privacy
by diminishing the number of occasions when a magistrate may issue a
warrant.332 Although such a reduction would minimize potential intrusions
into the relationship, it would not accommodate the legitimate interests of law
enforcement.
Require Submission and Approval of Search Plan. The magistrate's
capacity to protect attorneys against searches that threaten recognized
privileges would be enhanced significantly if, before issuing a warrant for a
law office search, he required the police to submit for his approval a plan
designed to minimize the intrusiveness of the search. 333 The search plan need
not be complex or detailed. The magistrate should accept the plan if it
includes the reasonable safeguards that the circumstances appear to demand.
The police, for example, should be required to execute the warrant while the
attorney is present, 334 to permit the attorney to assert legitimate privileges, 335
to avoid examining files or documents that, based on caption, size, or location
within the office, do not appear likely to fall within the scope of the
warrant,336 and to deliver under seal to the court for in camera review all
purportedly privileged documents. 37 The plan also might describe how the
332. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309 (1967). Under the "mere evidence" rule, police could not
seize property solely to prove a crime. Id. at 306.
333. In Deukmejian v. Superior Court the California Court of Appeals in a preliminary order directed
the Superior Court either to withdraw its preliminary injunction preventing the search or to modify the
injunction to ensure the reasonableness of the search. No. 55977, slip op. at 1-2 (Ct. App. May 7, 1979).
The Court of Appeals suggested use of a subpoena, id. and also suggested that the Superior Court could
assure such reasonableness by providing that the firm could be searched only pursuant to a plan previously
approved by the Superior Court. Id. at 2. Although that procedure may have been the appropriate
resolution ofDeukmejian because the Superior Court was ruling on the validity of the warrant, id. at 1, as a
general rule the magistrate who issues the warrant could approve the plan. See also Bekavac, supra note
188, at 15 (suggesting that magistrate require police to conduct law office search pursuant to guidelines
designed to minimize intrusion).
334. See notes 382-89 infra and accompanying text (discussing requirement of ensuring attorney's
presence during search).
335. See notes 370-75 infra and accompanying text (discussing requirement ofproviding attorneys with
opportunity to assert privileges during search).
336. See notes 424-30 infra and accompanying text (discussing officers' duty to make reasonable efforts
to minimize intrusion).
337. See notes 433-38 infra and accompanying text (discussing removal of allegedly privileged
documents under seal to court). In its preliminary order in Deukmejian v. Superior Court the California
Court of Appeals suggested that the plan should limit the search to those files, identified with the
cooperation of the attorney, that were likely to contain materials specified in the warrant and that the
attorney should be given the opportunity to remove allegedly privileged documents and present them to the
court for in camera review. No. 55977, slip op. at 2 (Ct. App. May 7, 1979).
Assembly Bill 1609, which amended sections 1524-25 of the California Penal Code and section 915 of
the Evidence Code to provide attorneys and other privilege-holders with some protection against the
abuses of search and seizure, initially provided in part that
[any] search warrant issued... for any item.., in the possession or under the control of any
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officers intend to assure that an attorney will not conceal or destroy
documents during the search.338
Essentially, a search plan would require law enforcement officials to
consider and articulate in advance how they intend to conduct the search in a
constitutionally reasonable manner.339 The proposal allows the magistrate to
guide the police early enough so that they can cure the defects that otherwise
might lead a court to invalidate the completed search.340 Before a court will
issue a wiretap order, for example, the police must provide a detailed, sworn
description of the methods they will employ to minimize the intrusiveness of
the tap.34 ' Like this requirement, the search plan proposal probably would not
hamper law enforcement unduly. At most, the police would have to spend a
little more time preparing for the warrant hearing, and the hearing might be
lengthened slightly. As a result, however, the interests of both effective law
enforcement and the attorney-client relationship would be promoted without
significant sacrifice to either.
Since existing fourth amendment jurisprudence offers no clear support for
a search plan, such plans might not be constitutionally required with respect
to law offices. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently indicated in Dalia v.
United States342 that the fourth amendment does not require the use of search
plans. In Dalia the Court held that an order authorizing the interception of
oral communications was not insufficient even though FBI agents failed to
specify that they would execute the order through covert entry.343 The Court
explained:
Nothing in the language of the Constitution or in this Court's
decisions interpreting that language suggests that . . . search
warrants... must include a specification of the precise manner in
which they are to be executed. On the contrary, it is generally left
to the discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of
how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized
by warrant. .... 344
attorney, physician, psychotherapist, or clergyman shall contain provisions which are
designed to minimize to the greatest extent feasible consistent with the objective of obtaining
evidence of criminal activity, intrusion into items which may be privileged and items which
relate to persons who are not suspected of involvement in the conduct being investigated.
A.B. 1609 § 3(a), Cal. Leg., 1979-1980 Sess. (1979) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal). The provision
would have accomplished the basic objectives of the search plan requirement. Unfortunately, the
legislature deleted it prior to passage of the bill. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1524-25 (West Supp. 1980).
338. See notes 396-400 infra and accompanying text (arguing that officers should seek voluntary
cooperation of attorney in producing evidence; as a precaution, however, officers should complete search if
they suspect attorney would hide or destroy evidence).
339. See Weinreb, supra note 201, at 72 (compelling police to consider reasonableness of search might
be most significant function of warrant requirement).
340. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507-08 (1978) (magistrate should assure that proposed search
will be reasonable, which requires balancing need for intrusion with threat of disruption to occupant).
341. Title III, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1976).
342. 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
343. Id. at 257.
344. Id. (emphasis added).
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Even if the Constitution does not require a search plan, a legislature or
administrative body should incorporate this protection into any proposal for
regulating law office searches.
Insist on a Higher Degree of Particularity. An attorney's fear that
officers executing a search warrant will invade his privacy by unnecessarily
rummaging through his office and seizing items that are not specified in the
warrant is not peculiar to the law office search. To reduce this threat, the
fourth amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue [unless they]...
particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. ' 345 Beyond limiting the scope of the search, the particularity require-
ment helps ensure that probable cause to seize the specified items exists, 346
aids the magistrate in assessing the reasonableness of the proposed search, 347
and restricts after-the-fact justification by ensuring that the police prepare a
preseizure record of the items sought. 348
When the possibility exists that law enforcement officials might examine or
seize privileged or otherwise protected material, the need for specificity
increases. The majority in Zurcher explicitly cited the particularity require-
ment as a significant measure that protects against an overly intrusive search
of the press.349 The Court also recalled that it had insisted in Stanford v.
Texas350 that the requirement "be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude
when the 'things' are books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which
they contain. ' 351 The Zurcher Court concluded that "[w]here presumptively
protected materials are sought to be seized, the warrant requirement should
be administered to leave as little as possible to the discretion or whim of the
officer in the field. '352
Since privileged material often will be subject to exposure in a law office
search, a constitutionally acceptable warrant must describe the items sought
345. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
346. 2 LAFAVE TREATISE, supra note 36, § 4.6, at 96-97; see United States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6, 7 (Ist
Cir. 1980) (holding that lack of particularity in warrant violated probable cause requirements); In re
Lafayette Academy, Inc., 610 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1979) (same).
347. S. SALTZBURG, supra note 307, at 57; see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971)
(plurality opinion) (particularity requirement prevents "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's
belongings"); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (particularity requirement safeguards freedoms
against "the whim of the officers"); 2 LAFAVE TREATISE, supra note 36, § 4.6, at 95 (particularity
requirement prevents general searches).
348. S. SALTZBURG, supra note 307, at 57; see 2 LAFAVE TREATISE, supra note 36, § 4.6, at 95
(particularity requirement prevents seizure of objects upon mistaken assumption that they fall within
magistrate's authorization).
349. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564-66 (1978).
350. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
351. Id. at 485. In Stanford v. Texas the Supreme Court invalidated a search pursuant to a warrant
authorizing the seizure of "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party of Texas. . . ." Id. at 486.
Fourteen cartons of material were seized, including books by Pope John XXIII and Justice Hugo Black, as
well as a marriage certificate, insurance policies, household bills, and personal correspondence. Id. at 479-
80. The Court noted, however, that "[a] 'book' which is no more than a ledger of an unlawful enterprise...
might stand on a quite different constitutional footing from the books involved in the present case." Id. at
485 n.16. See United States v. Torch, 609 F.2d 1088, 1090 (4th Cir. 1979) (1980) (warrant insufficiently
specific to authorize seizure of obscene materials but sufficiently specific to authorize seizure of business
records), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2928 (1980).
352. 436 U.S. at 564.
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with a high degree of specificity. Recognizing this requirement, the California
Supreme Court353 and trial courts in Los Angeles, California,354 and Portland,
Oregon, 355 have invalidated searches of law offices, in part at least, because
the police used insufficiently particular warrants.356 The principle is stated
simply but not easily applied. Although a magistrate must require the police
to be sufficiently specific, he must be careful to assure that the officer
executing the warrant can separate the items that are subject to seizure from
those that are not.357 When police describe files and documents by title, date,
author, intended recipient, and size, they can minimize the risk that they will
examine or seize irrelevant documents. 358 Frequently, however, the docu-
ments sought will not bear these identifying characteristics or the officers will
be unable to obtain this type of information. Consequently, the police might
have to describe documents generically, as they did in Andresen v. Mary-
353. Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 248, 529 P.2d 590, 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1974).
354. In re Law Offices of Bregman, No. SW 15591, slip op. at 2 (L.A. Mun. Ct. June 4, 1979). The court
explained that "third party search warrants of law firms ... must be drawn with scrupulous exactitude."
355. In re Stewart, No. DA-180-730-7910, slip op. at 2 (Or. D. Ct., Multnomah County, Dec. 4, 1979).
356. The First Circuit recently invalidated as insufficiently particular a warrant that could be read as
authorizing the seizure of all Medicare and Medicaid records located in a doctor's office. United States v.
Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 547 (1st Cir. 1980). In so doing, the court observed:
In a case involving the detailed examination of voluminous business records of a person being
investigated for possible criminal activity, the usual method of obtaining such records is by
subpoena.... We realize that the issue of a subpoena always entails the risk that the records
will be tampered with or even destroyed before they are delivered. The government's only
alternative to this procedure, however, is strict compliance with the fourth amendment's
requirement of a particularized warrant.
Id.
357. Police ordinarily seek documentary evidence from attorneys. In People v. Doyle, however, the
police seized a stolen typewriter in addition to client files. 77 Cal. App. 3d 126, 127, 141 Cal. Rptr. 639, 640
(Ct. App. 1977). In another case FBI agents searched an attorney's safe deposit box for money stolen from
a bank and for a sawed-off shotgun used to commit the robbery. In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 364 (E.D.
Va.) (per curiam), aff d per curiam, 381 F.2d 713, 714 (4th Cir. 1967). Likewise, in the vast majority of
cases in which attorneys have been served with subpoenas, the Government sought client files or firm
records. In one case, however, FBI agents served an attorney with a subpoena duces tecum requesting
production of stolen funds. In re January Grand Jury (Genson), 534 F.2d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 1976). For
citations to cases concerning attorneys served with subpoenas duces tecum, see notes 136-37 supra.
358. See, e.g., United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 545 (1st Cir. 1980) (invalidating warrant
authorizing seizure of doctors' Medicaid files in part because warrant did not incorporate time period for
dates of records sought); In re Lafayette Academy, Inc., 610 F.2d 1, 4 n.4 (1st Cir. 1979) (dictum) ("[in
many instances of warrants authorizing the seizure of documents from a general file efforts... may be
required to narrow the documents by category, time periods, and the like"); Pieper v. United States, 604
F.2d 1131, 1134 (8th Cir. 1979) (dicta) ("when a warrant ... is issued for the inspection of business records
on the basis of one suspected violation, the warrant must express, with some degree of particularity, the
dates of the records sought").
In In re Search Warrant the Government not only could describe the documents sought by title, date,
size, and content, but also could explain the meaning of particular file captions and indicate where the files
could be expected to be found within the office. 572 F.2d 321, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978). The FBI had much of this information because the documents had been stolen
from the office of the United States Attorney. Id. at 325. The government also must have obtained
information from someone quite familiar with the arrangement of the premises. Although a description of
the location of specified files within an office might minimize the scope of the search significantly, law
enforcement officials rarely will have information of this nature. Furthermore, the law should not
encourage the police to infiltrate a law office in order to obtain this type of data.
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land.359 Although descriptions such as "title abstracts" or "lender's instruc-
tions for a construction loan" 360 seem overly broad, they might suffice if the
officers can assure the magistrate that the search will be limited to one specific
area of the attorney's office or one set of files. 361 Alternatively, generic
descriptions might be permissible if the categories of documents specified are
limited to particular transactions or persons such as specified clients. 362 Such
descriptions, however, might not always be practicable. 363
The courts regularly have enforced subpoenas directing attorneys to
produce all documents pertaining to a particular client or matter.364 Further-
more, a subpoena, unlike a search warrant, legitimately may sanction a
fishing expedition in the subject's files.365 However, a court should invalidate
359. 427 U.S. 463 (1976). For a description of the items specified in the warrant, see id. at 480-81 n.10.
360. Id.
361. See United States v. Torch, 609 F.2d 1088, 1089-90 (4th Cir. 1979) (warrant authorizing search
and seizure of "records, documents, and writings related to the transportation... of... filthy films,
including route book, billing invoices, cash sales slips, credit memos, and other similar type documents"
sufficiently particular because, inter alia, search was limited to petitioner's person and van), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 2928 (1980).
The Los Angeles Municipal Court invalidated as overbroad the warrant to search the Cotton &
Bregman firm because the warrant authorized a search of"[a]ll rooms, cabinets, drawers, safes, closets and
other storage facilities therein." In re Law Offices of Bregman, No. SW 15591, slip op. at 2 (L.A. Mun. Ct.
June 4, 1979). The warrant in the Kaplan & Livingston case authorized the search of "[t]he multi-story
building ... including all rooms, lofts, attics, basements, desks, closets, filing cabinets, safes, vaults, and all
parts therein... storage areas, garages and outbuildings .. " Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal.
App. 3d 253, 255-56, 162 Cal. Rptr. 857, 859 (Ct. App. 1980) (quoting search warrant). Because the
officers did not seize any materials, the California Court of Appeals did not consider whether the warrant
was overbroad; rather, it permitted the officers to seek another warrant, the issuance of which would be
governed by newly-enacted legislation. Id. at 262, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
362. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-82 (1976) (upholding generic warrant that linked
some evidence to specified individuals and transactions). See also In re Lafayette Academy, Inc., 610 F.2d
1, 5 (Ist Cir. 1979) (holding that generic description of documentary evidence will be adequate if
sufficiently particular). The First Circuit has observed that most generic descriptions approved by the
courts have involved contraband or stolen property, not documentary evidence. United States v. Abrams,
615 F.2d 541, 545 (1st Cir. 1980).
Ordinarily, a generic description suffices if the police have acquired and included all reasonably
available descriptive facts in the warrant. See United States v. Cortellesso, 601 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1979)
(stating that generic description authorizes search of store when inventory consists ofstolen and legitimate
goods and when evidence establishes "reason to believe that a large collection of similar contraband is
present on the premises ... and... explain[s] the method by which the executing agents are to differentiate
the contraband from the rest of defendant's inventory"), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1016 (1980); 2 LAFAvE
TREATISE, supra note 36, § 4.6(a), at 98 ("greater degree of ambiguity" tolerated in description when police
have acquired all reasonably available facts and included them in warrant). See also United States v. Davis,
542 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir.) (stating that particularity requirement applied with "practical margin of
flexibility"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).
363. For a case in which the magistrate could not limit the area to be searched in an attorney's office,
see National City Trading Corp. v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The court rejecthd
the argument that the warrant to search the attorney's suite was invalid because it "did not delineate with
sufficient 'practical accuracy' the area to be searched." Id. at 1335.
364. See, eg., In re Grand Jury, 603 F.2d 469, 476-77 (3d Cir. 1979) (attorney req. ired to produce
business records of corporate client); Beekler v. Superior Court, 568 F.2d 661, 662 (9th Cir. 1978) (attorney
required to produce client's business and accounting records); In re Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719, 730 (7th
Cir. 1976) (attorney required to turn over money received from client suspected of bank robbery).
365. See Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 862-63 (8th Cir.) ("[s]ome exploration or fishing
necessarily is inherent and entitled to exist in all documentary productions sought by a grand jury"), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). See generally 1 LAFAvE TREATISE, supra note 36, § 1.4(b), at 64-65
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a search warrant as overbroad if it authorizes a seizure beyond the probable
cause articulated by law enforcement officers. 366 For instance, in Burrows v.
Superior Court367 the California Supreme Court held that a warrant authoriz-
ing the seizure of "any file or documents" pertaining to certain clients was
fatally overbroad because the alleged criminal conduct related solely to the
attorney's financial practices with those clients.368 The court explained that
"the information upon which the warrant was based justified a search.. . only
for financial records .... "369
Similarly, the courts have upheld subpoenas directing attorneys to produce
clients' documents extending back over many years. 370 However, when a
magistrate authorizes a search warrant specifying documents that extend
back over a lengthy period of time, he is providing the police with an open
invitation to examine and seize privileged and irrelevant items. For particu-
larity to provide meaningful protection against abuse of the law office search,
the courts must not accept the descriptive standards that would suffice for a
subpoena. Although descriptions based on the content of documents might be
highly specific, they undermine the particularity requirement by effectively
requiring the officer to read every conceivably relevant document in order to
identify those specified in the warrant. 37' Unfortunately, the portion of the
warrant approved in Andresen authorizing the seizure of "documents...
showing or tending to show a fraudulent intent, and/or knowledge as
(describing grand jury use of subpoenas duces tecum). To the extent that the fourth amendment applies to a
subpoena, a grand jury does not need probable cause to support a subpoena. Id. at 65. Rather, the subpoena
will survive challenge if it is not "oppressively overbroad or indefinite." AMSTERDAM, supra note 100, §
163, at 1-151; see Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946) (noting that in
context of agency subpoena ordering corporate production of documents, fourth amendment "at the most
guards against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be
'particularly described').
366. See 2 LAFAVE TREATISE, supra note 36, § 4.6(d), at 108 (when evidence sought described in
general terms, probable cause may be insufficient to justify search).
367. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
368. Id. at 250, 529 P.2d at 598, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
369. Id. The court based its decision on both the fourth amendment and the analogous search and
seizure provision of the California Constitution. Id. at 249, 529 P.2d at 597, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
The warrant that the magistrate issued in O'Connor v. Johnson suffered from the same vice. Although
the warrant set forth useful generic categories of documents, it authorized the seizure of essentially all of
the business records of the specified clients. See 287 N.W.2d 400, 404 (Minn. 1979) (en banc) (setting forth
items specified in search warrant). Although the Minnesota Supreme Court believed that the description
was sufficiently particular, it concluded that no degree of specificity could protect against invasions of
privileged material located in a law office. Id. at 404-05.
The description in the warrant authorizing the search of the Kaplan & Livingston firm also was quite
broad. See Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 255-56, 162 Cal. Rptr. 857, 859 (Ct. App.
1980) (warrant authorized search in "all rooms.., for [inter alia]... memorandums... notes or other
documents indicating [certain] transactions"). Without deciding the issue, the California Court of Appeals
suggested that it might agree with the trial court's conclusion that the search warrant was unconstitu-
tionally overbroad. I. at 262, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
370. See Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 859 (8th Cir.) (subpoena that directed attorney to
produce all documents relating to affairs of certain client over 10-year period legal), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
833 (1956); cf. In re Grand Jury (Freedman), 529 F.2d 543, 549 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,425 U.S. 992 (1976)
(subpoena duces tecum seeking 26 categories of law firm's financial documents over 10-year period valid
only if "most, if not all" items relevant to grand jury's inquiry). The lengthier the time period, the more
specific the description should be. Note, Search Warrants and Journalists' Confidential Information, 25
AM. U.L. REV. 938, 963 (1976).
371. 2 LAFAvE TREATISE, supra note 36, § 4.6(d), at 107.
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elements of the crime of false pretenses" 372 suffered from this vice. Descrip-
tions of this type require the officer not only to read all potentially relevant
documents, but also to read them carefully. Consequently, the courts should
seldom, if ever, hold that such descriptions are permissible in the law office
setting because the irrelevant documents subject to examination might be
privileged or highly confidential.
Similarly, for the particularity requirement to impose an effective limita-
tion on the scope of the search, courts must prohibit the use of omnibus or
catchall clauses authorizing a search for and seizure of any and all evidence
pertaining to a specified crime. Unfortunately, in Andresen the Supreme
Court explicitly approved just such a clause in a warrant to search an
attorney's office.373 The omnibus clause approved in Andresen, even if clearly
limited by the warrant to the specific crime under investigation, seems
inconsistent with the particularity requirement since it permitted the police to
make relatively unrestricted determinations about whether an unspecified
item was relevant and therefore subject to seizure.3 74 When law enforcement
officials are likely to find privileged materials on the premises, magistrates
should not condone such unchecked discretion.375 Moreover, by authorizing a
372. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 481 n.10 (1976) (citing language in warrant). Similarly, in
People v. Superior Court (Driscoll), in which the client was accused of murdering her family, the court
sustained a warrant authorizing the seizure of "letters, photo albums, books, journals, diaries, and other
personal papers .. . tending to show the mental condition of [the client] and her intentions and
relationships with her now deceased [family]." 68 Cal. App. 3d 845, 850, 137 Cal. Rptr. 391, 392 (Ct. App.)
(per curiam), decertified, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977).
Recently, however, the First Circuit held that a warrant authorizing the seizure of, inter alia, "[b]ooks,
papers... letters .... documents, [and] memoranda" constituting evidence of a violation of five specified
federal fraud and conspiracy statutes was insufficiently particular. In re Lafayette Academy, Inc., 610 F.2d
1, 3, 5 (lst Cir. 1979). But see United States v. Cortelesso, 601 F.2d 28, 30, 33 (1st Cir. 1979) (warrant
sufficiently particular that authorized seizure of records and "any" documents that were evidence of
violation of three sections of federal criminal code).
373. 427 U.S. at 480-82. The warrant recited a long list of documents that were subject to seizure
"together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown." Id, at 481
n.10. The Court held that the quoted phrase did not render the warrant impermissibly general because it
construed the phrase as referring to evidence relating to "the crime of false pretenses with respect to a
particular plot of land." Id. at 480-81. By emphasizing that the alleged scheme, which involved a complex
fraud, be established only "by piecing together many bits of evidence... that, taken singly, would show
comparatively little," id. at 481 n.10, the majority also rejected the contention that the lengthy list of
seemingly innocuous documents was tantamount to a general warrant. Justice Brennan, however, noted
that the officers executing the warrant seized an "overwhelming quantity" of documents that were either
suppressed or returned to the petitioner because they were unrelated to criminal activity. Id. at 493
(Brennan, J., dissenting). For Justice Brennan, this fact proved the "unlawful generality" of the warrant.
Id.
374. See 2 LAFAVE TREATISE, supra note 36, § 4.6(d), at 107 (clause referred to seizable documents in
terms of incriminating contents, thereby requiring officers to examine "virtually every document"); S.
SALTZBURG, supra note 307, at 108 ("total absence of particularity" in clause enabled "wholesale seizure of
anything that might in any way touch upon... case"); McKenna, supra note 53, at 79-80 (generality of
warrant gave too much discretion to officers). Cases decided after Andresen indicate that law enforcement
officials are employing similar clauses. See In re Search Warrant, 572 F.2d 321, 323 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (warrant authorized seizure of "[a]ny and all fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence (at the time
unknown) of the crimes of conspiracy, obstruction of justice and theft of government property [sic] in
violation of 18 U.S. Code §§ 371, 1503, and 641 which facts recited in the accompanying affidavit make
out"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
375. See Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 250-51, 529 P.2d 590, 598, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 174
(1974) (holding that warrant authorizing seizure of "any file or documents" relating to specified client
violates particularity requirement because it permits seizure of privileged materials).
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warrant permitting the police to seize "all" files relating to a particular crime,
subject, transaction, or client, a magistrate would seriously undermine the
utility of any descriptions that individually specify documents subject to
seizure under the warrant. Even if the officers have located all the documents
particularly described in the warrant, they will not know whether they have
discovered all of the items that deal with a specified subject until they have
searched every file in the office. 376
If courts demand a higher degree of particularity, occasionally the situation
will arise in which the police have probable cause to believe that criminal
evidence is located in a lawyer's office but are unable to describe the items
with sufficient specificity to avoid a detailed examination of all materials. If
the courts uncritically extended the existing practice to the law office,
however, the best efforts of law enforcement officials ordinarily would
provide very slight protection against the overly intrusive search. Fortunate-
ly, the Supreme Court has recognized that, if properly applied, the constitu-
tionally required safeguard of particularity can serve a very important
function.377 The potential loss of evidence is not too great a cost to incur to
preserve the countervailing values of the attorney-client relationship.
The courts cannot provide adequate protection for the legitimate interests
of attorneys and their clients through reliance on the particularity require-
ment alone, even if they apply it scrupulously. As Justice Stewart noted,
dissenting in Zurcher, "[t]o find a particular document, no matter how
specifically it is identified in the warrant, the police will have to search every
place where it might be-including, presumably, every file in the office-and
to examine each document they find to see if it is the correct one. ' 378 In
O'Connor v. Johnson the Minnesota Supreme Court agreed, concluding that
"the most particular warrant" would not adequately safeguard the relevant
privileges and the right to counsel since the police would still be unable to
locate specified items without examining privileged documents. 379 The court's
conclusion, however, might be too broad, for gr~at particularity might prove
useful, at least when employed in conjunction with other protective devices.
By requiring reasonable specification, including file caption and document
title, a magistrate can minimize the intrusion by indicating to law enforce-
ment officers that they need not and may not examine unrelated files and
documents.
Do Not Require Greater Showing of Probable Cause. Since law office
searches pose a serious threat to the attorney-client relationship, the question
arises whether courts should require police to demonstrate an enhanced
standard of probable cause for the search of a law office. Although commen-
tators have argued that a law enforcement officer should be required to make
376. See S. SALTZBURG, supra note 307, at 108 (suggesting no difference between warrant that allows
seizure simply of"all... evidence" of crime and warrant that specifies items to be seized but allows seizure
of all other evidence of crime; each warrant permits general search); cf United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d
541, 543 (Ist Cir. 1980) (warrant authorizing seizure of"certain business and billing and medical records of
patients of [named doctors] that evidence a scheme to defraud the United States" unconstitutionally
overbroad in that it provided no limitation on officer's discretion).
377. See note 347 supra and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court treatment of particularity
requirement).
378. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 573 n.7 (1978) (Stewart, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting).
379. 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (en banc).
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a greater showing of probable cause whenever seeking authorization for an
especially intrusive search,380 the Supreme Court apparently believes that this
approach is unacceptable because it would create unnecessary confusion. 381
Imposing a higher standard of probable cause for law office searches would
create similar administrative difficulties because the standard would lack the
clarity and familiarity necessary for easy application. Nonetheless, the
problem might be less pronounced than in other areas of police investigation
since the officer would not need to make an immediate on-the-street
evaluation of probable cause.
Because law enforcement officials would search law offices infrequently,
courts might justify a higher standard of probable cause for law office
searches as a means of providing greater protection to the attorney and his
clients. This additional degree of protection, however, might not justify the
increased cost that it would impose on law enforcement. The requirement that
the police demonstrate the existence of probable cause has not hindered the
ability of the police to gather criminal evidence. If the courts demanded a
higher standard of probable cause during the early stages of an investigation,
however, the police might be unable to establish that relevant evidence could
be found in an attorney's office.
In contrast, under the subpoena preference rule, the police need not
establish probable cause to demand evidence. If both the subpoena and the
search warrant are available alternatives, a court should not require the police
to meet a higher standard of probable cause, for to do so would effectively
preclude law enforcement officials from using a search warrant in many
instances. Because this particular proposal would not accommodate the
competing interests of law enforcement and the attorney-client relationship
the courts should not adopt it.
B. EXECUTION OF SEARCH WARRANTS
Compared to the issuance of a search warrant, the execution of the warrant
presents a more serious threat to the attorney-client relationship and thus a
more critical need for safeguards designed to protect that relationship. The
following proposals suggest ways to minimize the degree of the intrusion.
Do Not Provide Opportunity for Notice and Prior Adversary Hearing.
A prior adversary hearing would provide significant protection to the
380. See I LAFAVE TREATISE, supra note 36, § 3.2(a), at 452 (suggesting adoption of higher standard
than probable cause for particularly intrusive searches; McKenna, supra note 53, at 75 (same); cf. Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 69-70 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (evidence that might have established
probable cause for conventional search insufficient to support lengthy and extensive electronic surveil-
lance); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,770 (1966) (there must be "clear indication" evidence will be
found to justify intrusion into suspect's body).
381. In Dunaway v. New York the Supreme Court stated that "[a] single, familiar standard [of probable
cause to arrest] is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on
and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront." 442
U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979). See also Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note 293, at 394 (nonunitary standard
counterproductive because inherent uncertainty would lead courts to give greater deference to police).
The Supreme Court has sanctioned a lesser showing than probable cause only in certain limited and well
defined areas where the needs of law enforcement are great and the intrusion is minimal. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (stop and frisk); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967)
(administrative search).
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attorney-client relationship since it would permit an attorney to present and
litigate claims of privilege in a judicial forum before law enforcement officers
examined or seized any documents. Requiring a prior adversary hearing,
however, is but a thinly disguised version of the subpoena preference rule.
From a law enforcement perspective, the primary advantages of the search
over. the subpoena are surprise and expedition. A prior adversary hearing
would sacrifice both. Presumably, if the police were to prevail at the hearing,
the court then would permit them to conduct a search and to select the
material to be seized. In those instances in which the attorney unsuccessfully
contends in court that the documents were privileged, however, he probably
would tender the material voluntarily to avoid the disruption of a search.
Unless the police doubted the attorney's good faith, a follow-up search rarely
would prove necessary.
The subpoena preference rule more effectively balances the competing
interests of law enforcement officers and of attorneys and their clients than
does the law office search. The legitimate needs of law enforcement, however,
may require law office searches in some circumstances. If so, an adversary
hearing should follow rather then precede execution of the warrant.
Attempt to Ensure the Presence of Attorney. If the attorney is not a
suspect, a magistrate should require law enforcement officials "to make an
advance appointment-but not reveal the purpose-to provide for dignified
execution of the warrant. ' 382 This proposal attempts to ensure that the
attorney will be present. Furthermore, it might cushion the shock effect of the
search because it lessens the possibility that law enforcement officials will
serve the warrant while the attorney is conferring with a client.383 This
practice would be an affordable courtesy, though scarcely a constitutional
necessity. When the attorney is a suspect, however, advance notice would
diminish the element of surprise and increase the risk that evidence would be
lost, even if the purpose of the visit were not disclosed.
Although advance notice might not be essential, the attorney should be
present during a search to assert any applicable privileges. 384 Furthermore,
the attorney's presence would help minimize the intrusion by affording him
an opportunity to assist the officers in locating documentary items. His
presence also would reduce the likelihood of any subsequent disputes
382. Brief for Respondent at 14-15, O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1979) (en banc).
Law enforcement officials followed this procedure in serving the warrant to search the office of the Cotton
& Bregman firm. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Mandate and/or Prohibition at 6, People v. Municipal Court, LASC No. C 204532 (L.A. Sup. Ct. 1979)
(police officer, without informing attorney that magistrate had issued warrant, "volunteered" to meet with
attorney at law office). The police did provide a Boise, Idaho, television station with thirty minutes advance
notice before executing a search warrant recently at the station. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1980, § 1, at 1, 32,
cois. 1, 4.
383. This proposal, however, helps only the sole practitioner. In a larger firm, even if one attorney were
available to meet with the officers, other attorneys invariably would be meeting with clients at that time. To
minimize such an intrusion, the police officers should wear plain clothes.
384. See CAL. PENAL. CODE § 1524(c)(3) (West Supp. 1980) (providing that search warrant "must,
whenever practicable, be served during normal business hours" and on party "who appears to have
possession or control of the items sought"); Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 170 (same). See also
Cal. Atty. Gen. Proposal, supra note 300, at I (search must be conducted during daylight hours and
attorney must be present); L.A. DA/Bar Guidelines, supra note 20, at 102 (attorney has right to be present
during search).
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regarding the conduct of the search. Finally, the attorney could determine
whether any privileged documents had been examined or seized so that he
could inform either concerned clients or a court.
An attorney, however, should not have an absolute right to be present
during a search of his office.385 To avoid frustrating an otherwise legitimate
search when an attorney continually is unavailable, the officers should only be
required to make a reasonable attempt to execute the warrant in the
attorney's presence. 386 If the officers conduct the search in the attorney's
absence, they should take special precautions to assure that they do not
violate any privileges. 387 If an attorney attempts to obstruct a search, he
should forfeit his right to remain present for the remainder of the search.
To accommodate the attorney's needs to be present during a search of his
office, courts will have to modify prevailing fourth amendment doctrine.
Under current law a person has no right to be present during the search of his
premises. 388 As a matter of fourth amendment "reasonableness," however, an
attorney should have the right to be present during the search of his office.
Allowing the attorney's presence would alleviate partially the special dangers
inherent in a law office search without substantially sacrificing the interests of
law enforcement. 389
Provide Attorney with Opportunity to Assert Privileges. Under any set of
safeguards, the attorney must be permitted to assert any legitimate privilege
including the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine during
the search. This opportunity would preclude the officers executing the
warrant from examining purportedly privileged documents. Unless the
attorney has such an opportunity, no search and seizure practice will provide
adequate protection for the attorney-client relationship.
Although the attorney may assert relevant privileges during the search, the
courts will be the final arbiter. If the police believe that a particular document
specified in the warrant legitimately is subject to seizure and if the attorney
asserts that it is privileged, the only way of accommodating the interests of
both is for the police to transfer the documents under seal to a court for in
385. Ordinarily, the police could execute the warrant in the attorney's presence either by making an
appointment or by engaging in visual surveillance of the office. Unless the attorney observes each aspect of
the search, however, his presence would be ineffectual. A team of officers should be allowed to search
various parts of an office simultaneously only if an attorney familiar with the files and competent to assert
applicable privileges accompanies each officer. If the attorney were a suspect, the police should be
permitted to clear all personnel out of the search area to protect against loss of evidence. Nonetheless, the
attorney should be allowed to accompany the officers during the search.
386. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(c)(3) (West Supp. 1980) (providing that search of attorney's office
may be conducted in attorney's absence if official serving warrant unable to locate him after making
"reasonable efforts").
387. The California legislation provides that the special master authorized to conduct the search "shall
seal and return to the court for determination by the court any item or items which appear to be privileged
as provided by law." Id.; see notes 433-38 infra and accompanying text (discussing use of in camera review
of privileged documents transferred to court under seal).
388. See Payne v. United States, 508 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir.) (forcible entry into unoccupied
premises pursuant to search warrant not per se violation of fourth amendment), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933
(1975); United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40, 44-45 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
389. Cf Cal. Atty. Gen. Proposal, supra note 300, at 1 (officers executing search should allow attorneys
to be present during search, if possible).
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camera review. As long as the police employ this special protective procedure,
a magistrate should allow them to seize the evidence immediately.
Although the attorney has a legal right to assert claims of privilege, he
should not be permitted to resist the police physically.390 Instead, an attorney
should pursue a remedy for breach through litigation rather than through
self-help. If a court recognizes the attorney's right to assert privileges and if
law enforcement officials ignore the exercise of the privilege, presumably the
courts would invalidate the search and allow for both damages and legal
sanctions against the officers. So construed, this crucial safeguard should not
frustrate the primary objective of the search-expeditious access to potential
criminal evidence.
The threshold issue is not how, but whether, the police should honor a
claim of privilege. In Zurcher the Supreme Court noted that "Fifth Amend-
ment and state shield-law objections that might be asserted in opposition to
compliance with a subpoena [were] largely irrelevant to determining the
legality of a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment. ' 391 The ir-
relevance of the privilege against self-incrimination is easily understood in the
wake of Andresen,392 given the absence of legal compulsion during a search.
Presumably, the Court believed that state reporter shield statutes were not
intended to apply in the search and seizure context. Conceivably, however,
the Court might have been suggesting that no testimonial privilege may ever
be raised during a search. If so, the search warrant would provide an easy
means of evading the privileges that have been so carefully developed by
common law and statute.
If the police legitimately could examine items within the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine simply by obtaining a warrant to
search the lawyer's office, both attorney-client communication and written
trial preparation would be inhibited.393 Consequently, many courts seem to
390. Edward Masry, an attorney whose office was searched in Los Angeles, was arrested on charges of
assaulting a peace officer when he attempted to resist the search. Nat'l. L.J., Apr. 23, 1979, at 1, cols. 1-2.
He later contended that his resistance was justified by the California statutory attorney-client privilege, id.
at 14, col. 4, which provides that a lawyer's duty "is [t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every
peril to himself to preserve the secrets, of his client." CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1974).
391. 436 U.S. 546, 567 (1978).
392. See 427 U.S. 463, 477 (1976) (rejecting argument that search and seizure of attorney's private
papers violated privilege against self-incrimination).
393. See notes 114-28 supra and accompanying text (noting that most serious consequence of law office
search is "chilling effect" on client communication and trial preparation). The problem is not one of
waiver. Rather, the risk is that the objectives of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine will
be undermined significantly if law enforcement officials may search and seize privileged documents, even if
the prosecution may not use the information against the privilege-holders in formal proceedings. Wigmore
argued that the burden of preserving the confidentiality of communications within the scope of the
attorney-client privilege rested upon the attorney and his client. Consequently, if a third party breached
that confidentiality, even by surreptitious means, the client lost the privilege. 8 WIOMORE, supra note 79, §
2326, at 633-34. Commentators have recognized, however, that "[w]hile it may perhaps have been
tolerable in Wigmore's day to penalize a client for failing to achieve secrecy, such a position is outmoded in
an era of sophisticated eavesdropping devices against which no easily available protection exists." J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 240, § 503(b) [02], at 503-04. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings
Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Minn. 1979) (privileged status not lost when attorney
and client take reasonable precautions to assure confidentiality, but nonetheless overheard by surreptitious
eavesdropper). The attorney and his client must take reasonable precautions to maintain the confidentiality
of privileged communications. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Horowitz), 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir.) (client
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have recognized that the attorney should be allowed to protect privileged
materials during the search of his office.394 Whatever the original legislative
intent might have been, the purposes of these privileges would be servedpoorly if a court limited their invocation to a formal, trial-type "testimonial"
setting.395 Whether the attorney's right to assert the attorney-client privilege
or the work-product doctrine during a search is constitutionally necessary toprotect either privilege or whether the right is implicit in the privileges, law
enforcement officials must provide an attorney with the opportunity to assert
either privilege during a search of his office.
Permit Voluntary Cooperation by Attorney. In his concurring opinion in
Zurcher Justice Powell observed that "there is no reason why police officers
executing a warrant should not seek the cooperation of the subject party, in
order to prevent needless disruption." 396 When the police execute a warrant at
the office of an attorney who is not a suspect, some of the advantages of both
the search warrant and the subpoena can be preserved if the officers give the
attorney the opportunity to produce the evidence voluntarily. 397 The risk that
must act affirmatively to preserve confidentiality of files possibly containing communication from or to
lawyers but to which accountant has access), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973). The federal wiretapping law
illustrates this change in the law by providing that "[n]o otherwise privileged wire or oral communication
intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged
character." Title III, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1976).
394. See note 107 supra (describing recent judicial decisions with respect to law office searches).
395. Commentators disagree over whether the application of the attorney-client privilege and the work-
product doctrine extends beyond such formal contexts. Compare Callan & David, supra note 152, at 340
n.40 (most state courts apparently recognize that attorney-client privilege not limited to formal testimonial
setting), with Note, Client Fraud and the Lawyer-An Ethical Analysis, 62 MINN. L. REv. 89, 112 (1977)
(attorney-client privilege limited to judicial context).
A party may assert either privilege in response to a discovery request. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter") (emphasis added); MOORE, supra note 242, P 26.64[4], at 26--452 (work-product doctrine may be
asserted in response to any form of discovery request). Indeed, a party may challenge a subpoena duces
tecum as an unreasonable search and seizure if it seeks production of documents protected by the attorney-
client privilege. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 866 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956).
Two courts of appeals have held that a party may assert the work-product doctrine in response to an
IRS summons. See United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 987 (3d Cir. 1980) (although party
may assert work-product doctrine in resisting IRS summons, when work product of minimal substantive
content Government's showing of need comparatively lower); United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038, 1041(7th Cir. 1973) (although work-product doctrine applies to proceeding for enforcement of IRS summons,
strong public interest relevant in considering degree of necessity to be shown by government). The Supreme
Court recently granted a writ of certiorari to the Sixth Circuit in a case holding that the doctrine does not
apply in this context. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct.
1310 (1980).
396. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 570 n.2 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
397. If law enforcement officials have a legal obligation to permit an attorney to participate in the
production of the items specified in the warrant, sufficient legal "compulsion" might exist to support an
assertion of the attorney's own privilege against self-incrimination, even though Andresen apparently
intended effectively to remove that privilege from the search and seizure setting. See Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 477 (1976) (search, seizure, and introduction into evidence of business records do
not violate fifth amendment). The police and quite possibly the courts probably would be unenthusiastic
about offering the attorney an opportunity to cooperate if the procedure created a self-incrimination issue.
A court, however, could still rely on Andresen to reject such a claim because the attorney would not be
"required to say or to do anything under penalty of sanction." Id. at 476. Should the attorney decline to
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evidence will be lost is minimized not only because the officers will preserve
the element of surprise, but also because they will be present while the
attorney gathers the items sought. At the same time, the procedure would
eliminate the rummaging aspect of the search and the consequent examina-
tion of privileged documents.
Although the police might fear that the attorney will not be candid in
selecting and tendering the documents requested, the attorney need not have
unilateral discretion to determine what documents will be examined and
seized. If the'officers have any reason to doubt the attorney's good faith or to
believe that he has failed to tender all of the specified items in his possession,
they- should be permitted to complete the search,398 though not in disregard of
the attorney's assertion of a privilege. 399 When they conduct such a search and
then return the warrant, however, the officers should include a brief written
statement, stating how they believe the attorney attempted to thwart the
search.40
Often an attorney truthfilly can assert at the outset that none of the
specified items will be found in his office. Once a nonsuspect attorney informs
law enforcement officers that he does not possess some or all of the items
specified in the warrant, his word as an officer of the court should be accepted
and the search for the documents should not be conducted. 4°1 Law enforce-
ment officials probably will object, however, for they rightfully might
consider a search necessary to avoid unlawful suppression of evidence by
unscrupulous attorneys. Consequently, the search should be permitted. At
other times, an attorney voluntarily might produce everything specified in the
warrant, if given the opportunity to do so.402 Furthermore, an attorney
participate, the officers simply could conduct the search alone. The attorney would face no prospect of
being cited for contempt or any other sanction, as he would if he failed to comply with a subpoena.
Presumably, had the officers in Andresen merely permitted the attorney to produce the documents
voluntarily, the Supreme Court would have reached the same holding. An invitation to help minimize the
intrusive impact of an otherwise permissible search therefore need not be confused with fifth amendment
compulsion. Even if a court found compulsion, it might not consider the fruits of the compulsion
testimonial or incriminating within the "act of production" analysis in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391 (1976). See notes 43-49 supra and accompanying text (explaining Court's decision in Fiher).
398. See Cal. Atty. Gen. Proposal, supra note 300, at 3 (if attorney resists execution of search warrant,
officials conducting search may seize documents without his assistance); Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE §
1524(c)(1) (West Supp. 1980) (special master may conduct search if, in his judgment, attorney has not
produced items requested); Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 170 (officer may accompany attorney to
ensure that he is cooperating). In the absence of such a safeguard, law enforcement officials might just as
well serve the attorney with a subpoena. The L.A. DA/Bar Guidelines would even grant a criminally
suspect attorney the opportunity to tender the requested documents as long as the official conducting the
search expects that the attorney will comply and the lawyer is not in custody at the time of the search. L.A.
DA/Bar Guidelines, supra note 20, at 1.
399. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(c)(2) (West Supp. 1980) (purportedly privileged documents must
be sealed and delivered to court for prompt hearing).
400. Cf. Cal. Atty. Gen. Proposal, supra note 300, at 3 (when officials conduct search of uncooperative
attorney's office, they must submit written statements to court explaining why attorney's assistance not
sought).
401. Cf. Tarlow & Johnston, supra note 118, at 42 (as a practical matter, officers will be unwilling to
accept attorney's assertion that he does not possess items specified).
402. Courts should allow the attorney to waive the work-product doctrine with respect to certain types
of materials within the scope of the doctrine. Only the client, however, may waive the attorney-client
privilege. See People v. Doyle, 77 Cal. App. 3d 126, 128, 141 Cal. Rptr. 639, 641 (Ct. App. 1977) (state
constitution's search and seizure provision precluded attorney from consenting to search of client files).
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occasionally will produce documents that the officers would not havediscovered on their own because of their inability to recognize them as
specified items. Considering the minimal risks to law enforcement interests,
these two possibilities alone justify adopting the procedure.403
Alternatively, even if he is not permitted to tender the items sought, the
attorney still might be able to minimize the intrusion and assist in effectuating
the search. As long as the officers are willing to presume good faith on the
attorney's part, he could assist in limiting the scope of the invasion by
explaining his filing system and identifying those files that arguably are
relevant. Moreover, the attorney should be permitted to segregate all items
that he has reason to believe are privileged before the officers examine anydocuments. Because someone, whether the attorney or some neutral party,
must screen the documents initially to protect the client's privileges, the
attorney should make that determination since he will be more familiar withthe underlying facts on which the applicability of the privileges generally willdepend. By explaining file captions and document titles, the attorney may be
able to convince the officers that some of the allegedly privileged documents
are unrelated to the objects of the search. If he cannot convince the officers,the officers should place the documents under seal and transfer them to the
court for in camera review. 404
Law enforcement officials employed this procedure in two of the recently
reported law office searches, 405 one court adopted it to some extent in another
search,406 both the Attorney General of California 407 and the ABA Criminal
Law enforcement officials in some instances might obtain a waiver of the attorney- client privilege from a
client prior to the search, precluding the attorney from raising it. Cf. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d855, 864 (8th Cir.) (client's waiver of attorney-client privilege barred attorney from asserting privilege asgrounds for noncompliance with grand jury subpoena of client's papers in attorney's possession), cert.denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). When served with a search warrant, the attorney occasionally might confer
with the client and decide for tactical reasons to waive any relevant privileges.403. Some attorneys have argued that voluntarily cooperating with an officer executing a warrant does
not comport with their obligation to protect privileged material and client confidences. Amicus Brief ofCalifornia Attorneys for Criminal Justice at 6-7, Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 162Cal. Rptr. 857 (Ct. App. 1980). Consequently, the voluntary cooperation of the attorney should not be afactor in determining whether a search of an attorney's office is reasonable. Id. Certainly, an attorney
should be under no duty to cooperate in breaching privileges and confidences. By cooperating with the
officers, however, the attorney might be able to preserve privileges and confidences that otherwise might be
invaded.
404. See text accompanying notes 433-38 infra (describing feasible procedures for in camera review of
purportedly privileged documents).
405. In both O'Connor v. Johnson and the Cotton & Bregman case, law enforcement officers allowed
the attorneys to select the documents specified in the warrant as a result of an on-the-spot agreement, notbecause of any general policy. See notes 2-4, 15 supra and accompanying text briefly describing cases); cf.Henry v. Perrin, 609 F.2d 1010, 1011 (1st Cir. 1979) (prisoner's attorney refused to permit prison officials
to scan his case file but after negotiations with prison officials submitted it to state supreme court justice for
examination), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1652 (1980).
406. The modifications of the preliminary injunction suggested by the California Court of Appeals inDeukmejian v. Superior Court would have assured the attorney the right to assist in limiting the scope of the
search by removing privileged documents from the files subject to search. Deukmejian v. Superior Court,
No. 55977, slip op. at 2 (Ct. App. May 7, 1979).
407. In his brief on appeal in Deukmejian v. Superior Court, the Attorney General of Californiaproposed a more detailed procedure than the one adopted by the Court of Appeals: For each document in
an arguably relevant file, the attorney farst would indicate its nature without disclosing its contents and
then would state whether or not it was privileged. If specified in the warrant and nonprivileged, the
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Justice Section Committee on the Exclusionary Rule408 recommended it, and
the recent California legislation incorporated it.4°9 These instances suggest
that the procedure will not affect law enforcement objectives adversely.
Nothing precludes the police from soliciting the assistance of the attorney. By
leaving the decision solely to the discretion of the officers executing the
warrant, however, courts will breed unpredictability, caprice, and underu-
tilization of an effective minimization technique. Consequently, the officers
always should be obligated to seek the assistance of a nonsuspect attorney as
long as they do not question his good faith.
Although this procedure makes sense as a matter of policy, cases suggest
that the fourth amendment currently does not require it, at least when the
subject of the search is not a lawyer.410 Considering the potential for
minimizing the intrusion without significant sacrifice to law enforcement
interests, however, courts could interpret fourth amendment reasonableness
to require the police to invite and to accept the assistance of the attorney.4"
Alternatively, such an obligation should be implemented legislatively or
administratively.
Require that Search be Conducted by Special Master. To protect the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine without sacrificing
surprise and expedition, the law should require that an attorney's office be
searched by a neutral, legally-trained third party such as a special master. If
the person conducting the search is not affiliated with the police or the
prosecution, the risk that privileged information might be used against the
client diminishes significantly. Furthermore, legal training will ensure that
the third party will be better able to comprehend the materials located in a
law office and evaluate assertions of privilege. The recent California legisla-
tion adopts this approach.4 12 Like the California approach, the procedure
document would be seized. If doubt existed, the officer could briefly examine a nonprivileged document to
determine whether it had been specified in the wan-ant. If the officer believed that a document had been
specified and the attorney disagreed or asserted a claim of privilege, the document would be placed in a
sealed envelope and transfered to the court for in camera review. Cal. Atty. Gen. Proposal, supra note 300,
at 3.
408. Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 170. Because of this procedure, which provides the attorney
with the opportunity to avoid a search by producing all of the specified items voluntarily, the Committee
referred to its proposal as a Search Warrant Conditioned on Demand. Even when the officer concludes that
it is necessary to conduct the search himself, the proposal ensures that the attorney may accompany him.
Id.
409. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(c) (West Supp. 1980) (amendment provides that special master will
search nonsuspect attorney's office but will give attorney opportunity to produce voluntarily items;
allegedly privileged documents must be sealed and delivered to court).
410. See United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting defendant's argument
that failure to permit custodian of bank records to assist in segregating irrevelant documents in single file
constituted general search in violation of fourth amendment);-United States v. Chadwell, 427 F. Supp 692,
696 (D. Del. 1977) (rejecting defendant's argument that officer's failure to accept his word about location
of evidence constituted unreasonable search in violation of fourth amendment).
411. See 2 LAFAVE TREATISE, supra note 36, § 4.10, at 162 (suggesting that fourth amendment should
be construed to place police under duty to permit subject to assist in minimizing intrusion when no reason
exists to doubt his good faith).
412. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(c)-(f) (West Supp. 1980). The amendment permits a search by the
officer serving the warrant only if "a special master is not available and would not be available within a
reasonable amount of time ..." Id. § 1524(d). See also Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 170 (special
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does not have to be complex or burdensome. Upon establishing probable
cause to believe that evidence subject to seizure will be found in an attorney's
office, law enforcement officials could ask the court to appoint a master
pursuant to a special procedure established for that purpose.413 Law enforce-
ment officials would accompany the master when they executed the warrant,
but only the master would search files and review documents.414 If the master
conducts the search, the police should be present to provide guidance about
the precise items sought415 and the attorney should be present to assert claims
of privilege. The attorney's role, however, could be broader. To further
minimize the intrusion, the master should invite the attorney to tender
voluntarily the specified items, provided he does not doubt the attorney's
good faith.416 If he has reason to believe that the attorney has not fully
complied with the request, the master should complete the search without
further assistance from the attorney.417
As long as the master is truly neutral, accountable only to the court and not
to law enforcement officials, 418 he could examine allegedly privileged docu-
master may be appointed at discretion of magistrate). The Revised Report of the Exclusionary Rule
Committee contemplates a relatively passive role for the master. It specifies that the duties of the master
will include advising the attorney of special conditions attached to the execution of the warrant, serving as
a neutral witness, serving as a negotiator between the police and the attorney, serving as a neutral verifier of
the attorney's claims that particular files are irrelevant and sealing files or areas at the request of the
attorney. Revised Report, supra note 152, at 7.
413. If a legislature vested the authority to issue a warrant for the search of a law office in a court of
general jurisdiction, the court easily could issue the warrant and appoint the master in the same
proceeding. Similarly, a legislature could authorize a magistrate to appoint the masters. Under the
California statutory procedure, courts may appoint special masters from a list of attorneys maintained by
the State Bar for the purpose of conducting searches. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(d) (West Supp. 1980).
414. See id. § 1524(e) (prohibiting officer from participating in search or examining any item without
subject's consent).
415. This procedure would help to ensure that the master would be capable of identifying the evidence
sought in a complex white-collar crime investigation. But see Minority Objections of Linda Ludlow,
Deputy Attorney General of California, to Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 170 (master will be
unable to identify evidence in complex fraud case).
416. See id. § 1524(a)(4)(c)(1) (requiring that special master give party being searched opportunity to
provide items sought).
417. See id. (allowing special master to conduct search if party fails to provide items requested).
418. The California legislation, for example, requires the court to "make every reasonable effort to
insure that the [master) has no relationship with any of the parties .... Id. § 1524(d). A lawyer from the
Attorney General's office accompanied the state investigators who searched the office of Kaplan &
Livingston to aid in assessing the relevance of legal documents as well as questions of privilege. Petition of
Attorney General for Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition and for Stay Order; Memorandum of Points
and Authorities, at 1-2 Exhibit 7 (affidavit of Susan L. Frierson). Upon appeal of the preliminary
injunction granted by the superior court, the Attorney General proposed that in any future search of the
firm a deputy attorney general accompany the officers and act as their legal adviser. Cal. Atty. Gen,
Proposal, supra note 300, at 1. The L.A. DA/Bar Guidelines, supra note 20, require that in any search of a
suspect attorney's office "[a] deputy district attorney shall accompany the officers... [and] will be charged
with the responsibility of seeing that the search is conducted in such a manner as to minimize the possibility
of the breach of any confidential communication between attorney and client." Id. at 1. The proposal,
however, inadequately responds to the threat because it fails to ensure the protection of the information
through the use of a neutral third party. Although a prosecutor might be more capable of recognizing and
excluding irrelevant or privileged documents from close scrutiny or seizure than a police officer, the
attorney whose office is searched might justifiably believe that a fellow lawyer will be in a better position to
appreciate the significance of information gleaned from privileged documents than a less sophisticated
investigator. Consequently, such a procedure would increase the risk that privileged information might in
some way be used against the client in the future despite the good faith of the officers.
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ments during the search since the disclosure would not be significantly greater
than that which would occur pursuant to subsequent in camera inspection by
the court.419 The differences would be primarily logistical. In effect, the court
would authorize its delegate to conduct a preliminary review during the
search so that the court could avoid a subsequent review in chambers.
When an attorney asserts a claim of privilege, the master should request
that the attorney develop the factual context in detail. In this manner, an
attorney would provide the master with a reasonable basis for ruling on the
claim. If the attorney believed that he was able to develop adequate argument
in support of his claim of privilege on-the-spot, he could seek an immediate
ruling. The attorney and the law enforcement officers could accept the
master's disposition, expediting the proceeding by avoiding the necessity of
submitting the items to the court. Either the attorney or the officers, however,
should be permitted to object to the master's initial conclusion. If either
objected, the officer should be allowed to seal and transfer the disputed
documents to the court for in camera review.420 If, however, the attorney
concluded that he should engage in legal research, develop the facts, or confer
with the client in order to present competent argument on questions of
privilege, preliminary review would accomplish little. In this instance as well,
the officers should seal the disputed documents and transfer them to the
court.
This proposal is not novel. In addition to the recent California legislation,
courts have employed masters in the past to identify and exclude irrelevant
and privileged items pursuant to grand jury subpoenas or discovery re-
quests.421 The fourth amendment does not require that a neutral, legally-
trained third party conduct a law office search. Nonetheless, in view of the
threat to the attorney-client privileges, the search of an attorney's office might
be unreasonable unless such a party conducts the search. Requiring a special
master to conduct the search would constitute a major modification of search
and seizure procedure. Furthermore, other means exist for preserving the
integrity of the privileges while executing the warrant. Given some reasonably
protective procedure, the courts probably will not hold that this specific
alternative is constitutionally required. Rather the courts might infer such a
requirement more comfortably from the privileges themselves. Because this
proposal can potentially reconcile the competing interests of law enforcement
officials and of attorneys and their clients, a legislature or administrative body
should incorporate it into any comprehensive plan for regulating law office
searches.
419. The recently enacted California procedure does not authorize the special master to make even a
preliminary determination of claims of privilege. Instead, once the attorney asserts a privilege, the master
must seal the materials and deliver them to the court. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(c)(2) (West Supp. 1980).
420. If either the attorney or the client objects to the master's conclusions, they should be given a copy
of the master's written findings and an opportunity to challenge them before the court. Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855, 865 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
421. See, eg., In re Subpoena (Murphy), 560 F.2d 326, 331 (8th Cir. 1977) (panel of masters appointed
to identify documents not discoverable under work-product doctrine by government); Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855, 864-65 (8th Cir.) (master appointed to determine documents protected by
attorney-client privilege; privileged documents withheld from grand jury), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956); Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y.-1974) (special master employed to
consider claims of privilege raised by parties exchanging documents pursuant to civil discovery).
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Even if the fourth amendment does not mandate this procedure, the
warrant clause does impose certain restrictions on who may conduct a search.
For instance, a court or a legislature should not authorize the magistrate who
issued the warrant to participate in its execution. In Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New
York 422 the Supreme Court invalidated the search of an adult book store
because the town justice who issued the search warrant failed to show the
"neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer... [by] allow[ing]
himself to become a member, if not the leader of the search party which was
essentially a police operation. ' '423 Although the facts inlLo-Ji were extreme,
any direct participation by the magistrate in the actual search and seizure
appears to be inconsistent with the fourth amendment.
Impose Duty on Officers to Make Reasonable Efforts to Minimize Intrusion.
If courts do not allow the attorney to tender the evidence or do not employ a
special master to conduct the search, they nonetheless could protect against
unnecessary infringement of legitimate privileges by placing the officers
executing the warrant under a duty to make .reasonable efforts to minimize
the intrusion. More specifically, the courts should require the officers to
attempt to narrow significantly the number of potentially seizable files or
documents before examining any of their contents.
This proposal seems to be a realistic requirement.424 The officers might not
search some files solely because of the location of the files within the office. If
the officers were searching for documents pertaining to a securities fraud in
the hotel industry, for example, they would have no reason to search the office
of a member of the firm who did not engage in a securities practice and did
not represent any hotel industry clients. The officers easily could acquire
sufficient information to make this type of determination as long as the
attorney were present, cooperative, and honest. Similarly, if the officers were
authorized to search for evidence pertaining to a securities fraud, they would
have no need to examine a client's will or a witness' statement in a negligence
action.
Occasionally, neither the file captions nor the warrant descriptions will be
specific enough to permit the officers to narrow significantly the quantity of
documents arguably subject to seizure.425 In that event, a more thorough
422. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
423. Id. at 326-27. Most of the items seized were not described with particularity until after the search.
Id. at 324.
424. See Bekavac, supra note 188, at 15 (to minimize invasion of privileged files, officers should design
least intrusive measures for conducting search). For instance, in reference to recent searches in Los
Angeles, a spokesman for the Attorney General of California commented that state officers executing a
warrant to search a law office attempt to limit their examination to file captions. He noted that "[o]ur
agents don't go opening files." Search-Warrant Fever, supra note 33, at 886 (quoting Bob Cooke, Press
Officer for the Attorney General of California). See also Cal. Atty. Gen. Proposal, supra note 300, at 3
(instrncting law enforcement officers to examine folder covers to determine whether they are likely to
contain items listed in warrant). However, a press spokesman for the Attorney General has also been
quoted as stating that "[in order to find what you're looking for, you have to look in everything." Levine,
Proposed Legislation, in Searching a Lawyers' Office: A Delicate Balance, L.A. LAW., Oct., 1979, at 52
(quoting "attorney general's spokesman").
425. As two practicing attorneys have noted, "[w]hile many large firms have computerized catalogues
of central filing systems, most lawyers specializing in criminal law are sole practitioners or work in small
offices without sophisticated centralized filing systems. Even a cursory search in this context requires
examination of all documents in each office of the firm." Tarlow & Johnston, supra note 178, at 42.
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review of the documents would seem necessary. Even an examination limited
to file captions, however, might disclose privileged material, especially
protected work product.426 This situation illustrates the advantage of either
permitting the attorney to tender the evidence or employing a master to
conduct the search. On balance, however, the possibility that brief review of
file captions might infringe upon the privileges would not present an unduly
severe threat; if this type of review were to become standard practice,
attorneys readily could protect against disclosure by labeling their files more
discreetly.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Andresen- v. Maryland,427 the fourth
amendment imposes a duty on officers executing a search warrant for papers
to ensure that they minimize intrusions on privacy in conducting the
search.428 A procedure under which the officers must attempt to screen out
privileged and irrelevant documents during the search of a law office scarcely
can be considered unreasonable. In addition to the officers' constitutional
duty to minimize the scope of the search, a corresponding statutory obligation
can be devised from existing models. The American Law Institute Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, for example, provides that an officer
executing a warrant for the seizure of documentary evidence "shall endeavor
by all appropriate means to search for and identify the documents to be seized
without examining the contents of documents not covered by the warrant." 429
Federal eavesdropping legislation embodies the same principle by requiring
that the court ensure that every order authorizing or extending a wiretap
explicitly provides that the wiretap "shall be conducted in such a way as to
minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to
interception .... -430
Courts must apply a duty to minimize with sufficient flexibility to
guarantee that they will not frustrate the purpose of the search. They should
require an officer conducting the search to make only reasonable efforts to
exclude privileged and irrelevant documents. Under circumstances in which
an officer has no feasible means of making a cursory separation, courts should
exempt the officer from the requirement. As long as the attorney is present
and permitted to assert relevant privileges during a search, the officer's duty
426. See id. (suggesting that "file ... marked 'Client Jones-Entrapment Defense' can disclose an entire
theory of defense"). In Henry v. Perrin the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently expressed
concern that even a cursory review of an attorney's briefcase for textual contraband by prison officials
could reveal privileged and damaging information, especially when the prisoner had been charged with
escape, because the guards might be familiar with the charge. 609 F.2d 1010, 1012 (1st Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1652 (1980). The court pointed out that "wholly apart from any special facility in speed
reading, an individual's ordinary perceptions of briefly viewed phenomena, such as stroboscopic images,
can be substantial." Id.
427. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
428. Id. at 481 n.11.
429. ALI MODEL CODE, supra note 300, § SS 220.5(1). See also Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note
170 (person conducting search may look at items only to extent necessary to identify). A critic of this
proposal has characterized it as a "police peek procedure." Minority Objections of Linda Ludlow, Deputy
Attorney General of California, to Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 170.
430. Title III, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976). In
interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court has indicated that when courts must determine whether the
officer complied with his duty to minimize the interception of nonrelevant communications, they must
make an objective assessment of his actions, not his motives. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137
(1978).
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to minimize would not prove to be unduly burdensome. Furthermore, such a
duty would help alleviate the threat to the attorney-client relationship
presented by the law office search.431
Require Removal of Purportedly Privileged Documents Under Seal for In
Camera Review by Court. Whether an attorney, the police, or a master
conducts the search, the police should transfer allegedly privileged documents
under seal to the court for in camera review.432 If the attorney has tendered
the evidence, no practical difficulty should arise. The attorney can segregate
purportedly privileged documents, bring claims of privilege to the attention of
the officers, and arrange to have the documents transferred to the court under
seal.433 If the search has been conducted by a master, he can conduct a
preliminary review of claims of privilege on the spot; if either the lawyer or
the officer challenges the master's decisions, he can transfer the documents
directly to the court for further review.
The problem becomes a little more complicated when law enforcement
officers conduct the search since they must not examine the arguably
privileged documents in any detail.434 While the police are conducting the
search, they will encounter the practical problem of identifying the specified
items without scrutinizing every document in detail. As long as the attorney is
present, permitted to assert privileges, and willing to cooperate, he can
indicate which files contain only unprivileged material and hence may be
examined. When the police insist on conducting the search (perhaps because
the attorney is a criminal suspect) and the attorney asserts that a file or set of
files contains privileged items, the police should seal and then submit to the
court for in camera review all files that they have reason to believe might be
subject to seizure. 435
431. As a corollary to the duty to minimize, the officer conducting the search should be placed under an
explicit obligation to maintain the confidentiality of any allegedly privileged material examined during the
course of the search until the court rules that the items are not, in fact, privileged. See ABA Section of
Criminal Justice, Committee on Ethical Considerations in the Prosecution and Defense of Criminal Cases,
Draft Report on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, at 5 (recommending that prosecutors be placed
under obligation of confidentiality) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
432. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(c)(2)(d) (West Supp. 1980) (special master or officer conducting search
of law office under obligation to seal privileged material); Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 170
(same).
433. In O'Connor v. Johnson the attorney was permitted to retain his work-product file pending in
camera review by the trial court. 287 N.W.2d 400, 401 '(Minn. 1979) (en banc). The law enforcement
officers conducting the search at the Cotton & Bregman firm permitted the attorney to gather and then
tender the items specified in the warrant to the court for in camera review. Transcript at 3, In re Law Office
of Bregman, No. SW 15591 (L.A. Mun. Ct. Apr. 24, 1979). Once the police place the documents under
seal, they must assure that the items are transferred promptly to the court.
434. The ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure suggests one possible solution. It provides
that whenever the officer cannot identify documentary evidence without also examining the contents of
nonspecified documents, he must impound the documents for removal under seal without initially
examining them. ALI MODEL CODE, supra note 300, § SS 220.5(2). Although commendable because it
protects general interests in privacy and confidentiality, this proposal scarcely is necessary to protect
privileged material in an attorney's office. Rather, all purportedly privileged items should be segregated
and sealed for in camera review. Another recent proposal would extend even further by allowing the
attorney to insist that the entire premises be sealed pending a judicial hearing. Report, Exclusionary Rule,
supra note 170. But see Minority Objections of Linda Ludlow, Deputy Attorney General of California, to
Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 170 (sealing premises could prove extremely burdensome both to
police and attorney).
435. In United States v. Beusch the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that officers must remove
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Under this procedure, the quantity of disputed documents occasionally will
be so great that the remedy might be worse than the wrong. Some attorneys
might conclude that the impoundment of a significant portion of their files,
even for a relatively brief period of time, is too steep a price to pay to preserve
the privileged status of a few documents. On occasion, the attorney might
conclude that such a large-scale seizure would be more detrimental to his
practice than a more detailed immediate examination, presumably resulting
in a more limited seizure.436 Thus, the law should permit an attorney to select
the alternative he considers less intrusive,4 37 provided he does not attempt
unilaterally to waive his client's privileges.438 When the police deliver a
voluminous amount of seized material to a court, a master will often be
appointed to screen out privileged and irrelevant documents. If the master
conducted the search, however, he could eliminate the need to seize docu-
ments not specified in the warrant.
Even so, a court will minimize the intrusion only if it either requires the
police to provide the attorney with copies of all documents seized or expedites
the in camera review and hearing on claims of privilege. When the volume of
documents or administrative considerations preclude either alternative, im-
poundment would be more intrusive than useful.
To accommodate the competing interests, a court might interpret the
fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness as mandating that the
police transfer potentially privileged documents under seal to the court for in
camera review. This procedure, however, flows more readily from the
privileges than from the Constitution. Whether judicially, legislatively, or
administratively developed, this proposal is essential to protect the attorney-
client relationship.
Prohibit Assertion of Plain View Doctrine. The plain view doctrine
permits an officer during the course of a search to seize an item that is not
specified in the warrant if he observes the item from a lawful vantage, if he
discovers it inadvertently, and if he immediately recognizes it as fruits,
contraband, or evidence.439 If these conditions are met, courts will generally
relevant documents from a single volume or file folder that was within the scope of the warrant rather than
take the entire volume or folder. 596 F.2d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 1979). The Court, however, explicitly noted
that the result might be different if relevant and irrelevant documents were mingled in a set of files rather
than in a single volume or file folder. Id. at 877.
436. Although an obligation to impound and seal a large quantity of documents might seem
burdensome to the police, law enforcement officers have seized large quantities of textual material in the
past. See, ag., In re Search Warrant (Church of Scientology), [1978-79] 25 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2525,
2525 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1979) (search warrant executed by 25 FBI agents); In re Lafayette Academy, Inc.,
610 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1979) (four or five truckloads of documents seized from school administrative office);
VonderAhe v. Howland, 508 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1974) (small truckload of records and papers seized
from dentist's office); Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144, 145 (7th Cir.) (truckload of books, records, and papers
seized from doctor's office), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
437. Cf. United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 545 (Ist Cir. 1980) (dictum) (when disruptive
procedure necessary to identify documents specified in warrant, subject of search should be given option of
having analysis of privilege performed on premises or having all documents or copies removed for
consideration elsewhere).
438. When the attorney-client privilege is implicated, the attorney should choose the most protective
procedure unless the client consents to an alternative. When only work product is involved, however, the
attorney should have the discretion to decide which procedure the police should follow.
439. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466-69 (1971) (plurality opinion). For a discussion of
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condone the immediate seizure of items discovered in plain view because the
incremental intrusion is minimal and the benefits to law enforcement are
substantial.440
The balance of interests is quite different, however, when privileged or
highly confidential documents fall within the plain view doctrine. Courts
should not apply the plain view doctrine to the search of a law office because
of its potential for abuse and because of the threat it presents to the attorney-
client privilege and the work-product doctrine.441 If courts applied the plain
view doctrine, an officer could seize documents of evidentiary interest
discovered during the course of the search442 even though he had made no
prior showing of probable cause that the documents existed or would be
found on the premises. This result could drastically undermine the protective
capacity of both the particularity and probable cause requirements of the
fourth amendment and provide a significant incentive for a rummaging-type
search. Many attorneys, particularly criminal defense specialists, will possess
nonprivileged but highly confidential documents pertaining to their clients.
These documents, although not incriminating, nonetheless might be of great
evidentiary interest to the prosecution. As a practical matter, then, the
potential for stumbling upon additional evidence against either the person
under investigation or others not currently subject to suspicion could provide
an improper incentive to the police for searching a lawyer's office.
Reconciling the law office search with the attorney-client relationship is
difficult, even when the search is conducted pursuant to a highly particu-
larized warrant based on a showing of probable cause. By permitting the
seizure of documentary evidence in the absence of such a showing, the courts
recent developments in the plain view doctrine, see Criminal Procedure Project, supra note 301, at 308-11.
Courts and commentators have not agreed on the scope of the "inadvertence" element of the plain view
doctrine, but the better position seems to be that a discovery is inadvertent even if the police suspected they
would find an item, unless they had probable cause to obtain a warrant to search for it. See, e.g., United
States v. Liberti, 616 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1980) (mere expectation or suspicion that discovery likely does
not preclude application of plain view doctrine); United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th Cir. 1979)
(inadvertence established if police have no probable cause to believe discovery likely); 2 LAFAvE
TREATISE, supra note 36, § 4.11(d), at 179 (doctrine applicable only if no grounds exist for including
discovered objects in warrant); C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 134, § 11.03, at 217-82(same).
440. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,469-70 (1971) (plurality opinion). As long as the officer
has a right to be in a position where the evidence may be discovered and seized, he disturb* only an interest
in possession, not in privacy, when he seizes items in plain view. Id. As Justice Stewart explained in his
plurality opinion in Coolidge, the plain view doctrine does not conflict with the requirement that a search
be authorized by a neutral magistrate since it applies only when the officer is legitimately present. Id. at
467. Likewise, the doctrine comports with the policies underlying the requirement that warrants be
particular since the seizure of an object in plain view does not convert a limited search into a general one.
Id.
441. Cf. Note, Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 105, at 1000 & n.245 (urging that plain view
doctrine not apply to newsroom searches).
442. Arguably, since the incriminating nature of the evidence must be immediately apparent, a
document is not in plain view simply because the police see it because its evidentiary value is not necessarily
apparent. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring) (police with warrant to
seize gambling equipment could not rely on plain view doctrine to seize and examine film because they had
no reason to believe it was obscene before viewing it). But cf United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 559
(5th Cir. 1979) (officer with reason to believe others might be implicated in crime may leaf through address
book discovered in plain view), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Och, 595 F.2d 1247,
1256-59 (2d Cir. 1979) (police with probable cause to believe that documents in plain view are evidence of
crime may examine them), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 435 (1980); United States v. Hubbard, [1979- 80] 26
CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2073, 2075 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 1979) (same).
LAW OFFICE SEARCHES
are likely to upset any meaningful accommodation of the competing interests.
To ensure that the balance is not unfairly weighted against the prosecution,
however, the courts should not immunize from subsequent seizure items
inadvertently discovered in plain view during the search of a law office. As
long as the police are able to establish probable cause based on a source of
information independent of and untainted by the search, the courts should
allow them to obtain a warrant authorizing seizure of this evidence. 443
The Supreme Court recently suggested that the plain view doctrine might
not necessarily apply to a search for obscene material, 44 presumably because
it could threaten first amendment values. The Supreme Court did not address
the doctrine in Andresen and Zurcher, but these decisions nevertheless suggest
that traditional fourth amendment procedure provides adequate protection
against abuse. If so, the plain view doctrine will retain its vitality in law office
searches unless legislatures enact statutes or state courts interpret existing
state law as foreclosing use of the doctrine. Because of the potential for
irreparable harm to the sensitive interests implicated by a law office search,
the law should prohibit the police from asserting the plain view doctrine in
any such search.
C. POSTSEIZURE RELIEF
The injury to the attorney-client relationship might be further minimized if
courts employed various procedures after law enforcement officers have
completed a law office search.
Serve Attorney with Specification of Areas Searched. After completing a
law office search, the officers executing the warrant should give the attorney a
receipt specifying in reasonable detail not only the documents seized but also
the areas of the office searched and the files examined.445 This procedure
443. See also notes 461-88 infra and accompanying text (providing detailed discussion of role of fruit of
poisonous tree doctrine in law office search context). Once law enforcement officers have searched an
attorney's office, they would bear the burden of establishing an independent source for information
justifying a subsequent search. To a certain extent, the plain view doctrine is premised on the assumption
that the police would have probable cause upon discovering an item in plain view to obtain a new warrant
based on information gleaned from the discovery immediately. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
467-68 (1971) (plurality opinion).
444. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 & n.5 (1979). The Supreme Court of Louisiana
recently held that "[tihere is no plain view doctrine in First Amendment cases." Parish of Jefferson v.
Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So. 2d 158, 165 (La. 1977).
445. After a typical search, the officers must leave a receipt specifying the items seized with the
occupant of the premises. FED. R. CRiM. P. 41(d); cf. O'Neill, supra note 302, at 46 (suggesting officers be
required to make "strict post-search inventory"). In the Kaplan & Livingston search, an official tape
recorded portions of the search in order to make a clear record. Furthermore, secretaries for the firm
recorded the title of every document, whether or not seized, that was reviewed by the officers executing the
warrant. Petition of Attorney General for Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition and for Stay Order;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, at 12, Exhibit 7 (affidavit of Susan L. Frierson). A similar
procedure was followed in People v. Superior Court (Driscoll), 68 Cal. App. 3d 845, 850, 137 Cal. Rptr. 391,
393 (Ct. App.) (per curiam), decertified, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977). The obvious
disadvantage with such a procedure is that it significantly increases the amount of time required to search
the office. Although this procedure might prove burdensome to the police and might enhance the degree of
the intrusion, an attorney nonetheless might conclude that a precise record of the scope of the search is well
worth the additional inconvenience.
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would help the attorney determine whether officers reviewed privileged
materials. Although the fourth amendment does not compel such a proce-
dure, a legislature should adopt it as a matter of policy.
Promptly Return Copies of Seized Documents. To avoid the severe
disruption an attorney's practice and to ensure that he will be able to present
reasoned and factually specific arguments on claims of privilege in postseizure
proceedings, the attorney should receive either the original or a photocopy of
all the seized documents as expeditiously as is practicable. 446 If the police have
removed the files under seal, the court should provide appropriate security
measures to protect the files while they are being copied. When many
documents must be copied, the cost and burden might seem excessive.
Nonetheless, society must bear this expense because the more documents that
are seized the greater the threat the attorney-client relationship.
In an analogous situation the Supreme Court indicated that when law
enforcement officials have seized the only copy of an allegedly obscene film,
they promptly must make another copy and return the original to the
owner.447 Admittedly, the constitutional interest might not be as great when
officers seize an attorney's files. Nonetheless, his client's sixth amendment
right to effective counsel would be denied if the attorney's defense was
impeded because he lacked either the original documents or copies of them.
Even though an absolute copy-and-return rule probably is not constitu-
tionally required, a legislature should implement it as a matter of policy.
Provide Prompt Judicial Hearing on Claims of Privilege. Following the
seizure of files, the attorney and his client must receive a reasonably promptjudicial hearing on any claim that privileged materials have been seized.448
The need for an immediate hearing after a law office search is not so great as
in the obscenity context, in which an unlawful seizure might restrain
distribution of materials protected by the first amendment.4 9 Nonetheless,
the attorney and his client have a significant interest in eliminating any
uncertainty about the privileged status of documents removed from the
attorney's office.
446. Cf. Consumer Credit Ins. Agency, Inc. v. United States, 599 F.2d 770, 772 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting
that district court ordered Government to return originals of documents produced pursuant to subpoenas
duces tecum after concluding that plaintiff's business could be impeded), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1078
(1980); Blumenthal, supra note 293, at 30 (describing Connecticut press search guidelines that grant press
reasonable opportunity to copy documents seized during newsroom search).
447. See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1973) (in absence of copies of seized film, court
should permit film to be copied pending determination of obscenity issue or film must be returned).
448. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(c)(2) (West Supp. 1980) (providing for judicial hearing on claims of
privilege within three days of service of warrant unless impracticable; if impracticable, hearing will be
scheduled "at the earliest possible time"); Revised Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 152, at 8 (right to
hearing within 48 hours). See also ALI MODEL CODE, supra note 300, § SS 220.5(3) (providing for judicial
hearing on legitimacy of any seizure of documentary evidence as soon after search as interests of justice
permit).
449. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1973).
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As it does in considering an assertion of the attorney-client ,privilege, 450 the
work-product doctrine, 451 or other evidentiary privileges,452 a court should
review the documents taken from an attorney's office in camera to determine
whether the claim is justified. Before the court finally resolves the issue, it
should serve notice on the attorney and on all identifiable clients whose files
might have been examined or seized.453 Furthermore, the court should give
the attorney and these clients454 the opportunity to appear and present
arguments on the legitimacy of their claims.455 Because the party asserting a
450. See United States v. Osborn, 561 F.2d 1334, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1977) (court conducted in camera
review of sealed financial documents to determine if privileged); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d
855, 864 (8th Cir.) (court entitled to inspect subpoenaed financial documents to determine if privileged),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). Until recently and contrary to federal practice, California law generally
prohibited the court from reviewing allegedly privileged material in camera. See Romo v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 71 Cal. App. 3d 909, 922, 139 Cal. Rptr. 787, 795 (Ct. App. 1977) (plaintiff failed to establish
lack of confidentiality; court may not require disclosure in camera to rule on claim). The same bill that
recently implemented the law office search procedures also amended the Evidence Code to permit in
camera review when law enforcement officers seize purportedly privileged documents from an attorney's
office if "there is no other feasible means to rule on the validity of such claim [of privilege]." CAL. EVID.
CODE § 915(a) (West Supp. 1980).
451. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Dec. 19, 1978, 599 F.2d 504, 513 (2d Cir. 1979)
(district court should examine documents to determine if they qualify as work product); In re Subpoena
(Murphy), 560 F.2d 326, 332 (8th Cir. 1977) (court ordered in camera review of documents by special
master to determine if work product); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d
730, 731-32 (4th Cir. 1974) (court reviewed documents to determine if work product), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 997 (1975).
452. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-16 (1974) (when Chief Executive claims presidential
privilege for subpoenaed material, court should conduct in camera inspection); Palermo v. United States,
360 U.S. 343, 354 (1959) (in camera review appropriate for determining whether statement of government
witness must be disclosed under Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976)). But cf. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73,
84 (1973) (Freedom of Information Act exemption 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976), neither authorizes nor
prohibits in camera inspection of secret or top secret documents).
453. Identification of and notice to affected clients may not be possible in the absence of cooperation by
the attorney. The attorney should not be required to identify clients if he assures the court that he has
consulted with the clients in question and they would prefer not to appear. The attorney would remain
obligated to represent their interests at the hearing.
454. Both the attorney and his client should have standing to assert that privileged documents have
been seized or examined. Although the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, the Supreme Court
has noted that the attorney may attempt to preserve it on the client's behalf. Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 402 n.8 (1976). Both the attorney and his client have a sufficient interest in material protected by
the work-product doctrine to claim its protection and litigate an asserted breach. In re Special Sept. 1978
Grand Jury (II), 48 U.S.L.W. 2745, 2745 (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 1980).
Likewise, both the attorney and his client should have standing to assert that an examination or seizure
of privileged materials violated the fourth amendment right each has to be free from an unreasonable
search and seizure. A search of an attorney's office necessarily involves an intrusion into the attorney's
expectation of privacy. Cf. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1968) (union official has reasonable
expectation of freedom from government intrusion in shared, union office). If the documents seized belong
to the client, his possessory interest combined with his reasonable expectation that the documents will
remain relatively private while in the attorney's possession should permit him to contest their seizure from
his attorney's office. See generally 3 LAFAVE TREATISE, supra note 36, § 11.3(c), (d), at 560-61, 578
(bailment arrangement -creates expectation of privacy). Even if the documents belong to the attorney, the
work-product doctrine should confer standing on the client. To ensure that any person with a legitimate
interest in a search and seizure may come forth and object, legislatures should grant standing to any
"aggrieved" party. See Report, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 170 (committee split on whether clients
should have standing with slight majority favoring client standing).
455. The California Penal Code, for example, provides that a "court shall provide sufficient time for
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privilege generally will bear the burden of establishing the validity of the
claim,4 56 the attorney or the privilege-holder must provide the court with
whatever factual information is necessary to resolve the question.457 If the
court sustains the claim, it should promptly return the documents under seal
to the attorney.458
The frequent in camera review of documents on motions to quash
subpoenas for the files and records of attorneys suggests that the procedure isjudicially manageable. Because law enforcement officials probably will em-
ploy subpoenas more often than search warrants in seeking documentary
evidence from attorneys, in camera review should not prove burdensome.
Courts should require reasonably prompt in camera review under the fourth
amendment since the procedure is essential to the preservation of the
privileges and is consistent with the needs of law enforcement.
Implement Effective Exclusionary Rule. Once a court has adjudicated
the claims of privilege, the attorney and his client should be able to rely on
standard search and seizure remedies. When the prosecution has filed
criminal charges, the court should suppress any illegally seized evidence.459 If
the prosecution has not initiated any proceedings, the court should grant the
parties to obtain counsel and make any motions or present any evidence .... CAL. PENAL CODE §
1524(c)(2) (West Supp. 1980); cf. ALI MODEL CODE, supra note 300, § SS 220.5(3) (providing that any
person asserting right or interest in documents impounded pursuant to search warrant shall be given
opportunity to appear before court and move for return of documents).
If the court decides to employ a master to conduct a preliminary review when law enforcement officials
have seized many documents, the court should require the master to submit a written report that would be
made available to the parties. After the parties have filed briefs and argued the merits, the court should
resolve any challenges to the master's findings. See Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 865 (8th
Cir.) (after master completes report on whether documents privileged, attorney entitled to court ruling),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
456. See, eg., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574 (1976) (witness must invoke privilege
against being compelled to testify against self); In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1977) (claimant
bears burden of proving attorney-client privilege applicable); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 924 (2d
Cir. 1961) (claimant cannot remain silent and expect to assert attorney-client privilege successfully).
457. United States v. Osborn, 561 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1977).
458. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 663, 716 (1974); see ALI MODEL CODE, supra note 300, § SS
220.5(3). A federal district court recently found it necessary to say that the prosecution should not be able
to compel the court to surrender documents held by the court for in camera review procedures. See United
States v. Howell, 466 F. Supp. 835, 836 (D. Or. 1979). In Howell the defendant tendered certain books and
documents to the court for in camera review of his claim that a subpoena duces tecum seeking production
of the material violated his privilege against self-incrimination. Id. The court found that some of the
documents were privileged and others were not. At that point, the prosecutor served the clerk of the court
with a search warrant specifying the documents under consideration. Id. The court quashed the warrant in
order to prevent the very purpose of the in camera procedure from being undermined. Id. at 837. In
addition, it stated that the prosecutor's announced plan to serve a search warrant for the documents on the
defendant as soon as they were returned by the court would violate his privilege against self-incrimination
since he would be compelled to aid in the "discovery, production and authentication" of the incriminating
documents that he tendered initially in response to the subpoena. Id. at 838. Consequently, the court
concluded that a prosecutor may choose to employ a subpoena or a search warrant, but not a '"one-two'
punch." Id.
459. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (evidence obtained by unconstitutional search and
seizure inadmissible in both state and federal courts).
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attorney's motion for return of the documents.46° Finally, the courts should
allow both the attorney and his client to pursue a civil rights damage action.
461
Although a postseizure in camera hearing should prove sufficient when law
enforcement officers have brought purportedly privileged documents to a
court under seal, more is required when the attorney claims that the officers
examined privileged material during the course of a search. If a court
determines that the search violated the fourth amendment, the exclusionary
rule462 coupled with the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine463 should
preclude the prosecution from directly or indirectly using the information
contained in the privileged documents, unless the prosecutor can demonstrate
the existence of an independent source for the evidence or sufficient attenua-
tion from the original illegality to purge the taint.464 The fourth amendment
exclusionary rule, however, will not preclude all uses of unconstitutionally
obtained privileged information. Evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment, for example, may be employed as a basis for obtaining a grand
460. See VonderAhe v. Howland, 508 F.2d 364, 372 (9th Cir. 1974) (because neither civil nor criminal
action pending, district court should order return of documents to claimant). See generally Note,
Anomolous Jurisdiction: Pre-Indictment Relief for Victims of Unlawful Searches and Seizures, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 597 (1980).
461. Cf. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (cause of action available
against municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) based on official policy or custom but not respondeat
superior); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)
(cause of action implied under fourth amendment available against federal officers acting under color of
authority); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) (cause of action available against state officers under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) for depriving citizens' constitutional rights while acting under color of law).
Nonetheless, the utility of a civil rights damage action generally will be only theoretical because, as the
Supreme Court has indicated, a court will immunize law enforcement officers involved in procuring and
executing a warrant if they can establish that they acted in good faith and reasonably believed that their
actions were legal. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). But cf. Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S.
Ct. 1398 (1980) (no municipal immunity under § 1983). One of the clients of an attorney whose office was
searched, however, recently filed a $10 million damage action alleging that his civil rights had been
violated. LA. Judge Bars Search, supra note 15, at 4, col. 2.
In the rare instance when an attorney has good reason to believe that an illegal search might be repeated,
he is entitled to seek declaratory or injunctive relief. Although the district court in Zurcher entered a
declaratory judgment ruling that the search of the Stanford Daily's office was illegal, it declined to enter an
injunction, assuming that because the first search was declared illegal, another search would not occur.
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 136 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd per curiam, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.
1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). As noted earlier, a California trial court enjoined the search of the
Kaplan & Livingston firm while it was still in progress. Pending further review, the court of appeals
directed the trial court to modify or dissolve the injunction. See note 14 supra and accompanying text
(briefly discussing case). Without passing on the prosecution's contention that a California trial court lacks
the authority to enjoin the execution of a search warrant, the court of appeals ultimately issued a writ of
mandate directing the trial court to vacate the injunction. Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d
253, 260, 162 Cal. Rptr. 857, 863 (Ct. App. 1980).
462. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398-99 (1914) (evidence obtained in violation of
individual's fourth amendment rights cannot be used against that individual as substantive evidence of guilt
in federal criminal trial). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (extending Weeks exclusionary
rule to state criminal trials).
463. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (evidence obtained through exploitation
of illegality inadmissible in criminal trial).
464. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279 (1978) (evidence admissible when obtained from
source independent of primary illegality); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (evidence
admissible when connection between illegality, and evidence so attenuated as to dissipate taint). See
generally 3 LAFAVE TREATISE, supra note 36, § 11.4, at 612-80; Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree,"
Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CAL. L. REv. 579, 624-25, 642 (1968).
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jury indictment,465 or introduced into evidence in a civil proceeding when the
illegal search was conducted by another sovereign,466 or admitted in aparole467 or a probation468 revocation hearing, or relied upon as a basis for
criminal sentencing. 469 The policies of the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine, however, might be undermined if clients and attor-
neys believed that the prosecution could use information gleaned from
privileged documents against them. Moreover, if the search and seizure did
not violate the fourth amendment, the constitutional exclusionary rule would
provide no remedy against police examining privileged documents. Thus, the
courts should develop an effective remedy for invasions of privilege that occur
during a law office search. Some courts will dismiss the indictment when a
criminal defendant's state or federal constitutional right to effective assistance
of counsel has been violated by an intentional government intrusion into the
attorney-client relationship, 470 at least when privileged communications have
been disclosed.471 Given its deterrent potential, this extreme sanction is
defensible when the prosecution deliberately has sought to benefit by invading
a privilege or intentionally has declined to abide by established procedures
designed to safeguard confidential information. Furthermore, such a remedy
might be warranted if the prosecution clearly and irreparably has prejudiced
the client's defense.472 These courts that have adopted this remedy stated that
proof of actual prejudice should not be required since the harm can be subtle
and therefore difficult, if not impossible, to prove. 473 Automatic dismissal of
465. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354-55 (1974).
466. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976).
467. United States ex rel Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir. 1970).
468. United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 1975).
469. United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971).
470. See Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d 742, 756, 598 P.2d 818, 826, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658, 666(1979) (dismissing charges because undercover state agent participated in attorney-client meetings
contrary to state law guarantee of right to effective counsel). Following the search of the attorney's officeinvalidated by the Oregon trial court in In re Stewart, see note 22 supra (discussing Stewart), the district
attorney voluntarily dismissed 40 criminal cases unrelated to the subject of the search for which
confidential defense files had been examined during the search. S. 1790 Hearings, supra note 22, at 109(statement of Stephen Kanter, Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School).
471. See United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 1978) (dismissal of indictment only
appropriate remedy when codefendant, government informant, revealed defense strategy to prosecution).
472. In Barber v. Municipal Court the California Supreme Court noted that as a result of the intrusion
by a government informer into the attorney-client relationship the defendants "no longer feel they canfreely, candidly, and with complete confidence discuss their case with their attorney.... This lack of
cooperation, which resulted solely from the intrusion by law enforcement officers in the attorney-client
relationship, has resulted in counsel's inability to prepare adequately for trial." 24 Cal. 3d 742, 756, 598
P.2d 818, 826, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658, 666 (1979). In endorsing the dismissal sanction, the court indicated that
its decision was not limited to instances of actual prejudice. Id. at 757, 598 P.2d at 826, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
666. The mere assertion of a chilling effect on client communications, however, probably should not
automatically require dismissal of the indictment since such an allegation doubtlessly would be made in
every case.
473. See United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 208-09 (1978) (actual prejudice standard too difficult to
apply when confidences disclosed to government); cf. Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d 742, 756, 598
P.2d 818, 826, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658, 666 (1979) (problems of proof make exclusionary rule ineffective remedy
for protecting petitioner's right to counsel). See also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 565-67 (1977)(Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting) (attendance of government agent at defense team meeting per se
violation of sixth amendment; requiring defendant to prove intent or disclosure ineffective remedy).
In Barber v. Municipal Court the California Supreme Court maintained that an exclusionary remedy
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an indictment without any regard for the nature of the information revealed
or the circumstances of the case, however, fails to accord any weight to the
legitimate interests of the prosecution, especially if a court considers the
carefully executed search of an attorney's office proper. Moreover, such a
stringent all-or-nothing remedy might prove disadvantageous to the client
whose communications have been disclosed; in the absence of clear prejudice,
the courts might well strain to avoid penalizing the prosecution so severely.474
A rule prohibiting the prosecution from directly or indirectly using in any
legal proceeding privileged information obtained pursuant to the search of an
attorney's office, regardless of whether a constitutional violation had oc-
curred, would promote better reconciliation of the competing interests. 475 An
exclusionary rule and a "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine would provide a
direct remedy for invasions of the attorney-client privilege and the work-
product doctrine.
Although a court might hold that the sixth amendment right to counsel or
its state counterpart requires the exclusion of evidence when officers
deliberately intrude upon the attorney-client relationship, the prosecution
uses evidence derived from the intrusion, or these events prejudice the
defendant in any significant respect,476 a court or legislature should develop a
nonconstitutional rule as well because the right to effective assistance of
counsel might not be coterminous with the scope of the attorney-client
privilege or the work-product doctrine. Moreover, the sixth amendment
extends only to criminal prosecutions. The attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine, however, still will be undermined if the police can
would be inadequate both because it would require the client to redisclose privileged information in order
to prove his case and because it would fail to provide an effective deterrent. The first objection was
eviscerated by recent California legislation. See note 450 supra (discussing amendment to California
Evidence Code). The second objection could be met by requiring the government to establish an untainted
independent source for the evidence.
474. Cf. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REv. 525, 538-39
(1975) (courts' assumption that dismissal sole remedy for sixth amendment violation causes them to focus
on whether defendant's ability to present defense impaired; courts have found long delays do not violate
sixth amendment).
475. See Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d 742, 759-63, 598 P.2d 818, 828-31, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658,
668-71 (1979) (Manual, J., concurring and dissenting) (when state has invaded "defense camp,"
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that independent source of evidence exists). See also
Note, The Legislative Debate, supra note 290, at 183, 193 (privileged material seized during search should
be inadmissible in judicial proceeding). The federal eavesdropping law provides a model for just such a
broad exclusionary rule because it prohibits the use of the contents of or any evidence derived from an
illegally intercepted conversation "in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand
jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof ... " Title III, Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. S 2515 (1976). The recent Privacy Protection Act of 1980, see notes 290-92 supra, does not provide
for the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of its provisions. See Pub. L. No. 96-440 § 106(e) (1980)
(providing that "[e]vidence otherwise admissible in a proceeding shall not be excluded on the basis of a
violation of this Act"). The legislation has been criticized on this point. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1064, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20 (1980) (additional views of Rep. Drinan) (section 5 of H.R. 3486, the House version
of the Act, should not be read as eliminating use of exclusionary rule; without exclusionary rule, statute's
effectiveness undermined). But cf. S. 1790 Hearings, supra note 22, at 55 (statement of Philip B. Heymann,
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division) (arguing that exclusionary rule neither necessary nor
desirable).
476. See notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text (discussing Weatherford criteria for exclusion of
evidence).
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seize and the government can use protected materials against a client in
noncriminal proceedings.
Accordingly, in any type of legal proceeding, a party should be able to
make a prima facie showing that tendered evidence, a witness, a question, or
an objection477 may not be introduced or used by establishing that his
attorney's office has been searched, that he reasonably believes that privileged
materials were examined, and that he reasonably suspects that the evidence or
information was obtained or derived from the examination. The party could
not rely on unsubstantiated allegations, but would need to offer proof on each
element.478 At that point, the burden would shift to the opposing party to
prove by clear and convincing evidence 79 that it obtained the evidence or
information from an independent, untainted source.480
The burden of rebuttal would not be insurmountable as long as the officials
conducting the search employed reasonably protective procedures.48t If these
officials allowed the attorney to tender the documents for in camera review,
for example, or if they transferred seized files to the court under seal, or if a
special master conducted the search, the prosecution easily could refute an
allegation that privileged material had been examined or exploited. Likewise,
if law enforcement officials provided the attorney with a detailed specification
of the files examined during the search, he at least would know which
documents they might have examined. Whatever the procedure, it should
require a direct correlation between the potential for exclusion and the
precautions employed by the officers executing the search warrant.
Either the courts could derive a remedy directly from the privileges or a
legislature could implement one pursuant to a comprehensive legislative
477. The scope of the exclusionary rule must extend beyond actual evidence since an adversary can
benefit from knowledge of privileged information in many other ways. The entire theory of the
prosecution's case or its preparation to meet a particular defense, for example, might be based on
information obtained through an invasion of a privilege. See Wilson v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 3d
751, 760, 139 Cal. Rptr. 61, 66 (Ct. App. 1977) (when state has eavesdropped on attorney-client
conversation, state may not offer rebuttal or cross-examination in criminal proceeding unless it can prove
beyond a reasonable doubt evidence not derived from tainted source).
478. The party generally would need to present the privileged documents to the court for in camera
inspection in order to prove that the evidence or information could have been derived from them.
479. Considering the severity of the threat to the privileges and in some cases to the sixth amendment
right to counsel, something beyond the preponderance of the evidence standard should be required. Justice
Manual, concurring and dissenting in Barber v. Municipal Court, endorsed the reasonable doubt standard.
24 Cal. 3d 742, 763, 598 P.2d 818, 831, 157 Cal. Rptr. 685, 670 (1979) (Manual, J., concurring and
dissenting in part). Since the question of taint often will be difficult to prove or disprove with any great
certainty, the less stringent "clear and convincing evidence" standard would strike a more appropriate
balance between the competing interests.
480. This independent source requirement is derived from the fourth amendment "fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963) (evidence and
information obtained in violation of fourth amendment inadmissible in criminal trial unless knowledge of
either independently derived). When a party asserts that a privilege has been breached, however, the party
tendering the evidence should not be permitted to rebut a prima facie case by proving sufficient
"attenuation" between the illegality and the evidence. Id. Through attenuation analysis, the Court
essentially assesses the incremental deterrent effect of excluding evidence from a trial. Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 609-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). Thus, when a court employs an exclusionary remedy
to preserve the integrity of the privileges rather than to deter illegal police conduct, it should not apply this
analysis.
481. But cf. Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege After Attorney Disclosure, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 927, 940
(1980) (fruit of poisonous tree principle would be unworkable when adversary has obtained information
due to attorney's breach of client's privilege).
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scheme. Unlike the constitutional exclusionary rule, however, the proposed
remedy should not be limited to criminal trials. A court or legislature should
prohibit any use of the improperly obtained privileged information because
both client communication and trial preparation would suffer if the state
could use the material in civil, as well as criminal, trials. Furthermore, even if
restricting the rule is justified by negligible deterrence in a fourth amendment
context,482 broader coverage is warranted when the primary purpose is to
preserve the integrity of the privileges rather than to deter illegal police
conduct.
Courts have provided little guidance on whether the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine is necessary to preserve the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine.483 Recently, however, in United States v. Bone1484 a
federal district court declined to employ the doctrine to quash an IRS
summons requesting production of leads derived from attorney work product
surreptitiously seized and disclosed to the government by a messenger
employed by a law firm.48 5 The court grounded its decision on five considera-
tions: (1) the investigatory purpose of the summons, (2) the civil-criminal
hybrid status of the summons, (3) the improbability that quashing the
summons would promote the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule
since the documents were seized without governmental participation, (4) the
improbability that failure to suppress the information would impair the
policies of the work-product doctrine or the attorey-client privilege since
attorneys ordinarily are able to maintain the security and confidentiality of
privileged documents, and (5) the belief, influenced by increasing criticism of
exclusionary rules in general, that precluding the use of the information by
the Government at the investigatory stage would impose too great a cost on
effective enforcement of the revenue laws.486 In a companion case the court
482. See, eg., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-60 (1976) (if application of exclusionary rule
does not appreciably increase deterrence, its use unwarranted); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536-
39 (1975) (deterrent purpose of exclusionary rule not served by applying it retroactively); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-52 (1974) (exclusionary rule not applicable at grand jury stage because
deterrence negligible).
483. See United States v. Wolfson, 558 F.2d 59, 66 (2d Cir. 1977) (court unable to find case in which
violation of attorney-client privilege resulted in dismissal of indictment or new trial). Since Wolfson, the
Third Circuit and the Supreme Court of California have ordered dismissal in cases in which the intrusion
constituted a violation of the defendant's right to counsel as well. See notes 470-75 supra and
accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Levy and California Supreme
Court's decision in Barber v. Municipal Court).
484. 483 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Minn. 1979).
485. Since the document was being transferred from the attorney to the client and did not include the
substance of any client communications, the court held that it was not protected by the attorney-client
privilege. Id. at 1076-77.
486. Id. at 1079-82. The court relied on SEC v. OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Tex. 1979), in
which the federal district court refused to apply the exclusionary rule and the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine to preclude the SEC from basing a subpoena on a privileged report by the defendant's counsel
innocently obtained by the SEC. Id. at 1039-40. The court reasoned that as long as the SEC did not act
improperly in obtaining the report, precluding the agency from using it would not promote the deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Id. Moreover, a contrary holding would have elevated the attorney-client
privilege above the fourth amendment right to privacy. Id. at 1040; cf. Gruzen v. Arkansas, 591 S.W.2d
342, 345 (Ark. 1980) (fruit of poisonous tree doctrine and exclusionary rule do not apply when psychiatrist
provided police with information incriminating client in breach of psychiatrist-patient privilege).
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denied a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena based on the same purloined
document, essentially relying on the conditions set forth above.487
Even if the Bonell decision 488 is sustained on appeal, the issues in that case
clearly are distinguishable from those raised by a law office search. To
promote the policies of the work-product doctrine (or the attorney-client
privilege), the court's decision should not have been influenced by the
preliminary or hybrid character of the IRS summons. By permitting the
government to base a summons on stolen work product, the court might
discourage attorneys from preserving or transferring trial preparation materi-
al. Furthermore, the case differs from the law office search in terms of the
potential effect on the policies of both the fourth amendment and the relevant
privileges. Unlike seizure and disclosure by a private messenger, a search or
seizure by the police pursuant to a warrant does constitute the type of official
conduct that exclusionary rules are designed to govern: More significantly,
even if attorneys are able to prevent privileged documents from falling into
the hands of an untrustworthy individual, without protection from a court
they are relatively powerless to prevent the police from seizing these materials
pursuant to a valid warrant, unless of course they commit nothing to writing.
D. A MODEL FOR THE LAW OFFICE SEARCH
Both courts and legislatures easily can modify search and seizure proce-
dures to better accommodate the values of the attorney-client relationship.
The following approach attempts to summarize the procedures suggested
above-with the exception of the subpoena preference rule-that would
reconcile best the competing interests of law enforcement officials and of
attorneys and their clients. Preferably, these procedures should be imple-
mented in conjunction with the subpoena preference rule since the police still
will have occasion to search attorneys' offices. Because the balance of interests
necessarily changes when the attorney is a criminal suspect, the procedures
for searching nonsuspect and suspect attorneys will be considered separately.
Searching the Office of a Nonsuspect Attorney. The chief prosecuting
official of a jurisdiction should have sole authority to apply for a warrant to
search an attorney's office and a court of general jurisdiction should have sole
authority to issue the warrant. Before the court may issue the warrant, it
should be required to approve a search plan devised by law enforcement
officials detailing how they intend to minimize the scope and degree of the
intrusion. The court should act only upon a showing that the officers have
probable cause to believe that the items specified in the warrant are not
protected by either the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine.
Furthermore, the court should require police to establish that they have
probable cause to believe either that substantially equivalent evidence cannot
be obtained from an alternative source or that simultaneous searches are
necessary to prevent the loss of the evidence. Finally, the court should issue
487. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Rice), 483 F. Supp. 1085, 1087-88 (D. Minn. 1979).
488. To expedite review, the district court certified to the Eighth Circuit the question whether the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine should require quashing the grand jury subpoena. United States v. Bonnell,
483 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (D. Minn. 1979).
[Vol. 69:1
LAW OFFICE SEARCHES
the warrant only if it specifies the objects of the search with a high degree of
particularity, avoiding, if at all possible, descriptions based on the content of
documents.
A neutral, legally-trained special master should conduct the search in the
presence of the accompanying law enforcement officers. Initially, he should
provide the attorney with an opportunity to tender the specified items
voluntarily. If the attorney is unavailable, uncooperative, or suspected of bad
faith, however, the master should proceed without offering the attorney this
opportunity. To minimize his intrusion, the master should limit the search to
those areas of the office and files where he is likely to find the specified items.
When feasible, the master should resolve preliminarily any claims of privilege
during the search. If either the police or the attorney disputes the master's
conclusions, or if the master cannot resolve the claims practicably, the police
should transfer all the allegedly privileged documents under seal to the court.
If the police execute the warrant without the assistance of a master, they
should make reasonable efforts to assure that the attorney is present and they
should give him the opportunity to assert any legitimate privileges, which
must respect. The court should not allow either the master or the police to
justify seizure of an item under the plain view doctrine.
Following the search, the master should present the attorney with a list of
all the items seized, as well as all files and areas searched. As promptly as is
feasible, the attorney should receive either a copy or the originals of all the
evidence seized. On an expedited basis, the court should permit all interested
parties to brief and argue any claim of privilege pertaining to evidence
examined, seized, or transferred to the court under seal. If necessary, the
court should review the documents in camera to resolve these claims.
Expedited appeal should be available to the prosecution, the attorney, and the
privilege-holder. If the court sustains the claim of privilege, the documents
should be returned to the attorney.48 9
Finally, in any legal proceeding, a party should be allowed to make a prima
facie case that evidence is inadmissible or that information may not be used by
establishing that his attorney's office was searched, that he reasonably
believes the police examined documents protected by his attorney-client
privilege or work product prepared by his attorney on his behalf, and that he
reasonably believes that the prosecution directly or indirectly derived the
evidence or information from that examination. The party seeking to use the
evidence or information could rebut the prima facie case by establishing
through clear and convincing evidence an independent, nontainted source.
Searching the Office of a Criminally Suspect Attorney. Essentially, the
same procedures should be employed when the attorney whose office is
subject to search is a criminal suspect since the attorney's culpability will not
diminish the basic threat to the attorney-client relationship. A few modifica-
tions, however, are warranted in order to protect against potential loss of
evidence.
The attorney-client privilege is the client's privilege-not the attorney's. Its
ultimate objective is to ensure that clients receive adequate representation. 490
When a client attempting to hire a criminal lawyer mistakenly employs a
489. If the court rejects the claim, however, the documents should be delivered to the prosecution.
490. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
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criminal who is a lawyer, the client should receive the direct and indirect
benefits of the privilege as long as he did not seek representation in
furtherance of a continuing or future crime or fraud. Furthermore, even if a
court holds that the client at whose records the warrant was directed is not
entitled to claim any privileges, the court should determine whether other
clients, whose files might be examined in the process, are entitled to assert a
privilege.491
Apart from the possible harm to the clients of the criminally implicated
attorney, the policies of the privilege would suffer on a more general level. If
clients learn that otherwise privileged communications might be exposed to
police scrutiny if probable cause to suspect their attorneys develops, many
clients might exercise greater restraint in discussing sensitive matters with
counsel. The privilege and the procedures proposed above are designed to
discourage such a reaction. The same conclusion might be drawn with regard
to the work-product doctrine, which also is intended to enhance the quality of
representation. A client involved in litigation should not suffer for his
attorney's misdeeds. Furthermore, the law should not discourage criminally
suspect attorneys from committing to writing their trial preparation materi-
als.
When the police have no reason to suspect the attorney, in most instances
his professional and legal obligations will provide a sufficient safeguard
against loss of evidence. If the attorney is a suspect, however, the presumption
of professional integrity necessarily must yield to the law enforcement interest
in preserving evidence. Not only may the police substitute a search warrant
for a subpoena, but the police also should be allowed to execute it without
inviting the lawyer's assistance. Likewise, a magistrate should not require the
police to risk loss of evidence by exhausting alternative sources before
searching the law office. These proposed safeguards, however, are the only
ones that need be modified in order to protect legitimate law enforcement
interests. All of the other procedures recommended in the preceding section
should be observed, even when the attorney is a suspect, so that his clients can
receive the benefits of their privileges.
The California Approach. This article has proposed relatively substan-
tial modifications of search and seizure procedure. Zurcher suggests that the
Constitution does not require adjustments of this magnitude. If so, the
proposals must be implemented by alternative means. In order to develop the
comprehensive and interdependent procedural framework needed, legislation
is the most desirable approach.
Legislators should consider the recent amendments to the California Penal
Code492 that have been noted throughout this article and that constitute the
only attempt to resolve the problem through legislative modification of search
and seizure procedure. The California legislation contains many commenda-
ble procedures. Essentially, it provides that a special master will execute a
warrant to search for documentary evidence in the office of an attorney,
491. As the Minnesota Supreme Court stated in O'Connor v. Johnson, "we must take care to protect not
only the rights of the client who is suspected of criminal wrongdoing in the case which prompts the search
warrant, but also the rights of all clients of the attorney whose office is being searched." 287 N.W.2d 400,
404 (Minn. 1979) (en banc) (dictum).
492. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524 (West Supp. 1980).
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physician, psychotherapist, or clergyman not suspected of criminal con-
duct.493 The statute requires that a reasonable attempt be made to ensure that
the person in possession or control of the documents (presumably the
attorney in the law office search) is present when the warrant is executed.494
The master must provide the subject of the search with the opportunity to
produce the evidence voluntarily.495 If the subject of the search states that a
document specified in the warrant is privileged or simply confidential,496 the
master must place the item under seal and deliver it to the court.497 Although
law enforcement officials may accompany the master, only the master may
conduct the search itself.498 When material is returned to the court under seal,
a hearing must be conducted within three days if practicable and, if not, at the
earliest possible time.499
California has adopted many of the protections essential to the preserva-
tion of the attorney-client relationship. Significant safeguards, however, have
been omitted. The entire scheme, for example, is flawed because the
California legislature failed to adopt the subpoena preference rule, which
constitutes the best practicable compromise of the competing interests.
Beyond that, none of the procedures applies when the police have a
reasonable suspicion that the attorney is criminally culpable.500 Presumably,
ordinary search and seizure procedures will govern in that instance. As
contended above, limiting special procedures to the nonsuspect attorney will
not adequately protect the attorney-client relationship. Moreover, the
amendments fail to require the submission or approval of a search plan, fail to
direct the magistrate or judge issuing the warrant to focus on whether the
specified documents might be privileged, fail to require the consideration of
alternative sources of evidence, fail to require an enhanced showing of
particularity, and fail to provide an exclusionary rule incidental to the
privileges. Finally, and quite unfortunately, the legislature deleted prior to
passage of the bill a provision requiring that warrants explicitly describe how
the intrusion will be minimized and how privileged items will be protected.5°1
Nonetheless, the California legislation represents a major improvement over
traditional search and seizure procedure. With the modifications suggested in
this article, the California approach easily could provide a model legislative
response to the law office search problem.502
493. Id. § 1524(c)(1), (d). Although this article has focused exclusively on the problems presented by
the law office search, the procedures proposed could be extended to protect other privilege-holders or
institutional third parties.
494. Id. § 1524(c)(3).
495. Id. § 1524(c)(1).
496. The statute uses the phrase "should not be disclosed." Id. § 1524(c)(2).
497. Id.
498. Id. § 1524(c)(1), (e).
499. Id. § 1524(c)(2).
500. Id. § 1524(c).
501. See note 337 supra (setting forth deleted provision of legislation). This provision essentially would
have served the same function as a search plan.
502. But see Minority Objections of Linda Ludlow, Deputy Attorney General of California, to Report,
Exclusionary Rule, supra note 170 (arguing that California legislation is "poorly conceived" and should
not be used as model for other jurisdictions).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The law office search is with us. At the present time, it is unclear whether
the recent incidents are simply chance happenings or precursors of a practice
destined to become more common. 50 3 Past practice suggests that searching an
attorney's office scarcely is essential to effective law enforcement. For that
reason alone, perhaps law enforcement officials will use this tool most
sparingly.
Doubtlessly law enforcement officials will have a continuing and legitimate
need to gain access to information and criminal evidence possessed by
attorneys. In most cases, this need can be satisfied without damaging the
attorney-client relationship if the police serve the attorney with a subpoena,
whether or not legally required. Such an approach would probably have a less
inhibiting effect on client communications and attorney trial preparation than
any possible adjustment to search and seizure procedure. Moreover, quite
apart from any direct threat to the privileges, proceeding by subpoena is
desirable because its operative premise-that the professional integrity of the
bar can be relied upon-should be encouraged. In view of the bar's present
efforts to reconcile its duties to the client with its obligations to the
administration of justice and society, acknowledging that the attorney is an
ethical and conscientious professional has more than symbolic value. As it has
in the past, such an acknowledgement should prove to be a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Even if the subpoena preference rule is rejected, the competing
interests still might be reconciled, though not quite as effectively, by adjusting
search and seizure procedures.
Conceivably, either alternative can be implemented judicially, perhaps
through constitutional interpretation. A legislative solution, however, is
preferable. Unlike the judiciary, legislatures can act before potentially
irreparable harm occurs. As the recent California amendments illustrate, an
aroused legislature can react more expeditiously and effectively than a passive
court. Moreover, the legislature, not restricted to the peculiar and random
factual patterns thrust upon the judiciary, can propound a comprehensive
solution to a complex problem.
The emergence of the law office search has provoked a controversy because
of its threat and novelty. More importantly, however, it presents a challenge
to the bar, to law enforcement agencies, to the judiciary, and to legislatures.
They must resolve the seemingly sharp conflict between important, compet-
ing values. The challenge can be met; the conflict can be resolved without
significant sacrifice to the legitimate interests of either effective law enforce-
ment or the attorney-client relationship.
503. Even with, or perhaps because of, the recent California legislation, the California Court of Appeals
seems convinced that the law office search is not a passing fancy. In declining to pass on the
constitutionality or the effectiveness of the amendments in the abstract, the court noted that "lilt is not
unlikely that these issues will be before the court again .... Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App.
3d 253, 262, 162 Cal. Rptr. 857, 863 (Ct. App. 1980).
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